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ABSTRACT
THE FINANCIALIZATION OF THE NONFINANCIAL
CORPORATION IN THE POST-1970 U.S. ECONOMY
SEPTEMBER 2014
LEILA E. DAVIS, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Peter Skott
This dissertation analyzes the financialization of nonfinancial corporations (NFCs),
emphasizing changes in firm-level financial behavior in the post-1970 U.S. economy.
The dissertation consists of four essays. These essays ask what is the financialization
of NFCs, explore why NFCs have ‘financialized’, and evaluate the implications for
fixed investment behavior. Chapter 2 lays out a simple stylized framework describing
firm-level portfolio choice and utilizes this framework to analyze the implications of
increasing NFC involvement in the provision of financial services, increasingly en-
trenched shareholder value norms, and rising firm-level demand volatility for NFC
financial structure. By articulating underlying determinants of firm-level portfolio
and financing decisions, this chapter isolates specific features of the post-1970 U.S.
economy that can be identified with the ‘financialization’ of nonfinancial corporations,
and links these factors to expected changes in financial structure.
Chapter 3 identifies the key phenomena constituting the financialization of NFCs
via a detailed decomposition of firm-level balance sheets, thereby addressing the ques-
vi
tion of what is the financialization of NFCs. Changes in NFC financial behavior are
reflected in both an increasing share of – largely liquid – financial assets in firm port-
folios, and in changes in the structure of external finance, including increased indebt-
edness and equity repurchases among large firms. Chapter 4 explores the increasing
intertwinement of industry and finance in the case of General Electric, thereby ana-
lyzing in more detail the ‘financialization’ of large firms. This case study exemplifies
important complementarities and interdependence between the industrial and finan-
cial aspects of GE’s business. The shifts in GE’s balance sheet structure towards
greater financial asset holdings, increased indebtedness and a reduction in outstand-
ing equity are, furthermore, consistent with GE’s increased emphasis on ‘creating’
shareholder value and engagement in banking activities since the mid-1980s.
Chapter 5 uses a firm-level panel to econometrically analyze the relationship be-
tween financialization and fixed investment, exploring the implications of changes
in financing behavior, increasingly entrenched shareholder value norms and rising
firm-level demand volatility for NFC investment rates between 1971 and 2011. Both
shareholder value norms and rising volatility are identified as factors associated with
an empirically and economically meaningful decline in NFC investment rates. This
analysis also highlights key firm-size differences, building on the discussion in Chap-
ters 3 and 4. In particular, shareholder value norms are found to primarily influence
the financial decisions and investment behavior of large firms, whereas rising volatility
most substantially impacts small firms.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Finance in the U.S. economy
This dissertation analyzes the recent ‘financialization’ of nonfinancial corporations
(NFCs) in the U.S. economy by exploring the key trends pointing to the ‘financializa-
tion’ of NFCs, laying out determinants underlying observed changes in NFC financial
behavior, and analyzing the implications for fixed investment. The discussion em-
phasizes the role of increasingly entrenched shareholder value norms, rising firm-level
demand volatility, and NFC expansion into the provision of financial services in driv-
ing changes in the portfolio and financing behavior of NFCs in the post-1970 U.S.
economy. Both shareholder value norms and rising firm-level volatility are, further-
more, found to be associated with a decline in fixed investment rates.
This project fits into a growing literature on the ‘financialization’ of the U.S.
economy. Broadly, financialization is often defined as the “increasing role of financial
motives, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domes-
tic and international economies” (Epstein 2005, p. 3). While the precise concept
varies considerably across analyses, the shared underlying premise is that financial
sector growth is indicative of an important structural change over recent decades in
the U.S. economy. The increasingly dominant role of finance in the U.S. macroe-
conomy is evident, for example, in the shares of manufacturing, services, and FIRE
(finance, insurance, and real estate) in total corporate profits over the post-WWII pe-
riod (Krippner 2005, p. 179). From 1950 to 2001, the share of profits earned by FIRE
rose from barely 10% to approximately 45% of total corporate profits, while the share
1
of profits earned by manufacturing declined from approximately 50% to barely 10%.
Service sector profits, less FIRE, account for less than 10% of total corporate profits
for the full post-WWII period.1 Given a concurrent increase in non-financial corpo-
rate income derived from financial sources, these statistics, furthermore, constitute a
lower bound for total financial profits in the U.S. economy.
A structural shift in the U.S. economy towards finance is manifested not only in
growth in the size and scope of the financial sector, but also in the behavior of non-
financial actors and in nonfinancial outcomes.2 With respect to macroeconomic pol-
icy, Epstein (2002) discusses the implications of inflation targeting by central banks.
Che and Sethi (2013) analyze the impact of a specific financial innovation – naked
credit default swaps – on the cost of capital, and find a shift in the terms of lending
against borrowers. At the aggregate level, Skott and Ryoo (2008), Aglietta and Bret-
ton (2001) and van Treeck (2009) analyze the implications of ‘financialization’ for
macroeconomic outcomes and dynamics, and Boyer (2000) analyzes the possibility
of a ‘finance-led’ growth regime. With respect to households, Scott and Pressman
(2009) investigate the impact of rising household debt on household financing and
consumption decisions, and Basu (2011) analyzes the implications of rising household
debt for aggregate growth rates. Focusing on income inequality, Galbraith (2012)
argues that rising inequality in the U.S. is the direct consequence of the expansion
of financial incomes. Emphasizing the opposite direction of causality, Skott (2013)
investigates the role of rising inequality in financial instability. Epstein and Jayadev
(2005) emphasize changes in the functional distribution of income, documenting a
rising ‘rentier’ share of income; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin (2011) also analyze in-
1While finance is a growing source of profits, it is not an employment-intensive sector. Over the
same time period, the relative employment shares of manufacturing, FIRE and services show a dif-
ferent picture of structural change, namely an often-cited growth in the (nonfinancial) service sector.
Again, the relative size of the manufacturing industry declines, but now service-sector employment
largely compensates for the decline in the manufacturing sector.
2Hein and van Treeck (2010) review the literature on financialization in the Keynesian tradition.
2
come shifts into the financial sector. Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) find that
increased reliance among nonfinancial companies on financial earnings is associated
with a decline in the labor share of income.
1.2 A brief review of the existing literature
1.2.1 ‘Financialization’ and capital investment
Economic theories relying on the assumption of efficient financial markets con-
tend that deeper financial markets improve the economy-wide allocation of credit,
with positive implications for capital accumulation (Levine, 1997). Greenwood and
Scharfstein (2013) find growth in financial services since 1980 has been largely con-
centrated in asset management and household credit, and – with respect to asset
management – argue that, “the professionalization of asset management brought sig-
nificant benefits. The main benefit was that it facilitated an increase in financial
market participation and diversification, which likely lowered the cost of capital to
corporations” (p. 6). The financial system provides liquidity, performs risk-sharing
functions, provides information and monitoring, and supports both market-making
and innovation; all of these functions support capital investment among non-financial
actors of the economy. Particularly in light of the 2008 financial crisis, however, the
‘scale’ of finance in the U.S. has received growing attention. The question arises of
‘how big is too big’ with respect to the overall size of the financial system (Epstein
and Crotty, 2013). Cecchetti and Kharoubi (2012) find an inverted-U relationship be-
tween the size of the financial sector and aggregate productivity growth, suggesting
that financial deepening may improve efficiency up to some point, but not beyond.
Furthermore, a growing body of empirical evidence provides support for the con-
tention that a broadly-defined phenomenon of financialization inhibits capital accu-
mulation. Stockhammer (2004) finds that rising rentiers’ income explains roughly one
third of a slowdown in capital investment in the U.S. (p. 736), and van Treeck (2008)
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argues that rising rentier incomes are responsible for a diversion of funds from physical
investment into consumption expenditure. At the firm level, Orhangazi (2008) finds
that higher financial profits earned by nonfinancial companies and higher payments
paid to the financial sector inhibit investment, particularly among large firms.3 The
final chapter of this dissertation analyzes the implications of changes in financing be-
havior, increasingly-entrenched shareholder value norms, and rising firm-level volatil-
ity for firm-level investment, and finds both shareholder value norms and firm-level
volatility to be associated with an economically and statistically-significant decline in
investment rates.
1.2.2 The theory of the firm
A second strand of the literature on financialization, lying more specifically at
the firm level, focuses on changes in corporate governance largely associated with
the shareholder value movement. Since the 1980s, the ‘maximization of shareholder
value’ has become an increasingly dominant ideology driving corporate governance
decisions in the United States. Shareholder value principles contend that agency prob-
lems between shareholders (owners) and managers within nonfinancial corporations
lead to inferior corporate performance (Jensen, 1986, p. 323).4 Accordingly, agency
theory suggests two mechanisms to better-align the interests of managers with those
of shareholders, with the purported effect of improving firm-level efficiency: a hostile
market for corporate control, which ‘disciplines’ managers via a threat to managerial
3In a developing country context, Demir (2008) finds that an increasing rate of return gap between
financial and fixed investment, and growing uncertainty have a statistically significant negative
effect on real investment rates in Argentina, Mexico and Turkey, which has increasingly led firms
to invest in reversible short-term financial capital over long-term fixed investments. Gezici (2007)
similarly finds that financial liberalization in Turkey negatively impacts firm-level real investment
via increasing uncertainty and volatility.
4The agency problem is argued to derive primarily from moral hazard: managers may apply
“insufficient effort”, undertake “extravagant investments”, pursue “entrenchment strategies” to make
themselves indispensible, or exploit expensive perks like private jets or box tickets to ball games
(Tirole 2005 p. 17).
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autonomy (Jensen, 1986 p. 324), and stock-option based executive compensation,
which directly links managerial pay to the firm’s stock market performance (Jensen
and Murphy, 1990).5
A growing literature contends, however, that shareholder value ideology is detri-
mental both for firm performance and for aggregate outcomes. The critique lies along
various dimensions. Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) and Lazonick (2009) argue that
the shareholder value movement corresponds to a shift in business model from a strat-
egy of “retain and reinvest” (retain workers and reinvest earnings in the firm’s growth
and innovative capacity) to “downsize and distribute” (downsizing of the corporate
workforce and distribution of earnings), adversely impacting long-term employment
and ‘sustainable prosperity’ in the United States. Stout (2012) emphasizes the in-
creasing power of short-term shareholders (largely, institutional investors) relative
to long-term shareholders, resulting in “corporate myopia” (p. 65). Stockhammer
(2004) relates the shift in corporate governance strategy to capital accumulation, and
argues that the increasing emphasis of managers on ‘shareholder value’ has led to a
decline in desired investment rates at the firm level.
These developments in firm orientation and corporate governance strategy have
been summarized by a growing ‘portfolio conception’ of the nonfinancial firm, char-
acterized by an increasing orientation by NFCs towards financial markets (Fligstein,
1990; Crotty, 2005). Changes in the conception of the firm are characterized by a
shift,
“from an implicit acceptance of the Chandlerian view of the large NFC
as an integrated, coherent combination of relatively illiquid real assets
5Interestingly, this literature on agency problems in many ways represents a disavowal of the
Modigliani-Miller view of the firm. Famously, the Modigliani-Miller theorem says that—in an envi-
ronment of complete markets, no transaction costs and no other ‘distortions’ (such as taxes)—the
financial structure of the firm is irrelevant to the firm’s performance (Modigliani and Miller, 1958).
Tirole (2005) writes that the Modigliani-Miller theorem “acted as a detonator for the theory of
corporate finance” (p. 1), while the introduction of agency theory to discussions of the firm has
re-raised issues of corporate governance and financial behavior.
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assembled to pursue long-term growth and innovation, to a ‘financial’
conception in which the NFC is a ‘portfolio’ of liquid subunits that home-
office management must continually restructure to maximize the stock
price at every point in time” (Crotty, 2005, p. 88).
These changes in the conception of the firm are embedded in larger shifts in the
institutional context within which NFCs operate, including the growth of institutional
investors, changes in corporate tax law making stock-option based executive pay tax
deductible, an active market for managerial talent, and the corporate takeover market.
1.3 Dissertation outline
This dissertation is structured in four essays. These essays ask what is the finan-
cialization of the nonfinancial corporation in the U.S. economy, explore why NFCs
have ‘financialized’, and evaluate the implications for domestic fixed investment be-
havior. The analysis emphasizes shareholder value norms and rising firm-level volatil-
ity as two key characteristics of the post-1970 period in the U.S. economy that underlie
changes in firm-level portfolio and financing decisions and that are, in particular, as-
sociated with a decline in fixed investment rates, and also emphasizes the expansion
of nonfinancial companies into banking activities. Because the dissertation is format-
ted as essays, rather than as a single manuscript, some overlap between the chapters
is necessary to motivate each chapter as a free-standing essay. This is particularly
true in the introductions to each chapter and, for example, in the final econometric
chapter on investment, which utilizes the framework originally laid out in the first
chapter.
The analysis in this project lies at the firm level, which allows for a detailed anal-
ysis of firm behavior. The dissertation emphasizes the question of why nonfinancial
corporations in the U.S. have changed their behavior in such a sustained way over re-
cent decades such that U.S. NFCs are increasingly oriented towards and intertwined
with financial markets. In doing so, this dissertation builds on the existing litera-
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ture, in which the behavioral changes that have led to an increasingly ‘financialized’
firm remain largely unexplored. This elaboration of the behavioral mechanisms un-
derlying trends in firm-level behavior has important implications for macroeconomic
analysis as well; by articulating specific behavioral mechanisms, the analysis can
help to inform analyses of aggregate trends in capital accumulation, rising nonfinan-
cial corporate debt and cash holdings in the U.S. economy. The firm-level analysis
furthermore allows for a decomposition of the sector, and the findings emphasize
systematic differences between small and large firms.
1.3.1 The financialization of nonfinancial firms and a portfolio approach
to firm behavior
Chapter 2 identifies three factors specific to the post-1980 period in the U.S.
potentially driving firm changes in NFC financial behavior, and links these changes to
firm-level portfolio and financing decisions, utilizing a simple conceptual framework
describing firm-level balance sheets and financial decisions. First, there has been
a shift in NFC activity towards greater involvement by ‘non’-financial companies
in banking activities; second, increasingly entrenched shareholder value norms are
associated with changes in managerial objectives towards greater emphasis on short-
term stock market-based indicators of performance; and third, increased firm-level
volatility has changed the constraints subject to which managers make portfolio and
financing decisions. These three factors are themes that reappear throughout the
dissertation. By identifying three factors specific to the post-1970 U.S. economy
that can be directly linked to changes in firm-level financial behavior, this chapter
augments the existing literature, in which financialization is generally proxied by
rising flows of financial income between NFCs and the financial sector — an approach
that raises the question of why NFC behavior changed specifically in the post-1970
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period so as to generate significant increases in, for example, the financial profits
earned by NFCs.
1.3.2 What is the ‘financialization’ of the nonfinancial corporation?
Chapter 3 develops the concept of ‘financialization’ at the level of the nonfinancial
corporation by laying out the key stylized facts describing changes in NFC financial
behavior between 1950 and 2011 via a detailed decomposition of firm-level balance
sheets. As with the definition of financialization more broadly, the concept of the
‘financialization of nonfinancial firms’ is ambiguous, reflecting the wide range of phe-
nomena explored in the existing literature. Thus, in laying out these key stylized
facts, this chapter contributes to the literature on financialization by systematically
outlining the key trends in firm-level financial behavior that, first, point to the ‘finan-
cialization’ of NFCs and, second, that need to be explained. The analysis points to
sustained changes in the portfolio and financing behavior of NFCs over the post-1980
period, summarized by an increased share of financial assets held in NFC portfolios,
increasing indebtedness and equity repurchases among large firms, and simultane-
ous de-leveraging among small firms. Together, these trends point to the growing
‘financialization’ of nonfinancial corporations. Finally, the chapter briefly discusses
the interdependence of these observed trends in NFC portfolio and financing behav-
ior, and the insights that stand to be gained by analyzing these stylized facts in a
conceptual framework that emphasizes the ways in which changes occurring across
NFC balance sheets are linked. These links were also highlighted in the framework
discussed in Chapter 2.
1.3.3 A case study of General Electric: links between finance and indus-
try in a nonfinancial corporation
To explore in more detail the case of large firms, Chapter 4 explores interactions
between industry and finance in a case study of General Electric. Articulating the
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story of a particular firm, which both has a large financing arm and is often cited
in regard to the shareholder value movement, helps elaborate mechanisms underly-
ing the large-sample descriptive discussion of large firms. As a result of dramatic
expansion in its financial services division, GE Capital, since the mid-1980s, GE has
increasingly operated as a conglomerate combining industry with finance. Simultane-
ously, there is a shift in GE’s balance sheet structure towards greater financial asset
holdings, a dramatic expansion in outstanding debt, and a reduction in outstanding
equity. These changes are consistent both with involvement in banking activities
and with shareholder value orientation. The case study of GE, furthermore, exem-
plifies important complementarities between the industrial and financial aspects of
GE’s business. Between 1985 and the mid-2000’s, GE’s financial arm supported the
industrial business, but also depended upon the industrial business – both its credit
rating and the fact that GE was regulated as an industrial rather than a financial
firm – to grow. By analyzing the specific case of GE, it is possible to clearly distin-
guish changes in GE’s behavior that resulted in an increasingly financial orientation,
and to isolate two specific factors – shareholder value orientation and engagement in
financial services – driving changes in GE’s balance sheet structure.
1.3.4 ‘Financialization’ and firm-level fixed investment
In turn, the observed changes in the portfolio and financing behavior of NFCs raise
the question of accompanying changes in fixed investment behavior. Using a firm-
level panel, Chapter 5 econometrically analyzes NFC investment behavior, exploring
the implications of changes in financing behavior, increasingly entrenched shareholder
value norms, and rising firm-level demand volatility for investment between 1971 and
2011. Again, both shareholder value norms and firm-level volatility are, in particular,
identified as two characteristics specific to the post-1970 U.S. economy that are asso-
ciated with an economically and statistically significant decline in investment rates.
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The analysis also reiterates and highlights the firm-size differences laid out in Chap-
ter 3. In particular, the implications of shareholder value norms for fixed investment
are primarily limited to large NFCs, while rising volatility most substantially im-
pacts small firms. In identifying an empirical relationship between fixed investment
and both shareholder value norms and firm-level volatility, this chapter isolates two
factors specific to the recent period of financialization in the U.S. economy that un-
derlie the rising flows of financial income between nonfinancial corporations and the
financial sector that are generally used as indicators of financialization in the existing
literature on financial-sector growth and fixed investment.
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CHAPTER 2
UNDERLYING DETERMINANTS OF THE
FINANCIALIZATION OF NONFINANICAL
CORPORATIONS IN THE POST-1980 U.S. ECONOMY
2.1 Introduction
Within the literature on the ‘financialization’ of the U.S. economy, there has been
growing emphasis in recent years on the ‘financialization’ of non-financial actors, in-
cluding nonfinancial corporations (NFCs). The growth of finance in the post-1980
U.S. economy is exemplified by a sustained increase in the share of financial-sector
profits in total corporate profits (Krippner, 2012). Over the same time period, NFCs
also derive a growing proportion of profits from financial sources, such that growth
in financial profits extends beyond that directly captured by the profits of financial
institutions. Accordingly, the financialization of the U.S. economy is not limited to
changes in the size and structure of the financial sector, but is also manifested in
changes in the behavior of nonfinancial corporations. This financialization of NFCs
has, furthermore, been linked to nonfinancial outcomes, including investment (Stock-
hammer, 2004, 2006; Orhangazi, 2008; Davis, 2013), distribution and income dynam-
ics (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2011; Epstein and Jayadev, 2005), and employment
(Lazonick, 2009).
A precise definition of the financialization of the U.S. economy remains nebulous,
and this ambiguity also extends to the financialization of nonfinancial firms. All
definitions of the financialization of NFCs share, however, an emphasis on either
an increasingly complex relationship between NFCs and financial markets, or on a
stronger orientation of NFCs to financial measures of performance. Thus, Orhangazi
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(2008) uses the concept quite broadly to “designate the changes that have taken place
in the relationship between the non-financial corporate sector and financial markets”
(p. 3). Stockhammer (2004) defines ‘financialization’ by “the engagement of non-
financial businesses in financial markets...[where] financial activities are interpreted
as reflecting a shift in the firm’s objectives and a rising influence of shareholder
interests in the firm” (p. 721). Lazonick (2012) discusses the ‘financialization’ of
corporate resource allocation, stemming from the fact that companies are increasingly
evaluated by financial measures, such as earnings per share, rather than by the goods
and services they produce. Crotty (2005) discusses the “portfolio conception” of the
firm: as short-term goals have been prioritized above long-term growth objectives,
NFCs are increasingly viewed as bundles of assets rather than as capital-accumulating
enterprises. Furthermore, a significant strand of the literature on financialization
accords a primary role to the shareholder value movement in explaining both the
‘financialization’ of the U.S. economy more broadly, as well as related changes in
firm behavior (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Stockhammer, 2004; Davis, 2009). In
particular, shareholder value orientation is often associated with a change in corporate
strategy from one aimed to “retain [workers] and reinvest [corporate profits]” to one
aimed to “downsize [the workforce] and distribute [profits to shareholders]” (Lazonick
and O’Sullivan, 2000).
With the exception of changes in corporate strategy stemming from the share-
holder value movement, however, the existing literature on the financialization of
NFCs has not clearly linked observed outcomes, such as higher financial profits earned
by nonfinancial companies or a growing portfolio share of financial assets, to specific
changes in firm behavior underlying these outcomes. The implications of shareholder
value orientation have, similarly, not been systematically linked to changes in firm
financial behavior. Financialization is generally captured by rising financial flows be-
tween NFCs (or the nonfinancial corporate sector) and the financial sector and, while
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these indicators capture dramatic changes in, for example, where profits accrue in
the post-1980 U.S. economy, they also raise further questions. Specifically, what has
changed in NFC decision-making — for example, in managerial objectives, or in the
constraints subject to which financial decisions are made — such that a break in firm
behavior occurs specifically in the post-1980 period in the U.S.? These underlying
determinants have important implications for understanding the relationship between
‘financialization’ and NFC outcomes. For instance, the implication of higher lever-
age (with, correspondingly, higher interest payments) for fixed investment is likely to
differ if firms borrow to acquire fixed capital, to repurchase outstanding stock, or to
fund banking divisions.
This chapter identifies three factors specific to the post-1980 period in the U.S.
potentially driving changes in NFC financial behavior, and links these changes to
firm-level portfolio and financing decisions using a simple framework describing firm-
level portfolio choice. First, there has been a shift in activity towards the increasing
involvement of (large) ‘non’-financial companies in the provision of financial services
— i.e. borrowing and lending for profit. Second, increasingly entrenched shareholder
value norms are associated with changing managerial objectives, and increased em-
phasis on stock market-based firm performance targets. Third, increased firm-level
volatility reflects changing constraints subject to which NFCs make decisions. By
laying out a simple framework describing firm-level portfolio and financing behavior,
this chapter explores links between behavioral changes associated with each of these
factors and observed changes in NFC financial structure since the 1980s, which in-
clude an increased share of financial assets in firm portfolios, growing indebtedness
and equity repurchases among large firms, and concurrent de-leveraging among small
firms; these trends are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. For example, increased in-
volvement in banking activities – whereby firms first borrow in order to lend out funds
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for financial profits – is reflected in both a larger portfolio share of financial assets
and higher leverage.
These factors are neither proposed as jointly nor mutually exclusive explanations
of changes in firm behavior in the post-1980 U.S. economy; other factors, including
technological changes and increasingly globalized production chains, are also likely
to be part of a full explanation of documented changes in firm behavior. However,
identifying three particular factors underlying changes in NFC portfolio and financing
decisions opens a discussion aimed at explaining the changes in NFC behavior that
have yielded an increasingly ‘financialized’ nonfinancial firm. The factors laid out
in this chapter are themes that are then revisited throughout the dissertation. The
chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 discusses concepts of financialization
utilized in the existing literature, and argues that a discussion detailing changes in firm
behavior is complementary to the existing literature on financialization and NFCs;
Section 2.3 lays out a stylized framework describing firm-level balance sheet structure
and portfolio choice; Section 2.4 discusses, within this framework, how financing
activities, shareholder value motives and rising firm-level volatility are consistent
with observed changes in NFC balance sheet structure; and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Concepts of financialization in the existing literature
2.2.1 Identifying the ‘financialization’ of the U.S. economy
While specific concepts of financialization differ considerably across analyses, the
phenomenon is perhaps most often defined as the “increasing role of financial mo-
tives, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and
international economies” (Epstein, 2005, p. 3). As this definition covers considerable
ground, a wide range of implications and phenomena are carried under its umbrella.
Nonetheless, clear and systematic evidence of ‘financialization’ at the level of the
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U.S. macroeconomy is evident in growth in financial profits and in the magnitude of
financial flows, both within and across sectors.
Krippner (2005, 2012) documents both an increase in the share of financial-sector
profits in total corporate profits and an increase in financially-derived income earned
by the nonfinancial corporate sector in the post-1970 U.S. economy. Beginning in
the 1970s and accelerating during the 1980s, the share of profits earned by finance,
insurance and real estate (FIRE) rises from barely 10% to approximately 45% of total
corporate profits by 2001. The share of profits earned by manufacturing concurrently
declines from 50% to barely 10% of total corporate profits; service-sector profits, non-
inclusive of financial services, account for less than 10% of corporate profits for the
full post-WWII period.1 Epstein and Jayadev (2005), similarly, find evidence of the
growing financialization of the U.S. economy (as well as other OECD economies) in
a rising ‘rentier share’ of national income since the mid-1970s, where rentiers’ income
is defined as profits earned by financial firms – including banks, stockbrokers and
insurance companies – and interest income from the rest of the private economy (p.
50).
As evidence of financialization, Krippner points not only to an increased share
of financial profits in total corporate profits in the U.S. macroeconomy, but also to
the increased importance of financial revenue for nonfinancial businesses since the
early 1970s.2 The ratio of portfolio income to corporate cash flow – where portfolio
1Thus, Krippner defines financialization, “as a pattern of accumulation in which profit-making
occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production”
(Krippner, 2005, p. 181). Importantly, Krippner emphasizes that financialization is most evident
through this profit-based lens of identifying structural change: FIRE grows as a share of national
income over the same period, but is essentially matched as a share of GDP by non-financial services.
Furthermore, because finance is an employment-unintensive sector, employment-based measures of
structural change do not register substantial growth in finance.
2There is substantial evidence of rising flows of financial income both within and across other
sectors of the economy as well. Montecino et al (2014) find that intra-financial lending as a share
of total financial lending has grown nearly five-fold since the early 1950s. By 2007, intra-financial
sector lending is found to account for nearly half of all financial sector lending, as compared with
approximately 10% between 1950 and 1980. These intra-financial lending statistics, which would
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income is defined as interest income, dividend income and realized capital gains – for
nonfinancial business also begins to increase during the 1970s and accelerates during
the 1980s, then stabilizing at approximately five times the level of the initial post-
WWII decades of the 1950s and 1960s (Krippner, 2012, p. 184). As such, Krippner
(2005) argues that an understanding of financialization requires “both a sectoral and
an extra-sectoral perspective” (p 181): growth of finance in the U.S. economy is
“reflected in the expansion of banks, brokerage houses, finance companies and the
like, but equally it is reflected in the behaviour of non-financial firms” (p. 182).
While the growth in NFC portfolio income documented by Krippner at the sector
level captures that NFC financial behavior has changed since the early 1970s, the
index cannot capture specific ways in which firm behavior has changed. Thus, by
systematically defining the process of structural change that has occurred in the U.S.
economy, Krippner’s analysis raises important new questions about the changes in
firm behavior underlying the documented trends.
2.2.2 ‘Financialization’ and NFC investment behavior
While this section does not present an exhaustive literature review, a detailed dis-
cussion of a few influential papers that analyze the ‘financialization’ of NFCs – and,
in particular, the implications for fixed investment – clarifies both what has been
done in the literature, and the key questions raised by this existing work. Financial
flow-based indicators of financialization are common across the existing empirical lit-
erature on financialization and investment. At the firm level, Orhangazi (2008) finds
that increased payments by NFCs to the financial sector, and increased financial
profits earned by NFCs constrain fixed investment, particularly among large firms.
be masked in sector-level statistics, provide further evidence of a vast expansion in financial flows
pointing to the financialization of the U.S. economy. There is, furthermore, evidence of rising
financial flows between finance and households, clearly manifested in an expansion in household
leverage and interest payments leading up to the financial crisis in 2008 (Cynamon and Fazzari,
2008).
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Empirically, NFC payments to the financial sector are defined as the sum of interest
payments, dividend payments and own stock repurchases; and financial profits are
defined as the sum of NFC interest and dividend income. Both measures are found to
be negatively associated with fixed investment rates; thus, the empirical analysis cap-
tures systematic negative relationships between fixed investment and increased flows
between NFCs and the financial sector.3 From these results, Orhangazi concludes
that there is a negative relationship between financialization and fixed investment (p.
882). However, the fact that these financial flows stem from firm decisions to acquire
financial assets, or to borrow, repurchase stock or pay dividends, raises the question
of why NFCs changed their portfolio and financing behavior over the post-1970 period
in the U.S. such that these indicators rose in a dramatic and sustained way. Why
have NFCs ‘financialized’?
Given that firms make investment decisions subject to a finance constraint, the
decision to invest is inherently interdependent with the decision of how to finance that
investment, as well as with the decision not to allocate that finance towards another
use – for example, to acquire financial assets or to finance (discretionary) shareholder
payouts.4 As such, financial profits and NFC payments to the financial sector are en-
dogenous to the investment decision, and – as an explanation of the ‘financialization’
of NFCs – cannot isolate what has changed in the post-1970 economy such that firms
have changed their financial behavior in a sustained way. The behavioral motivations
that underlie the changes in NFC portfolio and financing behavior are important for
3Similarly to Orhangazi, Van Treeck’s (2008) investment specification captures shareholder value
orientation via the inclusion of interest and dividend payments, which are both found to have a
statistically significant negative effect on capital accumulation. The fact that the strength of the
effect of dividends on investment exceeds the strength of the effect of interest payments is taken as
evidence of shareholder value orientation among managers.
4Note that, while interest obligations are contractual, both repurchases and dividends (or the
retention rate) are discretionary for a firm’s managers.
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interpreting the relationship between investment and income flows between NFCs and
the financial sector.
Consider, for example, an increase in NFC payments to the financial sector that
reflect higher interest payments deriving from an increase in leverage. On the one
hand, increased interest payments draw (by definition) on the pool of available funds
and, therefore, come at a short-run tradeoff with other uses of funds, including physi-
cal investment. On the other hand, higher leverage — and the corresponding increase
in interest payments — is itself the result of a firm’s decision to borrow in pursuit
of some objective: for example, financing fixed investment to grow or earn profits,
financing repurchases to target a stock price increase, or covering rising interest obli-
gations. Importantly, the implications for fixed investment are expected to vary with
this motivation. Thus, high leverage can reflect very different factors – borrowing to
invest in an attractive capital investment project differs from borrowing to buyback
stock.
Further research of the financialization of NFCs, therefore, requires analysis of
the changes in NFC behavior that have driven observed trends. As noted in the
introduction, the primary behavioral channel that has been elaborated in the exist-
ing literature derives from a shift in corporate governance norms associated with the
growing entrenchment of shareholder value ideology in the U.S. economy (Lazonick
and O’Sullivan, 2000; Davis, 2009; Froud et al., 2006). Arising out of the appli-
cation of agency theory to firms, shareholder value ideology contends that agency
problems between shareholders (owners) and a firm’s management lead to inferior
corporate performance. Subsequently, norms supporting the ‘maximization of share-
holder value’ by managers have become increasingly entrenched via wide-reaching
institutional changes including, for example, changes in the structure of stock owner-
ship, wherein shareholding is increasingly dominated by large institutional investors
that hold shares for short periods of time — a marked departure from an earlier pe-
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riod dominated by long-term household-level stockholding (Stout, 2012). Shareholder
value ideology, in turn, establishes returning value to shareholders – largely via an
appreciating stock price – to be the primary goal of firm performance.
Stockhammer (2004) develops a theoretical framework that analyzes the implica-
tions of shareholder value orientation for investment, arguing that, since the early
1980s, managerial interests have become increasingly aligned with those of sharehold-
ers, such that managerial priorities have shifted from growth-maximizing to profit-
maximizing objectives. The theoretical specification emphasizes the separation be-
tween ownership and control (Crotty, 1990) and, accordingly, differing preferences of
managers and shareholders: prior to the entrenchment of shareholder value ideology,
managers maximize firm growth (the investment rate), despite owners’ preference for
profit maximization. The investment decision in Stockhammer’s framework, pictured
in Figure 2.1, is determined by managerial objectives, the firm’s finance constraint
and the firm’s growth-profit trade-off. The finance constraint defines the maximum
level of growth that can be financed by a given rate of profit (gFC), and the firm is as-
sumed to operate on the concave portion of its output-expansion function (rRG), such
that additional investment harms profits — i.e. there is a ‘growth-profit tradeoff’.5
In managerial capitalism managers maximize the investment rate, which is limited
by the finance frontier (gMF ). With shareholder value orientation, managerial priori-
ties become increasingly aligned with those of shareholders. Thus, managers become
increasingly profit-oriented and their utility functions rotate, reflecting the increas-
ing alignment of managerial preferences with those of owners. The consequence of
5The specification of the finance constraint is based on the premise that internal and external
funding differs for the firm such that managers are only willing to accept a given leverage rate
(borrowers’ risk), and banks provide credit to firms that are already profitable, taking the current
profit rate as a proxy for a firm’s ‘reliability’ (lenders’ risk); thus, investment, which depends on
available finance, depends on the profit rate. The concave portion of the growth-profit tradeoff
reflects growing managerial inefficiency associated with excessively fast growth of the firm, the
‘Penrose effect’.
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Figure 2.1: The investment decision in Stockhammer (2004)
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Source: Adapted from Stockhammer (2004); r is the profit rate and g is the investment (growth)
rate, gFC is the finance constraint; rRG is the growth-profit tradeoff; UO is the utility function
of owners (defined as UO = u(r)), and UM is the utility function of managers. With the shift
from managerial capitalism to shareholder value orientation, managerial utility functions shift from
UM = u(g) to UM = u(g, r). Investment declines from g
MF (growth in the managerial firm) to gSF
(growth in the shareholder-oriented firm), and profit rates rise from rMF to rSF .
shareholder value orientation is, thus, a decline in the firms’ desired investment rate
(gSF ).
This decline in the firm’s investment rate relies on an increasingly ‘profit-maximizing’
orientation among managers. However, maximizing shareholder returns need not be
equivalent with profit maximization. Shareholder value orientation among managers
is in large part a consequence of pay packages linking managerial compensation with
the stock price, suggesting that value-maximizing objectives are geared towards stock
price maximization, and empirical evidence suggests that since the 1980s shareholder
payouts have increasingly taken the form of stock price increases (i.e. capital gains)
rather than growth in dividend payments (Grullon and Michaely, 2002). If the stock
price is a key indicator of shareholder value, two identical firms earning the same
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profits could generate different ‘shareholder returns’ depending on their financial pol-
icy and payout behavior: if one firm repurchases stock, then by decreasing the total
stock of outstanding equity, the per-share price increases. Then, despite equivalent
profitability, the manager of the firm that has repurchased stock appears to have
more successfully improved stock-market performance and ‘shareholder value’ than
the one that paid out dividends; thus, growing shareholder value orientation is not
clearly identified with a shift to profit-maximizing objectives. This issue is addressed
in more detail in Section 2.4.2.
Furthermore, the framework does not incorporate that changes in investment be-
havior (the desired growth rate) have accompanying implications for a firm’s portfolio
and financing decisions and, thus, for the position of the finance constraint. Increased
managerial orientation towards shareholder value is likely to have implications for a
firm’s financial decisions including, for example, either a higher distribution of profits
(a lower retention rate) or an increase in share buybacks. Hein and van Treeck (2010)
note that these changes in financial behavior are reflected in downward shifts in the
finance constraint (gFC). With respect to the position of the firm’s constraints, it is
also important to consider interactions between micro-level behavior and macro-level
outcomes. If each individual firm moves along its output-expansion frontier to a lower
investment rate, aggregate demand falls: thus, “an individual firm may face a per-
ceived trade-off but this perceived trade-off does not extend to the macroeconomic
level: changes in accumulation and financial behaviour affect aggregate demand and
thereby the position of the frontier” (Skott and Ryoo, 2008, p. 834). While this ag-
gregation issue may not be vital for specifying the behavior of an individual firm, the
empirical application of the model extends the firm-level framework to an aggregate
setting.
Thus, despite the emphasis on shareholder value orientation in driving changes
in firm behavior in the existing literature, the precise channels through which these
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changes are manifested in NFC behavior remain incompletely defined. The existing
literature captures that changes in NFC behavior have occurred making NFCs more
intertwined with financial markets and more oriented towards financial indicators of
firm performance; however, a detailed behavioral story remains to be filled in.
2.3 A simple stylized framework: NFC portfolio decisions
This section develops a stylized framework describing the investment and financ-
ing behavior of an individual firm, which summarizes the determinants of the firm’s
investment and financing decisions. By laying out the factors describing the firm’s
decisions to invest in fixed capital, and to acquire financial assets and debt, this
framework can be used to analyze determinants underlying observed changes in firm
financial behavior over the post-1970 period in the U.S. economy. As such, this frame-
work can be used to approach the question of why firms have changed their financial
behavior over the post-1970 period so as to yield an increasingly ‘financialized’ or
‘financially-oriented’ firm.
2.3.1 The finance constraint
Consider a stylized depiction of a firm that can invest in two types of assets – fixed,
tangible capital (K) and financial assets (M). The firm’s total wealth is, therefore,
captured by its total assets (A), where A = K + M . The firm’s acquisitions of new
assets are financed by a combination of internal funds – defined as the profits earned
on both fixed and financial capital less shareholder payouts and interest payments
– and external finance, where external finance derives from debt (D) and proceeds
from new equity issues (νN). Importantly, a firm’s portfolio decisions involve not
only a choice about where to invest (fixed or financial capital), but also a choice
about how to finance that investment; thus, a firm’s portfolio and financing decisions
are intrinsically linked.
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The firm’s finance constraint, which equates the firm’s uses and sources of funds,
can then, therefore, be expressed as:
pII + M˙ +Div + i
debtD = P + idepM + νN˙ + D˙ (2.1)
where a dot over a variable denotes a time rate of change. The firm’s uses of funds
include the acquisition of new physical capital (K˙ = I, where pI is the price of the
investment good), new financial assets (M), dividend payments to shareholders (Div),
and interest payments on outstanding debt (idebtD, where idebt is the firm’s cost of
borrowing). The firm’s sources of funds include profits earned on fixed capital (P ,
where P = rK and r is the profit rate on capital), returns earned on financial assets
(idepM , where idep is the financial profit rate), new share issues (N˙ new shares at a
price of ν per share), and new borrowing (D˙).
Equation 2.1 highlights the endogeneity of indicators of financialization based on
income flows with respect to the investment decision. Financial profits (idepM), for
example, depend on the outstanding stock of financial assets (M), which is a portfolio
choice. Normalizing pI to one for simplicity, and writing Div = (1− sf )(P + idepM −
idebtD) (following Skott and Ryoo, 2008; Lavoie, 1992) where sf is the retention rate,
the finance constraint can be written:
I + M˙ = sf (P + i
depM − idebtD) + νN˙ + D˙ (2.2)
Equation 2.2 highlights that that new assets acquired – the sum of new fixed and
financial capital – are equivalent to the sum of retained earnings and new external
finance.
2.3.2 The firm’s desired stock of capital in a static setting
A simple maximization problem is illustrative in laying out the baseline determi-
nants of the firm’s financial decisions. First consider the firm’s decision to invest in
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fixed capital. To do so, it is instructive to begin by laying out the determinants of the
firm’s desired level of the capital stock (K∗) in a very simplified, static setting that
does not incorporate financing considerations. To begin, the firm’s objective function
is taken as given. The objective function may depend on various arguments, such as
profits, sales, or CEO pay, and these objectives may, furthermore, vary based on the
institutional context in which the firm operates. In particular, a transition to increas-
ingly ‘shareholder value’-oriented objectives will be discussed below. As a baseline
scenario, however, it is assumed that the firm maximizes profits, where profits are
standardly defined as:6
Π = pY − wL− cK (2.3)
The firm is assumed to be a price-taker in factor input markets, such that the wage
(w) and the cost of capital (c) are exogenous to the individual firm; this assump-
tion regarding the cost of capital will be relaxed below. On the other hand, due to
imperfect competition in product markets, the firm is not a price taker in goods mar-
kets and, therefore, faces a (firm-specific) demand curve that defines the relationship
between the price the firm earns from the sale of its output (p) and its output (Y ):
Y d = Bp−γ (2.4)
where B > 0 and γ > 1. The parameter γ, which captures the firm’s elasticity
of demand, is taken to be constant, and the parameter B captures the position of
the demand curve. The restrictions on the demand curve imply that it is downward
sloping and convex.
6Of course, firms do not directly maximize objective functions; however, strict maximization is
not necessary here for the qualitative discussion to hold. The main point is that firms engage in
‘goal-oriented’ behavior (Skott, 2012).
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For simplicity, the firm’s production technology can be described by a Leontief
form of the production function:
Y = F (K,L) = min{µL, σK} (2.5)
where µ and σ are technological parameters that capture labor productivity and
capital productivity, respectively. The firm’s desired level of capital in this static
one-period setting can, thus, be derived from the firm’s profit maximization problem.
This maximization exercise is useful in that it lays out the key parameters defining
the firm’s desired capital stock in any given period. Assuming monopoly power such
that there are barriers to entry, the firm chooses capital (K) and labor (L) so as to
maximize profits, where – using Equations 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 – profits can be written:
Π = B1/γ(σK)(γ−1)/γ − wσ
µ
K − cK (2.6)
Thus, the first order condition defining the firm’s desired capital stock (K∗) is:
∂Π
∂K
= B1/γ(σ)(γ−1)/γ(
γ − 1
γ
)[K∗]−1/γ − (wσ
µ
+ c) = 0 (2.7)
and the firm’s desired capital stock is:
K∗ = (
γ − 1
γ
)γBσγ−1(w
σ
µ
+ c)−γ (2.8)
Therefore, K∗, in a static setting with imperfect competition, given input costs, and
given technology is determined by the parameters that define the demand function
(B and γ) and unit factor costs (w σ
µ
+ c):
K∗ = K∗(B, γ, w
σ
µ
+ c) (2.9)
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K∗ defines the level of the capital stock that the profit-maximizing firm would ideally
hold, given current demand conditions and factor costs, if it were able to costlessly
and immediately adjust its capital stock to its desired level.
2.3.3 The investment decision
The investment decision is, however, inherently dynamic, and adjustment of the
capital stock is not costless. This non-flexibility of the capital stock derives, for ex-
ample, from the irreversibility of investment, and time lags between the investment
decision and implementation of new capacity (Skott, 1989; Crotty, 1992).7 Invest-
ment, therefore, takes the form of a stock adjustment from the current and towards
the desired stock of capital:
K˙ = λ(K∗ −K) (2.10)
where K∗ = K∗(B, γ, w σ
µ
+ c), and λ captures the speed of adjustment of the capital
stock.
With adjustment costs in the evolution of the capital stock it is, furthermore,
expected that the firm will hold excess capital capacity. Firms operate at less than
full capacity for various reasons, including, for example, to deter entry of new firms,
or to grant themselves flexibility to increase production in the case of an increase
7Thus, the non-flexibility of the capital stock does not derive from the standard neoclassical
assumption of convex adjustment costs (Skott, 1989), which imply that it is not only costly to adjust
the capital stock, but also that the cost of adjustment is increasing in the size of the investment:
“...it is not reasonable to suppose that costs are convex as a function of the size of the
program. On the contrary, one would expect important indivisibilities and increasing
returns: (i) the unit cost of new capacity may be smaller for a completely new and
purpose-built factory than for marginal additions and modifications to existing plant;
(ii) there may be fixed costs associated with the installation of new machinery...(iii)
information and learning by doing make the costs of installing two machines...less than
double the costs of installing only one” (p. 91).
Indivisibilities of the capital stock at the firm level imply ‘lumpiness’ in the adjustment of the
capital stock, such that the adjustment process is not necessarily ‘smooth’ as expressed in Equation
2.10; this caveat does not, however, affect the qualitative conclusions.
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in demand.8 Excess capacity implies that σ˜ < σ, where σ is the firm’s maximum
(technologically-determined) amount of output that can be produced with a given
stock of capital, and σ˜ is capital productivity when the firm’s capital stock is utilized
at its desired rate. On the other hand, assuming no labor hoarding, such that the firm
does not hire excess labor and that all workers hired by the firm are ‘fully employed’,
Y = µL. Thus, the production function can be expressed as Y = µL < σ˜K.9
While the parameters B and γ capture the firm’s demand conditions, the demand
curve is unobservable to the firm.10 In each period, however, the firm does observe a
particular point on its demand curve, defined by the current combination of the price
(p) at which it is selling its product and the level of output (Y ), which signal the
current demand conditions facing the firm. Because future demand is unknown at
the time of the investment decision, the firm uses this information regarding current
demand to make determinations about the expected profitability of additions to the
capital stock. For given unit costs, expected profitability can, therefore, be summa-
rized by the combination of the firm’s current profit share of income (pi = P/Y , where
P denotes profits) and current output (Y ), which together capture the demand condi-
tions facing the firm. Since in practice recent experience is likely to be an important
determinant of current expectations regarding future demand, current profitability
and output are taken to signal expected future demand.
8The use of excess capacity to deter entry assumes that entry willingness depends on the amount of
excess capacity among existing firms; thus, excess capacity deters entry as it “signals the willingness
of the firm to defend its position – should new entry take place – by expanding production and
cutting prices” (Skott, 1989, p. 53).
9With excess capacity and adjustment costs, the firm’s maximization problem changes slightly.
Given that the capital stock cannot be costlessly adjusted, the firm chooses the current level of
production (Y ) so as to maximize profits (Π = pY − wL), where the current capital stock is fixed.
The level of production (Y ∗) that is determined by this maximization problem determines K∗, and
K∗ is defined as a function of the same parameters as above.
10It can be assumed that the firm has a conjectured price elasticity of demand for its product,
such that it forms expectations regarding the position of the curve (defined by B), for a given price
elasticity (γ), which defines the slope of the curve.
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Thus, the determinants of the firm’s desired stock of capital can be summarized
as K∗ = K∗(pi, Y ), such that the firm’s investment rate (I/K = Kˆ = K˙/K) is:
Kˆ = λ(
K∗(pi, Y )−K
K
) (2.11)
Both the profit share and output are positively associated with the investment rate
(K∗pi > 0 and K
∗
Y > 0). Assuming that output is homogenous of degree one in capital,
the adjustment principle implies that the investment rate (Kˆ) depends on u = Y/K;
because un-utilized capital does not earn profits, the expected return on additional
capital also depends on whether the additional unit of capital will be utilized.
2.3.4 Financing behavior and financial structure
Up to now, the cost of capital (c) has been treated as an exogenous parameter
that is independent of the firm’s financial decisions. This assumption only holds
within a Modigliani-Miller framework, in which a firm’s performance is independent
of its financial structure and financing decisions. The Modigliani-Miller framework is,
however, based on strict assumptions regarding perfect information, perfect capital
markets, no bankruptcy, and no other ‘distortions’, for example, stemming from the
tax code (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Moving out of the Modigliani-Miller world,
the fact that investment must be financed implies that the firm’s cost of capital
depends on its financial decisions. For example, internal finance is cheaper to the firm
than external finance. In contrast to internal funds, debt entails future cash payment
commitments, and a larger stock of outstanding debt increases both lenders’ and
borrowers’ risk (Keynes, 1936; Minsky, 1975). From the perspective of the manager,
a larger stock of debt reduces the firm’s margin of safety with which to respond to
adverse shocks (Kalecki, 1971), and from the perspective of lenders, a larger stock of
debt signals potential solvency problems. The tax code is also likely to influence a
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firm’s financial behavior; for example tax advantages, whereby capital gains are taxed
at a lower rate than dividend income may encourage repurchases over dividends.11
Thus, a wide-ranging set of factors — from imperfections in financial markets,
to the tax code, to managerial preferences for lower-risk internal over external funds
— influence the cost of financing faced by an individual firm. While these financing
conditions are vastly complex, the various factors influencing the individual firm’s
cost of capital are summarized here by two interest rates: the firm’s rate of return
on its financial assets, or ‘financial profit rate’, (idep) and the firm’s cost of borrowing
(idebt). These interest rates are firm-specific: the cost of borrowing, for example,
captures not only the macroeconomic interest rate environment, but also how the
interest rate facing the individual firm depends on factors such as current leverage
and wealth. Imperfections in financial markets imply that even with discrepancies
between these two interest rates, managers will hold finite amounts of financial assets
and debt. If idep < idebt, the firm will still hold a non-zero stock of financial assets, for
example for transactions purposes or precautionary reasons. Similarly, if idebt < idep,
imperfections in credit markets requiring, for example, a firm to hold collateral in
order to obtain external financing, limit the stock of debt that the firm can acquire.
Thus, the firm’s decision about how to finance a capital investment — whether via
internal funds, new borrowing or equity issues — influences the cost of financing, and
the firm makes portfolio and financing decisions so as to minimize the cost of finance.
As such:
K∗ = K∗(pi, Y, idep, idebt) (2.12)
where idep and idebt are used as a shorthand for the complex set of factors determining
the terms at which the firm can borrow annd lend.
11Although the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the relative tax advantage of capital gains,
the incentive effect remains positive (Grullon and Michaely, 2002). Repurchases furthermore allow
investors to postpone the realization of capital gains and, therefore, defer tax payments.
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The cost of borrowing is expected to have a negative effect on the firm’s desired
stock of capital: an increase in the cost of external funds increases the cost of any
given investment project, reducing the desired stock of capital. The relationship be-
tween the financial profit rate and K∗ is, however more ambiguous, particularly over
recent decades as NFCs are increasingly involved in the provision of financial services.
On the one hand, an increase in the return on financial assets may drive a portfolio
reallocation away from fixed capital. On the other hand, if, for example, financial
profitability derives from the provision of consumer financing services by an industrial
firm for its own industrial product (i.e. captive finance), then higher financial profit
rates may in turn lead to a higher desired stock of fixed capital. Consider, for exam-
ple, auto companies, which offer financing for their cars. The financial profits earned
from the financing activity may be complementary with the non-financial (industrial)
aspects of the firm’s business, such that financial profitability may be positively as-
sociated with the firm’s desired stock of fixed capital. Similar intuition applies in the
case of store credit cards, which effectively capture demand for a particular company’s
products, while also generating financial profits for the firm. Therefore:
Kˆ = λ(
K∗(pi, Y, idep, idebt)−K
K
) (2.13)
2.3.5 Balance sheet adjustment
The fact that investment decisions are made subject to a finance constraint implies
that the stock of capital is determined interdependently with the stocks of financial
assets and debt. For given demand and financing conditions, the firm, therefore,
also has a desired stock of financial assets (M∗) and a desired stock of debt (D∗).
Like with the stock of fixed capital, the fact that portfolio and financing decisions
are interdependent, furthermore, implies that the firm’s desired stock of financial
assets depends not only on the return on financial assets, but also on the returns
that could be earned by instead allocating funds towards fixed capital as well as
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the cost of borrowing. Similarly, the desired stock of debt depends not only on the
cost of borrowing, but also on demand conditions and the financial profit rate, which
determine the returns that could be earned from allocating additional funds towards
fixed capital or financial assets. Thus, like K∗, the firm’s desired stocks of financial
assets and debt can be expressed as:
M∗ = M∗(pi, Y, idep, idebt) (2.14)
D∗ = D∗(pi, Y, idep, idebt) (2.15)
As noted above, imperfections in financial markets ensure that the desired stocks of
financial assets and debt are finite.
The expected partial derivatives determining the desired stock of financial assets
can be summarized as follows: M∗pi ≶ 0, M∗Y ≶ 0, M∗idep > 0, and M∗idebt < 0. First,
improved demand conditions may, on the one hand, drive a portfolio reallocation
towards fixed capital, thereby reducing the firm’s desired holdings of financial assets.
As with the relationship between the desired stock of capital and the financial profit
rate, however, the sign is ambiguous, and is likely to reflect the nature of the relation-
ship between the firm’s financial and nonfinancial activities. If there are substantial
complementarities between the financial and nonfinancial aspects of a firm’s business,
the sign may instead be positive, reflecting that improved demand conditions may
induce a firm’s management to also expand the firm’s financial services division. Sec-
ond, higher financial profits make holding financial assets more attractive, thereby
increasing the desired stock of financial assets and, third, a higher cost of borrow-
ing decreases the relative attractiveness of holding financial assets. Finally, D∗pi > 0,
D∗Y > 0, D
∗
idep
> 0, and D∗
idebt
< 0, such that the desired stock of debt depends pos-
itively on demand and the returns that the firm can earn with the borrowed funds,
but negatively on the cost of obtaining those external funds.
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Like with the adjustment of the capital stock, the adjustments of the firm’s out-
standing stocks of financial assets and debt are described as a stock adjustment from
the current level and towards the desired level of each stock. Because the firm’s port-
folio and financing decisions are interdependent, however, the evolution of each stock
depends not only on the difference between that stock and its desired level, but also
on the discrepancies across other parts of the firm’s balance sheet. Thus, Equation
2.11, which describes investment as an adjustment towards the firm’s desired stock
of capital, is amended to also include the current discrepancies between the firm’s
current and desired stocks of financial assets and debt. For example, even if demand
conditions are favorable such that K∗ > K, investment (K˙) will be lower if the firm
is holding fewer liquid assets than it would ideally like to hold (M∗ > M) than if
it is holding its desired stock of liquid assets (M∗ = M), because the firm will also
allocate funds towards financial assets.
Thus, the evolution of the firm’s balance sheet can be described as follows:
K˙ = f(K∗ −K,M∗ −M,D∗ −D)
M˙ = h(K∗ −K,M∗ −M,D∗ −D)
D˙ = z(K∗ −K,M∗ −M,D∗ −D)
where these three expressions must be jointly satisfied. The speed of adjustment
of each stock differs; in particular, the capital stock adjusts more slowly than the
firm’s stock of (more liquid) financial assets. Note that, given the stocks of capital,
financial assets and debt, the book value of equities is simply a residual and need not
be separately defined.
The adjustment equations leave the firm with one extra degree of freedom with
which to achieve the adjustment process, given that, from Equation 2.2, we know
that the firm has choice over both the retention rate (sf ) and the rate of new eq-
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uity issues (N˙). This extra degree of freedom can be closed by objectives preferring
repurchases (i.e. the use of N˙) over dividends (i.e. the use of sf ) that may derive,
for example, from CEO compensation schemes linking managerial pay to the stock
price. Abstracting for the moment from these complications, we can assume that
the distinction between the retention rate and the rate of new equity issues does not
matter, although this point is addressed further in Section 2.3.2.
Assuming linear homogeneity, we can divide through by the stock to get a growth
rate, thereby defining the determinants of the evolution of each stock. For example:
Kˆ =
K˙
K
=
I
K
= f(
K∗ −K
K
,
M∗ −M
K
,
D∗ −D
K
) = f(
K∗
K
,
M∗
K
,
M
K
,
D∗
K
,
D
K
) (2.16)
where the ratios of the desired to the current level of K (K
∗
K
, M
∗
K
, D
∗
K
) are jointly
determined by pi, Y , idep and idebt. If output is homogenous of degree one in capital,
then pi and Y can be re-written as the combination of profit rate on capital, r = P/K,
and the utilization rate of capital, u = Y/K. Therefore:
Kˆ = f(u, r, idep, idebt,
M
K
,
D
K
) (2.17)
Mˆ = h(u, r, idep, idebt,
M
K
,
D
K
) (2.18)
Dˆ = z(u, r, idep, idebt,
M
K
,
D
K
) (2.19)
Equations 2.17-2.19 are useful in that they give important information regarding
the evolution of the firm’s balance sheet and the determinants of changes in firm-level
financial structure. We can, thus, trace changes in the firm’s balance sheet structure
to changes in (exogenous) relative returns, managerial objectives, and the constraints
subject to which the firm makes portfolio and financing decisions. Changes in relative
returns have direct effects on the desired stocks of capital, financial assets and debt, as
shown from the expressions for K∗, M∗, and D∗. If a firm faces an increase in the cost
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of borrowing, for example, then K∗ is expected to decline, leading also to a decline in
the investment rate. Changes in objectives and constraints, on the other hand, lead to
changes in the way in which given financial conditions influence a manager’s portfolio
and financing decisions. A change in objectives, for example, may be reflected in a
lower or higher desired stock of fixed capital at otherwise equivalent demand, financial
profitability and borrowing costs: a firm’s manager may react differently to the same
demand conditions and financial indicators depending on their objectives regarding
the firm’s performance.
The asset adjustment principle, in turn, gives the effect on Kˆ, Mˆ and Dˆ. Take, for
example, Equation 2.17, which describes the evolution of the capital stock (i.e. fixed
investment behavior). Because K∗ enters the investment demand function directly,
any factor that increases K∗ increases the investment rate, and vice versa. Thus,
improved demand conditions, captured by r and u, are both expected to positively
impact the firm’s desired stock of capital (K∗) and, in turn, to positively impact
the firm’s investment rate (Kˆ). Similarly, the ambiguity regarding the impact of
an increase in financial profitability on the desired stock of capital, discussed above,
extends directly to the investment rate as well, such that the sign is a priori inde-
terminate.12 Finally, an increase in the cost of borrowing, by decreasing the firm’s
desired stock of fixed capital, is expected to lead — all else equal — to a decline in
the investment rate.
Turning to the outstanding stocks of assets, first, an increase in the stock of finan-
cial assets is expected to have a positive impact on the investment rate. To understand
12Empirical evidence for the investment function, shown in Chapter 5, finds a negative relationship
between financial profitability and fixed investment in all specifications and subsamples, with the
exception of among the largest quartile of nonfinancial corporations in the U.S. economy. It is argued
that this positive relationship among the largest firms may reflect that large firms are engaged in
different types of activities (and, accordingly, hold different types of financial assets) than smaller
firms (or most firms) in the U.S. economy, and are able to generate complementarities between the
financial and nonfinancial aspects of their businesses that are not available to the majority of firms.
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Table 2.1: Expected partial derivatives for Equations 2.17-2.19
r u idep idebt M D K
Kˆ + + −/+ − + − −
Mˆ −/+ −/+ + − − − +
Dˆ + + + − − − −
the intuition, note that – holding all else equal – the firm’s desired portfolio compo-
sition is defined by K∗ and M∗. Thus, an increase in the stock of financial assets will
induce a portfolio reallocation towards capital, so as to maintain the desired relative
ratio of capital to financial assets.13 An increase in the stock of debt, on the other
hand, is expected to decrease the investment rate, all else equal. Because debt entails
future cash payment commitments, a larger stock of debt increases both lenders’ and
borrowers’ risk, thereby reducing the firm’s investment demand (Keynes, 1936; Min-
sky, 1975). Finally, an increase in the stock of capital reduces the firm’s investment
demand. The intuition is the inverse of that for an increase in the stock of financial
assets: for a desired stock of capital defined by the current demand conditions, finan-
cial profit rate and cost of borrowing, an increase in the current stock of capital will
induce a portfolio reallocation towards financial assets. A similar adjustment process,
based on the partial derivatives for M∗ and D∗, applies to the evolution of the firm’s
stocks of financial assets and debt. Table 2.1 summarizes the expected partial deriva-
tives for Equations 2.17-2.19, and notes cases where the expected partial derivatives
are ambiguous.
13This adjustment process is consistent with that described by Tobin (1965), who argues that in a
monetary economy with two types of assets “the community will hold the two assets in proportions
that depend on their respective yields” (p. 678), such that “Capital deepening in production requires
monetary deepening in portfolios” (p. 679).
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2.4 Determinants of shifts in NFC behavior
By specifying determinants underlying firm-level decisions to invest in fixed capi-
tal, acquire financial assets, or hold debt, this framework allows us to specify changes
in firm behavior as deriving from changes in relative returns or interest rates, changes
in objectives, or changes in constraints facing NFCs. Thus, we can analyze determi-
nants underlying the changes in NFC financial behavior that point to an increasingly
‘financialized’ nonfinancial corporation. This approach, in turn, links the financial-
flow based indicators of financialization discussed in Section 2.2 to underlying changes
in firm behavior, given that rising flows of financial income between NFCs and the
financial sector derive from changes in NFC balance sheet composition and financ-
ing behavior. The objective is to explain possible determinants of changes in NFC
financial structure that have occurred since the early 1970s: a portfolio shift towards
a greater share of financial assets, an increase in debt and repurchases among large
NFCs, and a decline in indebtedness among small NFCs.
2.4.1 The provision of financial services
The concurrent increase in the stocks of both financial assets and gross debt held
on NFC balance sheets may, first, reflect an expansion in the scope of NFC activities
into the provision of financial services, whereby ‘non’-financial firms increasingly op-
erate banking divisions. Expansion into financial services is consistent with growth
in financially-derived income earned by NFCs relative to total profits over the post-
1980 period (Krippner, 2012). A movement of large NFCs into banking activities is,
furthermore, consistent with anecdotal evidence of large corporations — like General
Electric, General Motors, and Ford — that have been increasingly involved in con-
sumer financing over the post-1980 period. Automobile companies are, in particular,
well-known for the provision of ‘captive’ finance, wherein they not only manufacture
and sell cars, but also sell consumer financing for these cars. The case of General
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Electric, which has moved into a wide range of financial services since the mid-1980s,
extending from captive finance to the management of other firms’ private-label credit
cards, is explored in detail in Chapter 4.
From Equations 2.17-2.19, it is clear that – for given objectives and constraints –
changes in demand conditions, financial profitability, and the cost of borrowing lead
to changes in the firm’s financial structure via changes in the desired balance sheet
composition (K∗, M∗ and D∗). In particular, a movement into banking activities
may derive from an increase in the return a firm can earn on financial assets (idep)
relative to its cost of borrowing (idebt). If the firm is able to borrow at a lower rate
than at which it can lend, profits can be earned by first borrowing and then lending
out the same funds – i.e. borrowing and lending for profit. Evidence for an increase
in financial profitability is found in an increase in the rate of return that NFCs could
earn on deposits beginning in the late 1970s with tight money policy and interest rate
deregulation (Krippner, 2012). Simultaneously, certain NFCs – particularly large
firms with bond ratings – have faced a decline in the cost of borrowing as debt
has increasingly taken the form of bond (rather than bank) finance. NFCs may,
furthermore, have advantages in the provision of financial services relative to financial
companies, due to the fact that they are not officially banking/financial institutions
and, therefore, are not regulated as financial firms. Relatively lighter regulation –
for example, in the interest rates that NFCs can charge on outstanding consumer
receivables – provides NFCs with profit advantages in financial services relative to
purely financial companies.
Both a decline in the cost of borrowing (idebt) and an increase in the financial
profit rate (idep) work in the same direction so as to increase the desired stocks of
both financial assets and debt held on the firm’s balance sheet. First, a decline in the
cost of borrowing is expected to increase the firm’s desired stocks of both financial
assets and debt (M∗
idebt
< 0, such that a decrease in idebt leads to an increase in M∗,
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and D∗
idebt
< 0 such that a decrease in idebt leads to an increase in D∗). Second, an
increase in the financial profit rate is, similarly, expected to increase the firm’s desired
stocks of both financial assets and debt (M∗
idep
> 0 such that an increase in idep leads
to an increase in M∗, and D∗
idep
> 0 such that an increase in idep leads to an increase in
D∗). In turn, M˙ > 0 and D˙ > 0, such that the outstanding stocks of financial assets
and debt both rise over time as firms adjust their balance sheets towards the desired
composition reflecting the expansion into financial services. Thus, an expansion in
the scope of a nonfinancial firm’s activity into the provision of financial services is
expected to be reflected in greater outstanding stocks of both financial assets and
debt on the firm’s balance sheet.
An increase in the stocks of debt and financial assets on the firm’s balance sheet
deriving from NFC involvement in financial services has important implications for
understanding growth in nonfinancial corporate debt and financial asset holdings in
the post-1980 U.S. economy. Rising leverage deriving from an expansion of NFC activ-
ities into financial services is not clearly indicative of growing balance sheet fragility.
Given that the activities of financial firms are less reliant on physical capital than
those of nonfinancial firms, and that financial firms hold larger outstanding stocks
of both debt and financial assets because profits are generated by the interest-rate
differential between them, a ‘non’-financial company that is increasingly operating as
a financial firm is expected to have a more leveraged balance sheet structure than a
nonfinancial company exclusively engaged in industrial activities or the provision of
(non-financial) services. The issue of leverage among NFCs engaged in the provision
of financial services is again commented on in Chapters 3 and 4.
Furthermore, an increase in financial asset holdings is often cited as crowding
out the acquisition of fixed capital. If, however, financial asset holdings are higher
because firms are borrowing and lending for profit, there is no a priori reason to
expect the firm’s fixed investment rate to decline. First, a decline in the cost of
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borrowing is expected to be associated with an increase in the desired capital stock
and, accordingly, in the investment rate (K∗
idebt
< 0). Second, the impact of a change
in the financial profit rate on the firm’s desired capital stock is ambiguous and –
as discussed above in Section 2.3 – is likely to depend on the activity from which
financial profits are derived. More specifically, if financial profits are derived from the
provision of captive financing services for the firm’s own industrial product, there are
reasons to expect that financial profitability will positively impact the desired stock
of capital (such that K∗
idep
> 0) The empirical evidence presented in Chapter 5, which
finds the financial profit rate to be positively related to the investment rate for the
largest quartile of firms in the U.S. economy, is consistent with this account.14
2.4.2 Shareholder value ideology
The post-1980 period in the U.S. economy is also marked by significant changes
in corporate governance associated with growing shareholder value orientation among
NFC managers. The entrenchment of shareholder value ideology has been supported
by both a market for corporate control (which ‘disciplines’ managers by creating a
threat to the manager’s position of authority) and stock option-based compensation
(which provides managers a ‘carrot’ for improving the firm’s stock market perfor-
14Note that a portfolio shift towards financial assets in the firm’s portfolio could also derive
from a deterioration in demand conditions, stemming, for example, from increased international
competition in the post-1970 period (Crotty, 2005). Deteriorating demand conditions are expected
to lead to a lower desired stock of fixed capital (K∗). Furthermore, if a simultaneous increase in
financial profitability decreases the firm’s desired stock of fixed capital (K∗idep < 0), then an increase
in financial profitability would further decrease the firm’s desired stock of fixed capital. An increase
in financial profitability has the opposite effect on the desired stock of financial assets, such that
M∗ increases, and the firm’s desired ratio of K∗ to M∗ declines. Importantly, it is likely that the
effect of the financial profit rate on the firm’s desired stock of capital differs for different types of
firms and, in particular, for firms of different sizes; this claim is supported by the empirical evidence
in the final chapter of the dissertation. Whereas large firms may be moving into the provision of
financial services – wherein an increase in financial profitability has a potentially positive impact on
K∗ and Kˆ – small firms facing adverse demand conditions may simply invest in fixed capital at a
slower rate, such that a portfolio shift towards financial assets on the balance sheets of small NFCs
simply reflects a lack of profitable investment opportunities.
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mance).15 By directly linking managerial interests with the firm’s stock price per-
formance, these institutional mechanisms have arguably led to changing managerial
objectives and, specifically, a growing emphasis on stock-price maximization. Im-
portantly, the firm’s desired balance sheet composition and financial behavior also
depend on the firm’s objectives, such that – for given demand conditions, financial
profitability and cost of borrowing – changes in objectives may lead to changes in K∗,
M∗ and D∗. Thus, this shift in objectives is expected to lead to changes in the firm’s
financial behavior.
The implications of shareholder value orientation for NFC financial decisions is
most clearly manifested in a dramatic increase in buybacks at the sector level and
among large NFCs, discussed further in Chapter 3. By reducing the firm’s stock of
total outstanding equity, stock buybacks directly improve stock-market based mea-
sures of firm performance, including the short-term share price, earnings per share,
and return on equity. Consider two otherwise identical firms – with the same produc-
tion technology, product-market demand conditions, financial profitability and cost
of borrowing – that earn the same profits in any given year, and pay out the same
proportion of these profits to shareholders. One firm does so in the form of dividends,
whereas the second firm utilizes buybacks. Given that the firms are otherwise iden-
tical, the total market valuation of the two firms (νN) is identical. The firm that
bought-back its stock, however, decreased the total number of outstanding shares
(N˙ < 0) such that the per-share price (ν) has risen. Thus, while in a Modigliani-
Miller framework, there is no difference in firm stock market valuation if shareholder
payouts come in terms of dividends (i.e. by utilizing the retention rate, sf ) or the
rate of new equity issues (N˙), managers oriented towards maximization of the firm’s
15While both of these mechanisms were theoretically intended to more closely align the interests
of managers with those of shareholders (Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Murphy, 1990), recent work has
shown that the market for corporate control may, in fact, aggravate the agency problem within firms
(Skott and Guy, 2013).
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share price are more likely to pay out shareholders via repurchases. Empirical evi-
dence furthermore points to a substitution of repurchases for dividends in shareholder
payouts since the early 1980s (Grullon and Michaely, 2002).
Given that repurchases are a use of funds, they must be financed via a separate
source of funds and, consequently, may also be linked to the firm’s other financial de-
cisions. In particular, the increase in stock buybacks in recent decades is symptomatic
of changes in objectives, towards an increased emphasis on ‘maximizing shareholder
value’. A shift in objectives is expected to be associated with a shift in the firm’s
demand for capital, financial assets and debt – given otherwise equivalent pi, u, idep
and idebt. Thus, the firm’s portfolio choices can be re-expressed as follows, where a
shift in firm objectives towards ‘value’ maximizing norms is captured by Sv:
Kˆ = f(u, r, idep, idebt,
M
K
,
D
K
;Sv) (2.20)
Mˆ = h(u, r, idep, idebt,
M
K
,
D
K
;Sv) (2.21)
Dˆ = z(u, r, idep, idebt,
M
K
,
D
K
;Sv) (2.22)
While the precise effect of shareholder value norms on the firm’s acquisition of each
balance sheet component remains open to further investigation, some clear hypotheses
can be laid out. With respect to investment in fixed capital, it is expected that a firm
targeting value-maximizing objectives will be less willing to invest in fixed capital –
at otherwise equivalent r, u, idep and idebt – than a firm maximizing profits. Thus,
a ‘value’-maximizing firm is less willing, even at the same expected profitability, to
tie up funds in long-term fixed capital investment projects, given that capital invest-
ments are both irreversible and take an extended period of time to realize returns. In
effect, shareholder value norms strengthen the link between managers’ investment and
financing decisions and the expectations of stock-market participants, such that man-
agers increasingly focus on meeting stock market expectations. Empirical evidence
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in Chapter 5 supports this prediction for the largest firms in the U.S. economy, such
that KˆSv < 0.
16 In general, this trend is expected to reduce managerial willingness
to tie up funds in irreversible and plant-specific capital investment projects.17
Conversely, one may expect that decreased willingness to tie up funds in physical
capital investment projects may instead be associated with an increased desire to
hold financial assets (M) at otherwise equivalent r, u, idep and idebt. In contrast
to physical capital, financial assets are more liquid and provide managers with the
flexibility, for example, to reorient funds towards shareholder payouts should the stock
price falter, or should the firm fail to meet value-based goals of performance. In that
case, MˆSv > 0. Finally, it is expected that a value-maximizing firm is more willing
to hold debt than a profit maximizing firm, such that DˆSv > 0. In particular, there
may be a substitution of debt for equity on the balance sheets of NFCs, wherein
managers borrow in order to buyback stock. Further empirical evidence is required
to fully determine these signs. If, however, an increase in financial assets and debt on
NFC balance sheets derives from shareholder value objectives, there are clearly vastly
different implications for investment and long-term firm performance than in the case
of movement in the provision of financial services. Finally, it is important to note that
if this behavior is true of a sizable number of firms in the economy, demand conditions
change as well: if investment declines across the sector, then demand conditions for
the products of individual firms will deteriorate as well. Thus, there are derived macro
effects on utilization and the profit share; a decline in aggregate demand is expected,
16Furthermore, evidence that stock option-based pay — which is a clear mechanism that aligns
managerial interests with the share-price performance of the firm and, therefore, is likely drive a
shift in managerial objectives — is larger both in absolute value and relative to firm size among large
firms than small firms (Core et al, 1999), suggests that shareholder value norms and a corresponding
shift in managerial objectives is likely limited to large NFCs in the U.S. economy.
17One could, however, also imagine scenarios in which the effect would operate in the other
direction; during a stock market boom, for example, if stock market participants expect or ‘demand’
infrastructure investment, managers that are more strongly oriented towards fulfilling shareholder
expectations may be more likely to invest in fixed capital.
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in turn, to influence firm behavior. While these effects are outside the scope of this
dissertation, they are potentially integral to macro-level analyses of shareholder value
orientation and capital accumulation.
2.4.3 Rising firm-level volatility
Rising firm-level volatility is also a stylized characteristic of the post-1980 period
in the U.S. economy that may have contributed to changes in NFC portfolio and
financing behavior. For given objectives, a firm’s desired balance sheet composition
also depends on its environment, and rising volatility signals changes in the envi-
ronment in which firms make financial decisions. Despite a moderation in aggregate
volatility, an increase in firm-level volatility has been extensively documented (Comin
and Phillipon, 2005), and has been linked, for example, to new information and com-
munication technologies leading to shorter product life cycles (Skott and Guy, 2013).
Higher demand volatility reflects changes in the constraints subject to which NFCs
make portfolio and financing decisions. Higher demand volatility, reflecting greater
uncertainty, is expected to (1) increase liquidity preference (drive higher demand for
financial assets, M∗), (2) decrease managerial willingness to tie up funds in long-term
fixed capital, thereby reducing the desired stock of capital (K∗), and (3) decrease
managerial willingness to hold debt, all at otherwise equivalent expected returns on
fixed and financial capital and cost of borrowing. Because volatility changes the
desired stocks at otherwise equivalent rates of return, volatility – like shareholder
value norms – causes shifts in the functions describing NFC demand for capital,
financial assets and debt:
Kˆ = f(u, r, idep, idebt,
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where KˆV < 0, MˆV > 0 and DˆV < 0. The implication is a lower demand for fixed
capital, greater demand for liquid financial assets and lower demand for debt. All of
these trends are consistent with changes in the financial behavior of small nonfinancial
corporations over this period. Furthermore, the increased demand for liquid financial
assets is, in particular, one change in firm behavior that is often cited as pointing
to an increasingly ‘financialized’ nonfinancial corporation. Thus, volatility may also
be a factor that has driven behavior that appears increasingly ‘financialized’ among
NFCs.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter lays out a framework describing firm-level portfolio and financing
decisions, and uses the framework to discuss three factors that potentially underlie
the changes in financial behavior that point to the financialization of nonfinancial
corporations. Since the early 1970s, NFCs in the U.S. economy have acquired grow-
ing shares of financial assets in their portfolios, large firms have become increasingly
leveraged and involved in repurchases of their own stock, and small firms have slowly
de-leveraged their balance sheets. Increasing involvement of (primarily large) NFCs
in the provision of financial services, a shift in managerial objectives towards a grow-
ing emphasis on stock market performance, and rising firm-level volatility are three
factors that may have driven the changes in NFC balance sheet structure and finan-
cial behavior that point to the ‘financialization’ of nonfinancial corporations in the
U.S. economy.
These three factors, furthermore, can be clearly linked to the existing literature
on financialization and NFC investment. Both a shift in objectives towards the max-
imization of stock market performance and increasing involvement in the provision of
financial services, for example, are consistent with the increase in gross payments by
NFCs to the financial sector that Orhangazi (2008) utilizes to proxy financialization.
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Similarly, if rising firm-level volatility drives the acquisition of financial assets among
NFCs, and large firms also earn financial profits because of increasing engagement
in banking services, these factors are also consistent with the increase in financial
profits (or what is termed rentiers’ income at the aggregate level) earned by NFCs.
This chapter builds on this existing literature, however, by exploring specific behav-
ioral mechanisms that underlie observed increases in financial flows. In doing so, the
discussion in this chapter begins to move beyond the idea that a broadly-defined phe-
nomenon ‘financialization’ has directly changed firm behavior, and to instead narrow
in on specific characteristics of the post-1970 period that have led NFCs to engage
in behavior that appears increasingly oriented towards financial markets. Interest-
ingly, however, the case of rising firm-level volatility – while likely inducing firms to
hold relatively greater shares of financial assets in their portfolios and, thus, appear
increasingly ‘financialized’ – does not clearly stem from the expansion of financial
markets.
The three factors introduced in this chapter are themes that reappear through out
this dissertation. Chapter 3 lays out in more detail the specific changes in balance
sheet structure and firm-level financial behavior that this chapter begins to explain,
and Chapter 4 explores two of the mechanisms discussed in this chapter — the provi-
sion of financial services and shareholder value orientation — in the case of General
Electric. Finally, the framework introduced in this chapter is again utilized in Chap-
ter 5, which econometrically analyzes the specification of the investment function
presented here, and the methodology used in Chapter 5 could, in turn, be extended
to other parts of the firm’s balance sheet as well. Empirical evidence is presented
supporting the contention that rising firm-level volatility and increasingly entrenched
shareholder value norms negatively impact firm-level fixed investment rates among
NFCs in the U.S. economy.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ‘FINANCIALIZATION’ OF THE NONFINANCIAL
CORPORATION IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: A
DECOMPOSITION OF FIRM-LEVEL BALANCE SHEETS
3.1 Introduction
The increasingly dominant role of finance over recent decades in the U.S. econ-
omy has led, in recent years, to a growing literature on ‘financialization’. While
the precise concept of financialization varies considerably across analyses, the shared
premise is that financial sector growth signifies an important structural change in
the U.S. economy, highlighted by sustained growth in the share of financial-sector
profits in total corporate profits beginning in the early 1970s (Krippner, 2012). Im-
portantly, ‘financialization’ is manifested not only in changes in the size and structure
of the financial sector, but also in the behavior of nonfinancial corporations (NFCs)
and in an increasingly complex relationship between NFCs and the financial sec-
tor. For example, many large NFCs have increasingly come to resemble financial
companies (Froud et al, 2006), and the hostile takeover movement and shareholder
value ideology have been associated with changes in corporate governance that have
arguably increased the weight of short-term valuations of firm performance in man-
agerial decision-making (Crotty, 2005; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). Changes in
NFC financial behavior have, in turn, been linked to nonfinancial outcomes, including
fixed investment (Davis, 2013; Orhangazi, 2008; Stockhammer, 2004), employment
(Milberg and Winkler, 2013; Lazonick, 2009), inequality (Epstein and Jayadev, 2005;
Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2011; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013), and macrody-
namics (Skott and Ryoo, 2008; Aglietta and Bretton, 2001).
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As with the definition of financialization more broadly, the concept of the ‘finan-
cialization of nonfinancial firms’ is ambiguous, in large part reflecting the range of
phenomena explored in the existing literature. Accordingly, various changes in NFC
financial behavior have been isolated and analyzed, but the literature does not in-
clude a systematic, detailed discussion of the changes in financial behavior – i.e. the
stylized facts – summarizing the ‘financialization’ of nonfinancial corporations. It is,
however, necessary to understand precisely what has happened with regard to NFC
financial behavior before explaining why these changes have occurred, or to what
effect. Thus, this chapter develops the concept of financialization insofar as it applies
to nonfinancial corporations via a detailed decomposition of firm-level balance sheets,
laying out the key trends in NFC financial behavior over the post-1980 period in the
U.S. economy.1 In laying out these stylized facts using firm-level data, this chapter
contributes to the literature on financialization by defining the specific changes in
firm-level behavior that need to be explained. The primary objective is, therefore,
descriptive, and does not aim to provide a detailed account of why these behavioral
changes occurred, or of what the implications for NFC outcomes have been.
Three stylized facts are presented, each corresponding to one part of the firm’s
balance sheet. First, NFCs are holding a growing share of – largely liquid – financial
assets relative to fixed capital in their portfolios. Second, large NFCs have become
increasingly leveraged, but the majority of NFCs have de-leveraged their balance
sheets. Third, there has been a change in the role of equity, specifically manifested
in a dramatic increase in stock buybacks, again concentrated among large firms.
Taken together, these stylized facts point to pronounced changes in the financial
behavior of NFCs in the post-1980 U.S. economy. These stylized facts, furthermore,
highlight systematic differences between small and large firms. While differences
1The analysis utilizes Compustat data; variable definitions are summarized in Table A.1 in the
appendix.
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Figure 3.1: Capital and financial assets relative to sales (yearly medians)
Source: Compustat, author’s calculations
among firms are – of course – to be expected, the systematic differences by firm size
point to differences in how the constraints facing small and large firms have evolved
over recent decades. In contrast, while an industrial decomposition is also discussed,
systematic differences in financial behavior across industries are not found. The
chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the insights into the financialization of
NFCs that can be gained by analyzing these stylized facts in a conceptual framework
that emphasizes the interdependence of portfolio and financing decisions.
The chapter is organized as follows. Sections 3.2-3.4 constitute the primary anal-
ysis of the chapter, laying out recent trends in NFC portfolio composition, debt, and
equity holdings respectively, with an emphasis on the post-1980 period. Section 3.5
discusses the implications of these changes in firm financial structure for analysis of
financialization and nonfinancial corporations, and Section 3.6 briefly concludes.
48
Table 3.1: Portfolio composition, relative to sales (yearly medians)
  1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Capital stock 19.52% 20.90% 24.41% 21.62% 22.95% 22.57% 18.52% 
Financial assets 27.44% 25.12% 26.49% 25.36% 32.81% 45.49% 47.79% 
Cash & short-term assets  13.18% 7.14% 4.32% 3.49% 4.39% 7.52% 14.23% 
Receivables 10.38% 11.94% 15.41% 14.79% 15.51% 15.72% 14.42% 
Advances 0.49% 0.39% 0.62% 0.14% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Other assets 1.14% 1.41% 2.26% 2.27% 4.78% 8.10% 7.61% !
Source: Compustat, author’s calculations
3.2 Portfolio composition
The asset side of NFC balance sheets captures a sustained shift in firm-level portfo-
lio composition away from fixed capital and towards – largely liquid – financial assets.
Krippner (2012) traces the portfolio shift towards financial assets to high and volatile
interest rates in the 1980s, which increased uncertainty regarding the cost of capital,
thereby discouraging the acquisition of long-term irreversible fixed capital. Simulta-
neously, high interest rates and interest-rate deregulation opened opportunities for
higher relative profits on financial assets, further supporting a portfolio shift towards
financial assets.2 Furthermore, this shift has also been cited in a growing ‘portfolio
conception’ of nonfinancial corporations, wherein NFCs are increasingly viewed as
bundles of assets with returns to be maximized, rather than in a coherent way as
capital-accumulating and productive enterprises (Crotty, 2005; Fligstein 1990). This
portfolio shift has also been related to a growing corporate emphasis on ‘core compe-
tence’, which has reduced the (domestic) investment needs of U.S. firms, and thereby
supported instead the acquisition of financial assets (Milberg and Winkler, 2010).
Figure 3.1 plots the across-firm yearly medians of fixed capital and financial assets
measured relative to sales between 1950 and 2011. Until the early 1980s, the two
2It is important to note that this portfolio shift does not, a priori, correspond to a decline in the
investment rate; for example, financial investments may be increasingly complementary to capital
investment in an increasingly volatile environment. Davis (2013) finds evidence of complementarities
between financial investments and capital investment among NFCs in the post-1970 U.S. economy,
and Orhangazi (2008) finds differential effects of financial profits on investment by firm size.
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ratios move in close unison, highlighting that NFCs acquired new fixed capital and
financial assets in relatively constant proportions.3 Beginning in the early 1980s,
however, NFCs began to acquire financial assets at a faster rate than fixed capital.
The first two rows of Table 3.1 summarize the evolution of fixed capital and financial
assets relative to sales from 1950 to 2010, recording the value of each ratio at the
beginning of each decade. Over the full period, the median ratio of capital to sales
remains relatively constant, from 19.5% in 1950 to 18.5% in 2010. Narrowing in on
the post-1980 period, however, capital to sales declines after the mid-1980s, from a
peak of 25.6% in 1986. The shift in NFC portfolio composition is, however, driven
more directly by an increase in financial asset holdings, which rise from 25.4% of sales
in 1980 to 47.8% in 2010.
3.2.1 Financial assets
Figure 3.2 decomposes total financial assets into four (exhaustive) subcategories:
cash and short-term investments, total current receivables, other investments and ad-
vances, and miscellaneous ‘other’ financial assets. While it is important to note that
any definition of financial assets is constrained by current accounting rules, this defi-
nition usefully summarizes the categories of financial assets that NFCs have acquired
over recent decades. The four sub-categories are defined as follows. First, ‘cash and
short-term investments’ includes cash and all securities that are readily transferable
to cash with original maturities less than one year. Among other examples, this cat-
egory includes commercial paper, government securities, other marketable securities,
money-market funds, and certificates of deposit. While, due to accounting rules, ‘cash’
3The qualitative pattern is similar when capital and financial assets are instead measured as the
across-firm yearly mean, or when normalized by total assets. The fact that the mean and median
move together highlights that the portfolio shift occurs across the distribution of NFCs; this point
will be addressed further in Section 3.2.3. Here, asset stocks are normalized by sales, rather than
total assets, to avoid possible biases stemming from the fact that an increase in financial assets
relative to assets definitionally requires a decline in non-financial assets relative to assets. Instead,
sales provide a useful proxy for firm size.
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Figure 3.2: Components of financial assets relative to sales (yearly medians)
Source: Compustat, author’s calculations
cannot be disaggregated from other short-term investments, this category includes a
firm’s most liquid and short-term assets. Second, receivables are standardly defined
as outstanding claims collectible in cash (generally within one year). As is clear from
Figure 3.2, together, receivables and cash and short-term investments dominate NFC
financial assets holdings over the entire time period.
Third, ‘investments and advances’ include assets such as bank or savings & loans
securities, or investments in and advances to unconsolidated subsidiaries. These are
assets that are classified as neither capital nor as R&D related expenditures (and,
therefore, do not include copyrights or other intellectual property). While the ambi-
guity of this definition raises questions regarding whether all of these ‘investments and
advances’ are necessarily financial, this sub-category constitutes a small proportion
of total financial assets, and the discussion is not sensitive to a definition of financial
assets that does or does not include this component. In contrast, the final category of
‘other’ financial assets grows substantially over this period, and particularly since the
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early 1980s. While the documentation is unclear regarding what exactly comprises
this miscellaneous category of assets, one can draw inferences from the business press,
which Krippner (2012) cites in listing “an array of new financial instruments—money
market funds, ‘stripped’ treasuries, Euromarket and Caribbean offshore dollar mar-
kets, foreign currency instruments, and portfolios composed of options and futures
contracts” on NFC balance sheets (p. 55). An increase in ‘other’ financial assets
is also evident at in the aggregate level (Flow of Funds) data, in which the largest
category of financial assets is an unidentified miscellaneous category (see Crotty 2005
for a discussion).
Figure 3.2 highlights that NFC financial asset acquisitions over the post-1980
period are concentrated in cash and short-term investments, and in miscellaneous
financial assets. The remaining rows of Table 3.1 summarize the change in each
component of financial assets over time. As noted above, the ratio of investments and
advances to sales is low over the full period, and since the early 1980’s receivables have
also, on average, grown proportionally to firm-level sales. Simultaneously, however,
‘miscellaneous’ financial assets rise from 1.1 percent of sales in 1980 to 7.6 percent in
2010, and even greater growth occurs in holdings of liquid financial assets, which rise
from 3.5 percent to 14.2 percent of sales between 1980 and 2010.
This build-up of liquid financial assets is consistent with a large literature on
growing corporate cash holdings, for which various explanations have been proposed.
Foley et al (2007) argue that growing cash stocks reflect tax motives: given that
profits earned abroad are taxed if repatriated, foreign profits are instead held (and
recorded) as cash. While this account likely applies primarily to large NFCs, which
are more often multinational and earn foreign income, Bates et al (2009) find that
even firms without foreign income exhibit secular growth in cash holdings, and instead
attribute the rise to growing firm-level (idiosyncratic) risk between 1980 and 2006.
The longer-term perspective in Figure 3.2, however, which also includes data for the
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original post-WWII period, suggests that recent growth in cash has largely returned
cash holdings to the level of the early 1950s: cash holdings declined substantially in
the 1950s and 1960s, began to rise again in the early 1980s, and accelerated since the
1990s.
It is, furthermore, important to recognize that current accounting standards do
not allow for disaggregation of ‘cash’ from other ‘short-term’ investments. Before the
adoption of new accounting regulations in 1988, a pure cash number – bank drafts,
checks, demand deposits and money orders – could be isolated from all other short-
term assets, which were categorized separately. Here the composite category is used
for all years to ensure comparability in the series over time. However, in light of
the 2008 financial crisis, during which markets for securities that were very highly
rated and thought to be very liquid froze leaving (financial) firms insolvent, a note
of caution should be applied to the aggregation of cash with other securities. Take,
for example, commercial paper, which is classified as a short-term financial asset on
NFC balance sheets and, therefore, included in the ‘cash and short-term investments’
category. While commercial paper has generally been considered a stable investment,
the market for commercial paper froze in 2008 when Lehman Brothers failed; thus,
a category of assets that was thought to be safe and liquid – i.e. as good as cash –
proved risky (see Kacperczyk and Schanbl, 2010). As such, a note of caution should
be applied to the interpretation of growing NFC cash hoards over recent decades.
Subject to this qualification, however, this category is treated as liquid assets.
3.2.2 The capital stock
In examining the asset side of NFC balance sheets, it is important to explore the
potential objection that the portfolio shift away from fixed capital primarily captures
problems with the definition of the capital stock stemming, in particular, from in-
tangible capital. This objection would contend that the documented portfolio shift
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towards financial assets does not reflect ‘financialization’, but instead captures (1) cor-
porate reorganization, both domestic and international, and (2) a shift towards less
(tangible) capital-intensive and more brand-based, and knowledge- and technology-
intensive production in the U.S. economy. With respect to corporate reorganization,
there is evidence that, over this period, NFCs have downsized the scope of their
operations, so as to focus on ‘core competence’, reflected in increasingly ‘modular’
production (Skott and Guy, 2013).4 Taking into account the increasingly global na-
ture of production (Milberg, 2008; Milberg and Winkler, 2010), this shift in scope
implies that that U.S. NFCs increasingly hold relatively more ‘intangible’ as opposed
to ‘tangible’ capital, reflecting a transition towards less (tangible) capital-intensive
technology and more knowledge-based technology. This objection would in turn con-
tend that the documented portfolio shift towards financial assets via a comparison
with (fixed, tangible) capital is invalid.
This criticism has teeth, given that firms in the U.S. are increasingly involved in
less capital-intensive activities over the decades in question. Importantly, however,
Figure 3.1 highlights that shift in portfolio composition derives more from an increase
in financial asset holdings than from a decline in capital. Thus, relative to firm
size, NFCs are holding more financial assets than they used to, independently of the
definition of capital. Furthermore, as will be shown in Section 3.2.3, manufacturing
firms continue to dominate the nonfinancial corporate sector after the 1980s, pointing
to a continued role for fixed capital in understanding the behavior of NFCs.5
4This shift towards core competence occurs across firms within the U.S., but also captures the
increasing globalization of production, whereby U.S. firms focus less on heavy manufacturing, and
more on ‘light’ aspects of production, such as branding and marketing. Milberg and Winkler (2013)
cite the example of corporations like The Gap, which no longer engage in manufacturing and instead
earn their profits entirely through the marketing, branding and sale of already-manufactured goods.
5Furthermore, with respect to offshoring, Krippner (2012) contends that there is no a priori
reason to expect that nonfinancial activities abroad exceed financial activities abroad for nonfinancial
corporations – citing, for example, the expansion of international financial markets such as Eurodollar
markets. Krippner supports this claim with aggregate-level evidence that international portfolio
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At a directly practical level with respect to this analysis, there are significant dif-
ficulties involved in measuring intangible capital, and there is no clear or standard
method of valuation. Brown et al (2009) explain that, “Measurement of the R&D
stock is...fraught with difficulties. The absence of a long series of R&D expenditures
makes perpetual inventory methods for stock computations infeasible and the depre-
ciation rate for an intangible asset like R&D is hard to determine” (p. 161). These
difficulties are reflected also in Compustat, in which data for intangibles is (very)
incomplete, and consistently non-zero values begin only during the 1990s. Finally,
recent attempts at the valuation of intangibles are often premised with the objective
of resolving a ‘paradoxical’ discrepancy between the book value and market value of
outstanding equities. Given NFC involvement in the stock market (via repurchases)
over the same period, this starting point raises flags about the assumptions made
in the calculations of intangibles. In this discussion, intangibles are, therefore, not
explicitly valued, and the capital stock is defined more simply as domestic, tangible
capital.
3.2.3 Firm size and industry
An advantage of firm-level data is that it allows for sectoral decomposition and,
in particular, for exploration of systematic differences across sub-categories of firms.
Both firm size and industry provide informative lenses with which to analyze the
sample. The sample is divided into four size quartiles according to total assets, and ten
distinct industries based on standard industrial classifications (SIC codes); an eleventh
industry, high tech, is defined as a composite category drawing from other industries.6
income (i.e. financial income) earned by U.S. NFCs is comparable in scale to domestic portfolio
income. The data required to make similar comparisons at the firm level are unavailable.
6The industries are agriculture, forestry and fishing; mining; construction; manufacturing; trans-
portation, communications, electric, gas & sanitary services; wholesale trade ; retail trade; services;
non-operating establishments; and conglomerates. High tech includes high-tech manufacturing,
55
Because the majority of these ten industries are quite small, comprising less than 5%
of total assets over the entire period, the discussion here emphasizes three industries:
manufacturing, services, and high tech. With respect to industrial composition, it is
important to note that – despite a simultaneous decline in manufacturing as a share
of U.S GDP – manufacturing remains the largest industry in the sample over the full
time period. A substantial decline in the share of assets held by manufacturing firms
(and a corresponding increase in the share of services) disappears from the sample
when financial firms – i.e. financial services – are excluded. Nonetheless, given that
this period in the U.S. is often associated with deindustrialization, growth in the
service economy, and the expansion of high tech and information technologies, these
three industries are particularly relevant to analysis of this time period, and it is
important to evaluate whether the trends in firm-level financial behavior outlined in
this chapter differ systematically across these industries.7
Table 3.2, which summarizes the evolution over time of portfolio composition for
these three industries and by firm-size quartile, highlights that the shift in portfo-
lio composition occurs across firm size and industry, albeit with differences in the
magnitude of the portfolio shift. Note that, because Table 3.2 records yearly medi-
ans, the sub-components are not additive. Among manufacturing firms the decline
in capital is much smaller than among service firms. Despite the smaller decline in
capital, however, manufacturing firms record an increase in financial assets similar
to other industries. After remaining fairly constant between 1950 and 1980, financial
communications services, and software and computer-related services. Details on the industrial
classifications are in Table A.2 in the appendix.
7The industrial composition of the sample over time is summarized Table A.2 in the Appendix
for five-year periods between 1950 and 2009, both for the full sample and each size quartile of firms.
For a clearer sense of industrial composition, the next two largest industries – transportation and
communications, and retail – are also included in Table A.2. The sample registers a relatively small
decline in the total share of manufacturing – from 58.6% of total assets in 1950-1954 to 45.4% in
2005-2009 – such that, for the entire period, the sample is dominated by manufacturing firms. After
manufacturing, transportation is consistently the second largest industry, comprising at least 30%
of total assets in each subperiod, and high tech grows over time, peaking in 2000-2004.
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Table 3.2: Portfolio composition for key industries and by firm size, relative to sales
(yearly medians)
  1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Manufacturing  
Capital stock 20.00% 20.97% 22.22% 17.77% 20.01% 21.14% 16.12% 
Financial assets 27.99% 24.66% 26.14% 25.13% 31.60% 42.28% 50.46% 
Cash & short-term assets  13.81% 7.35% 4.04% 3.22% 4.55% 7.65% 18.42% 
Receivables 10.51% 12.09% 16.11% 16.04% 16.02% 16.56% 15.40% 
Advances 0.47% 0.38% 0.51% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Other assets 1.01% 1.34% 2.12% 2.01% 4.37% 7.61% 7.28% 
Services               
Capital stock 15.33% 22.99% 27.54% 25.30% 17.38% 15.46% 8.98% 
Financial assets 27.37% 39.25% 39.04% 32.64% 43.85% 67.35% 55.00% 
Cash & short-term assets 14.05% 9.30% 7.67% 6.06% 6.61% 17.82% 19.82% 
Receivables 9.00% 11.68% 17.91% 16.17% 18.68% 20.19% 15.79% 
Advances 0.97% 0.00% 1.61% 0.76% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Other assets 2.45% 2.18% 4.50% 3.36% 5.88% 10.63% 8.21% 
Tech               
Capital stock 13.02% 17.93% 21.50% 18.60% 16.70% 16.27% 10.77% 
Financial assets 27.50% 25.98% 33.40% 30.20% 39.88% 77.97% 63.28% 
Cash & short-term assets 9.71% 6.43% 5.07% 4.01% 6.55% 26.97% 26.60% 
Receivables 12.38% 14.16% 19.05% 18.89% 18.54% 20.85% 16.40% 
Advances 0.27% 0.00% 0.37% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Other assets 0.87% 1.60% 2.92% 2.38% 5.44% 11.41% 7.93% 
1st Quartile               
Capital stock 16.34% 15.75% 18.18% 16.00% 15.11% 14.54% 8.07% 
Financial assets 23.92% 23.06% 26.69% 29.45% 37.48% 48.56% 50.56% 
Cash & short-term assets 10.62% 6.33% 4.62% 5.41% 6.32% 11.37% 18.13% 
Receivables 10.86% 12.00% 15.88% 15.91% 15.77% 15.80% 13.67% 
Advances 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Other assets 1.19% 1.85% 2.13% 2.12% 3.88% 6.50% 5.61% 
2nd Quartile               
Capital stock 18.03% 19.62% 20.32% 17.61% 18.24% 18.66% 14.09% 
Financial assets 27.93% 24.51% 24.65% 25.39% 31.94% 47.94% 52.10% 
Cash & short-term assets 12.87% 7.01% 3.94% 3.76% 5.25% 12.20% 20.52% 
Receivables 10.26% 11.91% 14.92% 15.74% 16.22% 17.53% 15.37% 
Advances 0.42% 0.32% 0.22% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Other assets 1.14% 1.33% 2.22% 1.95% 4.00% 7.10% 6.27% 
3rd Quartile                
Capital stock 19.62% 22.77% 25.90% 20.74% 22.98% 22.13% 20.46% 
Financial assets 27.75% 25.97% 26.59% 24.16% 30.44% 37.68% 40.20% 
Cash & short-term assets 13.99% 7.27% 4.33% 3.14% 3.71% 5.32% 12.66% 
Receivables 10.08% 11.93% 15.31% 14.66% 15.31% 16.77% 13.85% 
Advances 0.55% 0.79% 0.91% 0.18% 0.00% 0.00% 0.11% 
Other assets 1.13% 1.25% 2.27% 2.26% 4.41% 7.50% 7.30% 
4th Quartile               
Capital stock 29.15% 36.24% 53.65% 38.66% 43.47% 41.05% 39.12% 
Financial assets 32.23% 27.83% 29.11% 23.94% 33.53% 47.42% 48.96% 
Cash & short-term assets 15.30% 8.47% 4.46% 2.56% 2.98% 4.35% 10.78% 
Receivables 10.42% 12.06% 15.52% 13.39% 14.41% 16.57% 14.21% 
Advances 1.84% 2.65% 3.44% 1.93% 2.52% 2.84% 3.41% 
Other assets 1.10% 1.35% 2.51% 2.87% 7.48% 12.04% 11.05% !
Source: Compustat, author’s calculations.
Note that because the table records yearly medians, the component categories are not additive.
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Figure 3.3: Components of financial assets relative to sales by firm size (yearly medi-
ans)
Source: Compustat, Author’s Calculations
asset holdings of manufacturing firms rise sharply after 1980, doubling from 25.1%
to 50.5% of sales between 1980 and 2010. Among service firms, the share of financial
assets grows more smoothly over the entire period, from 27.4% of sales in 1950 to
55.0% of sales in 2010. Among these three industries tech firms record the largest
increase in financial assets relative to sales – from 27.5% in 1950 to 63.3% in 2010. In
both services and tech, capital to sales increases between 1950 and 1970, and then de-
clines over the remainder of the period. Furthermore, growth in the stock of financial
assets is concentrated in liquid assets and ‘other’ financial assets for all sub-samples
of firms.
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Across firm size, the trends are similar.8 For all size quartiles, the ratio of the
capital stock to sales declines after 1970, at which point financial assets relative
to sales rise. However, both the magnitude of the shift and the relative shares of
liquid versus miscellaneous assets acquired vary systematically across firm size.9 First,
the total increase in financial asset holdings is relatively larger among smaller firms,
falling as firm size increases. Second, among smaller firms, financial asset holdings are
increasingly dominated by liquid financial assets, whereas among large firms, financial
asset holdings are increasingly concentrated in miscellaneous financial assets. This
pattern is indicated in Figure 3.3, which plots the across-firm yearly medians of the
components of financial asset holdings by firm size quartile. Cash holdings of firms in
the bottom quartile rose from 5.4% in 1980 to 18.1% in 2010, and miscellaneous assets
rose from 2.1% to 5.6% over the same period. Concurrently in the largest quartile, on
the other hand, cash and short-term investments only increased from 2.6% to 10.8% of
sales, whereas miscellaneous assets grew from 2.9% to 11.5% of sales. These statistics
suggest that large firms have acquired new financial instruments that are not easily
classifiable on NFC balance sheets, and may also be consistent with evidence that
many large firms have developed their own financing arms – ranging from store credit
cards to consumer credit loans – during this period.
8It seems unlikely that the firm-size decompositions are dominated by differences in industrial
composition by firm size. Table A.2 points to broadly similar industrial shifts across size quartiles —
namely, a rise in services and tech, and a decline in manufacturing – although there are differences
in the relative magnitude of these shifts by firm size. Smaller firms move more decisively into both
tech and services, and accordingly exhibit a greater decline in manufacturing. Among the largest
quartile of firms, on the other hand, manufacturing is far more stable, and services barely exceed
5% of total large-firm assets in 2005-2009.
9The differences between small and large firms are mirrored by differences between newer versus
well-established firms, and size and age are strongly correlated in the sample. There are clear
theoretical reasons to expect differences by firm size and age: well-established and large firms have
advantages of incumbency, networks in product markets, access to external finance, possibly bond
ratings, and larger absolute stocks of cash and other resources with which to compete.
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Figure 3.4: Debt relative to the capital stock
Source: Compustat, Author’s Calculations
3.3 Debt
The second key stylized fact pointing to the ‘financialization of nonfinancial firms’
is manifested in NFC liability structure. An increase in gross corporate debt over the
post-1970 period has been cited as a definitive characteristic of the financialization
of NFCs (Palley, 2007), and Flow of Funds data clearly documents rising corporate
leverage at the sector level. The firm-level data highlights, however, that changes in
debt holdings differ decisively by firm size: the post-1970/post-1980 period is char-
acterized by rising leverage among large firms, but concurrent de-leveraging among
small firms. To this effect, Figure 3.4 plots leverage, defined as gross debt relative to
the capital stock, and illustrates that rising mean leverage across NFCs since the early
1970s is simultaneous with declining median leverage. In Figure 3.4, debt is defined
as total debt and, therefore, neither distinguishes between bank and bond debt, nor
by length to maturity. Table 3.3a summarizes the evolution of gross leverage over
time for the full sample of firms.
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Figure 3.5: Change in the distribution of debt by firm size
(a) Bottom (1st) Quartile (b) Top (4th) Quartile
Source: Compustat, Author’s Calculations
Figure 3.4 illustrates, first, that both mean and median leverage increased faster
during the 1950s and 1960s than over the subsequent period of financialization. Thus,
while it is true that NFC leverage – in both the mean and median– is substantially
higher in 2011 than in 1950, increasing indebtedness is neither concentrated in nor
limited to the post-1980 U.S. economy. Furthermore, over the initial post-WWII pe-
riod, mean and median leverage moved together, suggesting that debt holdings over
this period evolved fairly uniformly across the distribution of firms. Beginning in the
1980s, however, trends in mean and median leverage diverged; while mean leverage
rose from 52.5% to 73.6% between 1980 and 2010, median leverage declined moder-
ately from 68.5% to 60.6%. This time frame is consistent with accounts attributing
rising corporate debt to leveraged buyouts during the hostile takeover movement of
the 1980s (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001).
The divergent trends in mean and median gross indebtedness during the early
1980s point to increasing leverage among large firms and concurrent de-leveraging
among small firms. This firm-size distinction is summarized by the histograms in
Figure 3.5, which describe the distribution of debt to capital for firms in the bottom
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Table 3.3: Evolution of debt over time, full sample
  1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
(a) Debt relative to the capital stock 
Median 24.63% 43.86% 68.61% 68.49% 75.33% 70.24% 60.29% 
Mean 33.16% 37.45% 57.54% 52.52% 73.81% 87.03% 76.73% 
(b) Debt relative to total assets 
Median 8.44% 15.58% 28.30% 27.47% 28.12% 22.21% 18.70% 
Mean 15.24% 18.96% 33.13% 29.80% 33.93% 31.22% 28.33% !
Source: Compustat, Author’s calculations
and top quartiles of the asset distribution in 1970-1974 and 2005-2009.10 Among small
firms the distribution of debt has become increasingly skewed towards zero, such that
in 2005-2009 more than 55% of small firms hold debt between zero and twenty-five
percent of capital (the lowest bin). The percentage of small firms with zero leverage
also increases substantially, from 13.7% in 1970-74 to 23.7% in 2005-09. Among large
firms, on the other hand, the distribution of debt shifts to the right, such that in
2005-2009 there are fewer firms with ‘low’ leverage than in 1970-74.11 Furthermore,
only 1.7% and 2.4% of large firms hold no external debt in 1970-1974 and 2005-2009,
respectively. The top panel of Table 3.4a summarizes the evolution of gross debt over
time by firm size quartile, and reiterates this bifurcation in the acquisition of debt
between small and large firms: leverage only increased between 1980 and 2010 among
firms in the largest quartile of the asset distribution. In contrast to these firm-size
differences, each industry largely mirrors the full sample pattern. The industrial data
10Because the distribution of debt is dramatically skewed to the right and also bounded at zero,
the full range of debt to capital is truncated in these histograms; without truncating the distribution,
however, it is impossible to capture any detail in the figures.
11With financial disintermediation in the 1970s, the nonfinancial corporate sector relied less on
traditional bank finance and increasingly on bond finance. This trend points to a likely bifurcation
in the cost of finance for small and large firms that corresponds with differences in the pattern
of leverage outlined here: large firms (that are more reliant on bond finance) are likely to face a
declining cost of finance relative to small firms (that are more reliant on banks) over the period
shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.
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Table 3.4: Evolution of debt over time by firm size and industry; yearly medians
  1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
(a) Debt relative to the capital stock  
Firm Size 
1st Quartile 20.00% 40.00% 66.17% 86.42% 92.24% 69.97% 54.17% 
2nd Quartile 24.59% 43.47% 80.06% 78.17% 75.24% 49.95% 27.42% 
3rd Quartile 26.65% 47.07% 77.10% 74.18% 80.78% 77.55% 68.37% 
4th Quartile  26.57% 41.77% 59.63% 53.30% 60.38% 76.61% 76.71% 
Industry 
Manufacturing 18.12% 38.46% 73.49% 79.27% 85.16% 77.55% 68.37% 
Services 51.79% 72.95% 86.44% 72.80% 86.95% 54.11% 70.26% 
Tech 35.12% 37.42% 94.29% 78.29% 76.34% 48.44% 63.64% 
(b) Debt relative to total assets 
Firm Size 
1st Quartile 6.90% 13.56% 19.98% 23.64% 22.37% 13.33% 8.72% 
2nd Quartile 6.44% 14.94% 26.61% 26.15% 23.28% 10.90% 4.64% 
3rd Quartile 9.38% 16.53% 30.80% 28.58% 30.69% 26.97% 23.25% 
4th Quartile  11.73% 18.45% 34.52% 29.37% 32.29% 31.98% 28.85% 
Industry 
Manufacturing 6.13% 13.95% 25.27% 23.62% 24.97% 20.56% 14.20% 
Services 16.49% 23.08% 36.17% 26.30% 23.47% 8.75% 11.48% 
Tech 8.74% 13.43% 28.61% 25.89% 20.48% 7.09% 8.72% !
Source: Compustat, Author’s calculations
in Table 3.4a highlights that the across-firm yearly medians describing the evolution
of leverage for manufacturing, service, and tech firms all follow the full-sample pattern
of rising leverage in the initial post-WWII period, followed by declining leverage since
the 1970s/1980s.
Given that mean leverage rose simultaneous with growing stocks of – largely liquid
– financial assets, debt measured relative to total assets also provides insight into the
evolution of the financial robustness or fragility of NFCs. A shift in balance sheet
structure, such that firms hold both more liquid assets and more debt, could, for
example, reflect an interest rate differential between borrowing and lending, leading
firms to borrow and lend for profit – i.e. an expansion into banking activities. Figure
3.6 plots the across-firm yearly means and medians of debt relative to total assets.
Like debt relative to capital, NFC indebtedness relative to total assets increased in
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both the mean and the median in the initial post-war decades. This trend is to be
expected, given that gross leverage increased over these decades, whereas the portfolio
shift towards financial assets did not begin until the early 1980s. Unlike gross leverage,
however, debt relative to assets has not risen in either the mean or the median since the
early 1980s. For the full sample of firms, debt relative to assets declines very slightly
between 1980 and 2010, from 29.8% to 28.3% in the mean and more substantially
from 27.5% to 18.7% in the median. Descriptive statistics summarizing the evolution
of debt relative to assets for the full sample of firms are shown in Table 3.3b.
The fact that net indebtedness has fallen suggests, on the one hand, that rising
leverage is not necessarily indicative of growing balance sheet fragility among (large)
NFCs in the post-1980 period. Higher stocks of outstanding debt and financial assets
are an inevitable outcome of running a financing arm, wherein a firm first borrows
and then lends for profit. A firm running a credit card division, for example, first
borrows in order to then lend out consumer loans. On the other hand, however, the
increase in gross debt – viewed independently – may nonetheless capture increased
fragility insofar as crisis may more deeply and adversely affect NFC balance sheet
structure. If, for example, assets are not able to be liquidated in a time of crisis, a
firm could still face the liquidity or solvency issues of a highly leveraged nonfinancial
firm without any financing division.
Table 3.4b summarizes the evolution of debt relative to assets by firm size and
industry over time. These descriptive statistics reiterate expected firm size differences:
small firms – which hold relatively more liquid assets and less gross debt – register a
sharp decline in debt to assets, and as firm size increases, the magnitude of the decline
decreases. Among large firms, the across-firm median of debt to assets declines less
than one percentage point, from 29.4% in 1980 to 28.9% in 2010. Finally, the sub-
samples of manufacturing, services and tech firms all mirror the full sample, albeit
with differences in magnitude. In particular, there is a greater decline in debt relative
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Figure 3.6: Debt relative to total assets
Source: Compustat, Author’s Calculations
to total assets for tech firms, which is consistent with these firms’ larger increase in
cash holdings.
3.4 Stock repurchases and the shareholder value movement
The increase in the indebtedness of large NFCs beginning in the early 1980s has
been accompanied by a dramatic increase in NFC repurchases of own stock. The
sector-level explosion in buybacks is well documented, and has received considerable
attention in the literature on financialization and the shareholder value movement
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Lazonick, 2009; Stout, 2012; Davis, 2009). Share-
holder value principles contend that agency problems between managers and share-
holders (owners), deriving primarily from moral hazard on the part of managers, lead
to inferior corporate performance.12 Accordingly, agency theory suggests two mech-
12This moral hazard is argued to occur because managers apply “insufficient effort”, undertake
“extravagant investments”, pursue “entrenchment strategies” to make themselves indispensable, or
exploit expensive perks like private jets or box tickets to ball games (Tirole, 2006, p. 17).
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anisms to better-align the interests of managers with those of shareholders and – by
ameliorating agency problems within the firm – improve firm-level efficiency: a hostile
market for corporate control, which ‘disciplines’ managers via a threat to managerial
authority (Jensen, 1986) and stock option-based compensation (Jensen and Murphy,
1990). The concurrent rise of institutional investors has both supported a transition
away from long-term stock holding towards higher trading frequency, which requires
increased attention to the firm’s short-term stock price (Lazonick and O’Sullivan,
2000; Stout, 2012), and the push for stock option-based managerial compensation
(Krippner, 2012).
Stock repurchases are a clear manifestation of increasing managerial emphasis on
‘shareholder value’. By repurchasing the firm’s stock, managers improve – for given
profits – stock market-based measures of firm performance, including the (short-
term) share price, return on equity (ROE), and earnings per share. Consider, for
example, two otherwise identical firms – with the same level of profits in any given
year and the same stock market valuation (the stock of outstanding shares multiplied
by the per share price). Both firms direct the same proportion of these profits for
shareholder payouts, but one firm does so in the form of dividends, whereas the
other firm does so in the form of repurchases. Then, even though the total stock
market valuation of the two otherwise identical firms is the same, the firm that has
reduced the outstanding stock of equity via stock repurchases will have a higher per
share price. Increases in repurchases are, thus, consistent with the transition to stock
option-based managerial pay. Empirical evidence suggests, accordingly, a substitution
of repurchases for dividends after the mid-1980s (Grullon and Michaely, 2002).
The firm-level data reinforces the sector-level trend of stock buybacks, but high-
lights that repurchases are concentrated among large firms. Figure 3.7a plots the
yearly mean of gross equity repurchases relative to total outstanding equity across
NFCs for the full sample of firms, as well as for the largest and smallest quartiles
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Figure 3.7: Gross stock repurchases relative to total equity
(a) Full sample, 1st and 4th quartile
(b) Manufacturing, service and tech firms
Source: Compustat, Author’s Calculations
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of firms.13 This figure underscores that equity repurchases by large firms dominate
the full-sample trend, whereas repurchases by small firms remain low over the entire
period. Furthermore, Figure 3.7b indicates that, despite this significant difference by
firm size, manufacturing, service and tech firms all on average mirror the full-sample
trend in Figure 3.7a. In contrast to the mean trend, median equity buybacks are
zero in each year. This point is unsurprising given the bulky and episodic nature
of stock repurchase programs: firms announce that a given quantity of stock will be
repurchased over a specified time frame — for example, that $15 million dollars worth
of stock will be repurchased via open market purchases within the next year — to
be followed by years without repurchases. Thus, it is not expected that most firms
would repurchase stock in any given year.
Within the broader process of institutional change that has supported the en-
trenchment of shareholder value ideology, repurchases have been directly supported
by specific regulatory changes. Four key regulatory changes – in 1983, 1991, 1993 and
2003 – are denoted by the vertical lines in Figures 3.7a and 3.7b; plotting repurchases
against this regulatory backdrop points to correlations between specific changes in
regulation and NFC repurchases. Prior to the early 1980s, stock repurchases were
effectively prohibited under the anti-manipulation provisions of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934. Scope for (legal) large-scale repurchases was first opened in
November 1982, with SEC Rule 10b-18, which provides ‘safe harbor’ by guaranteeing
that a firm’s managers will not face insider trading and manipulation charges for
targeting the stock price if each day’s open-market repurchases are less than 25% of
average daily trading volume for the previous four weeks, and if the company does
not repurchase shares at both the beginning and end of a day’s trading (Grullon
13Due to availability of repurchase data, Figure 3.7 only covers the post-1970 period.
68
and Michaely, 2002). Following this regulatory change, a first period of growth in
repurchases is recorded beginning in 1983.
Subsequently, an amendment to Rule 10b-18 in 1991 shortened the required hold-
ing period between when executives exercise their stock options and when they are
allowed to sell the stock. This amendment made it easier for managers paid in stock
options to exploit short-term increases in a firm’s share price, without being subject
to the uncertainty of possible declines in the value of the shares in the period be-
tween exercising one’s stock option and selling the stock (Lazonick, 2013). In 1993,
changes to the tax code further strengthened incentives to link managerial pay to
stock market-based metrics (Stout, 2012). Code 152(m) stipulates a one million dol-
lar cap on the tax-deductibility of non-performance based pay, without instituting
a similar cap on the tax-deductibility of ‘performance-based’ pay. As ‘performance’
quickly became synonymous with stock price (Stout, 2012), this law provided clear
incentives for stock option pay and, accordingly, for repurchases. Finally, additional
updates were made to Rule 10b-18 in 2003, to “simplify and update the safe harbour
provisions” (Lazonick, 2013). Following these rule revisions, 2003 corresponds to a
third period of dramatic growth in NFC repurchases.
While Figure 3.7 points to correlations between the volume of stock repurchases
and specific regulatory changes, Figure 3.8 plots the trend in average yearly gross
equity repurchases for the full sample of firms relative to the business cycle, indicating
that repurchases are also procyclical. The vertical lines in Figure 3.8, which denote
NBER-dated recession years, highlight that repurchases decline during business-cycle
downturns and increase during macroeconomic expansions.14 This observation is
consistent with the expectation that one advantage of repurchases over dividends as
14The NBER dates recessions monthly; thus, a vertical line denotes any year with a recession,
although the recession need not last the entire year. The annual data can, therefore, provide only a
relatively crude breakdown of this relationship.
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Figure 3.8: Gross stock repurchases relative to total equity; shown against the busi-
ness cycle
Source: Compustat, Author’s Calculations.
Vertical lines denote years that include an NBER-dated recession. The NBER dates recessions
monthly and, thus, a vertical line includes any year with a recession, although the recession did not
necessarily last the entire year.
a form of shareholder payouts – from the perspective of management – derives from
the more ‘discretionary’ nature of repurchase programs: declining dividend payouts
are likely to be met with greater market hostility than declining repurchases, which
are expected to be intermittent. Jagannathan et al (2000) provide evidence that,
while repurchases are strongly procyclical, dividends tend to steadily increase over
time. Finally, Figure 3.8 highlights that, prior to 2007, declining repurchases lead
the official recessions; at the beginning of the 2007 recession, however, gross equity
repurchases were at an all-time high.15
15However, clearer analysis of the relationship between repurchases and recessions requires quar-
terly or monthly data, as well as comparisons between the relationship of repurchases to the business
cycle and to stock market performance. Empirical and theoretical evidence suggests that firms should
repurchase stock following poor stock market performance – for example, in order to boost the firm’s
stock market valuation and ward off takeover bids; thus, growing decoupling between ‘real’ economic
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3.5 Discussion
The trends laid out in Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 summarize sustained changes
in the portfolio and financing behavior of NFCs since the early 1980s that point to
the ‘financialization’ of nonfinancial corporations. Importantly, considerable insight
into the causes and implications of these behavioral changes stands to be gained by
exploring the relationships between these stylized facts. Because firms make portfolio
and financing decisions subject to a finance constraint, a firm’s sources of funds
(profits earned on fixed and financial assets, new borrowing, and proceeds from new
equity issues) are in each period definitionally equivalent to the firm’s uses of funds
(the acquisition of new assets, interest payments on outstanding debt, and payouts to
shareholders). Thus, a firm’s choice to acquire capital or financial assets, or repurchase
stock is inherently interdependent with both the decision of how to finance that use
of funds and the decision not to allocate those funds towards another use. Because
this chapter is descriptive, it is beyond the scope of the discussion to propose either
a complete account of links between changes in NFC financial behavior, or a detailed
causal argument regarding the factors underlying these changes. Nonetheless, a brief
discussion of growing NFC involvement in banking activities and the shareholder
value movement provides insight into these stylized facts and basic links between
these changes in NFC financial structure.
First, evidence points to the increasing involvement of (large) nonfinancial cor-
porations in the provision of financial services (see, for example, Froud et al, 2006).
As noted in Section 3.3, a shift towards banking activities would be reflected in a
structural shift in NFC balance sheets: firms that borrow and lend for profit hold
relatively greater stocks of financial assets and outstanding liabilities, relative to firm
size, than firms that are engaged purely in production. This factor suggests that
performance and corporate profits/stock market trends since 2007 suggests that stock market trends
may be more relevant than the official business cycle.
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Figure 3.9: Correlation between borrowing and investment
Source: Compustat, Author’s calculations
increases in both financial asset holdings and debt, particularly among large firms,
(partly) reflect a shift in activity aimed, for example, at exploiting a growing dif-
ferential between returns on financial and fixed assets. Importantly, this shift need
not a priori come at the expense of directing these funds towards fixed capital and,
therefore, is not necessarily consistent with a line of the financialization literature
suggesting that financial asset holdings come at the expense of investment in fixed
capital (for example, Milberg and Winkler, 2013).
Second, the implications of shareholder value ideology are not limited to increasing
equity repurchases, but are also likely linked with changes in debt and cash holdings.16
At a most basic level, stock buybacks must be financed; greater buybacks come at
16In fact, a stated theoretical rationale for designing incentives to enforce shareholder value maxi-
mization is to “disgorge the cash” (Jensen, 1986) and, as such, ‘successful’ implementation of share-
holder value principles is designed to be linked with shifts in the structure of NFC balance sheets.
Within the economics literature, this rationale signifies a marked departure from the Modigliani-
Miller view of the firm (Tirole, 2006), according to which a firm’s financial structure is irrelevant for
its non-financial outcomes (Modigliani and Miller, 1958).
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a (short-run) trade off with other uses of funds. Figure 3.9 documents a declining
correlation between NFC borrowing and fixed investment since the 1970s, such that
— despite rising average debt holdings — new borrowing is less and less channeled
into fixed investment.17 Importantly, both repurchases and increases in gross debt are
concentrated among large firms. The shareholder value movement has, furthermore,
been argued to drive increasing ‘short-termism’ in managerial priorities, which, in
turn, further supports the ‘portfolio conception’ of the nonfinancial firm by stream-
lining the process of shuffling and re-shuffling (parts of) corporations to maximize
portfolio return (Fligstein, 1990; Crotty, 2005). Thus, changes in corporate behavior
associated with the shareholder value movement are likely to have related implications
for NFC financial behavior, spanning the use of financial assets and the propensity
to borrow external funds, in addition to changes in the form and magnitude of pay-
outs to shareholders. While the discussion here of the relationships between changes
across NFC balance sheets is only suggestive, it points to the insights to be gained
by exploring links between the stylized facts presented in this chapter.
3.6 Conclusion
Within the literature on financialization, there is an increasing emphasis on the
non-financial implications of financial sector growth and, in particular, on the ‘fi-
nancialization’ of nonfinancial firms. Despite growing attention to financialization of
NFCs, however, there has been no systematic discussion of what precisely has hap-
pened at the firm level, such that the basic stylized facts describing changes in NFC
financial behavior have remained quite vaguely defined. This chapter develops the
concept of the financialization of the nonfinancial corporation by laying out, using
firm-level data, three stylized facts — one corresponding to each part of the firm’s
17A version of this graph appeared in Mason (2013).
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balance sheet — describing changes in firm financial behavior in the post-1980 U.S.
economy. First, since the early 1980s NFCs are holding a growing share of, largely
liquid, financial assets relative to fixed capital in their portfolios. Second, large NFCs
have become increasingly leveraged, even as the majority of NFCs have de-leveraged
their balance sheets. Third, there is a change in the role of equity, specifically man-
ifested in a dramatic increase in stock buybacks that is concentrated among large
firms. Together, these trends point to an increasingly ‘financial-orientation’ among
NFCs in the U.S. economy, and an increasingly complex relationship between NFCs
and financial markets. Furthermore, the analysis emphasizes systematically different
trends in NFC behavior by firm size, which highlight that the constraints facing small
and large firms have evolved differently over the recent financialization of the U.S.
economy, and, consequently, that the behavioral stories underlying the financializa-
tion of small and large firms differ.
This chapter, therefore, contributes to a clear and unified conception of the fi-
nancialization of nonfinancial corporations and, in turn, the clear elaboration of the
firm-level stylized facts opens scope for approaching the questions of why NFCs have
changed their financial behavior, and to what effect. Two factors, which are also
raised in Chapter 2, are discussed in this chapter – the increasingly involvement of
NFCs in the provision of financial services, and a growing shareholder orientation
among NFC managers. Importantly, both factors point to the insights that stand to
be gained by analyzing the firm-level stylized facts in a unified framework, rather than
exploring each in isolation. Growing NFC involvement in the provision of financial
services, for example, leads to increased holdings of both financial assets and debt on
the firm’s balance sheet; a large stock of debt that is matched by large holdings of
financial assets need not have any a priori implications for non-financial outcomes,
namely investment behavior. Changes in NFC financial behavior are, however, ex-
pected to have implications for firm-level fixed investment rates; this question is taken
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up in Chapter 5, which finds econometric evidence that increasingly entrenched share-
holder value norms are negatively associated with the investment rates of large NFCs
in the U.S. economy. Thus, the primary objective of this chapter — to establish
the evidence for the financialization of NFCs in the U.S. economy — has important
implications for the analysis of the nonfinancial implications of financialization in the
U.S. economy.
75
CHAPTER 4
INDUSTRIAL-FINANCIAL LINKS IN U.S.
NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF
GENERAL ELECTRIC
4.1 Introduction
Over the post-1980 period, General Electric (GE) developed a large financing
arm – GE Capital – which grew in size relative to its parent company from the
early 1980s through the early 2000s, reflecting dramatically expanded involvement
by a ‘non’-financial company in the provision of a wide portfolio of financial services,
ranging from private-label credit cards, to airline leasing, to providing finance for
leveraged buyouts. The result has been that, over the post-1980 period, General
Electric Consolidated has increasingly operated as an industrial-financial conglomer-
ate. This expansion in GE’s financial services division not only captures, within an
individual firm, a breakdown in boundaries separating finance and industry in the
post-1980 U.S. economy, but also highlights that financial and industrial aspects of
GE’s business are highly interdependent. This interdependence is evident, for exam-
ple, in that GE’s high credit rating, which provides the company with the access to
cheap credit that funds its financial division, is based off the industrial, rather than
the financial, core of the business.
For these reasons, GE offers insight into the ‘financialization’ of nonfinancial corpo-
rations over recent decades in the U.S. economy. The financialization of nonfinancial
business is manifested both in the growing orientation of nonfinancial firms towards
financial markets, and in an increasingly complex and interdependent relationship
between nonfinancial firms and the financial sector. These changes are reflected, for
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example, in the fact that, since the early 1980s, the nonfinancial corporate sector has
earned a growing share of total profits from financial activities (Krippner, 2012). Con-
currently, shareholder value ideology has been associated with changes in corporate
governance, which arguably increase managerial emphasis on short-term (financial)
valuations of firm performance (Crotty, 2005; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). Cor-
responding changes in the financial behavior of nonfinancial firms are reflected in
both an increasing share of financial assets in firm portfolios, and in changes in the
structure of external finance, including increasing indebtedness and growing equity
repurchases among large firms (see Chapter 3).1
This chapter analyzes a case study of General Electric to address the question of
how and why nonfinancial companies are increasingly linked to and oriented towards
financial markets in the post-1980 U.S. economy. Case studies can complement the
existing literature on ‘financialization’ and NFCs by narrowing in on institutional
details of changes in firm behavior that are only evident with analysis of individual
firms. There are important limitations to analyses of the financialization of nonfi-
nancial corporations based on aggregate and firm-level data. In both aggregate and
firm-level statistics, for example, the largest category of financial asset growth af-
ter 1980 consists of ‘miscellaneous’ financial assets, and in the aggregate data, this
category is simply an accounting residual (see Crotty, 2005, for a discussion). Case
studies, on the other hand, can garner specific insights into the types of financial
activities in which firms are involved and, thus, into the types of financial assets
that they are holding. This insight into specific financial activities can, furthermore,
clarify the interpretation of results from firm-level econometric studies by pointing to
specific behavioral channels underlying large-sample patterns.
1A growing literature emphasizing the ‘financialization’ of nonfinancial companies, furthermore,
links changes in financial behavior to nonfinancial outcomes, including fixed investment (Davis, 2013;
Orhangazi, 2008; Stockhammer, 2004), income distribution (Epstein and Jayadev, 2005; Tomaskovic-
Devey and Lin, 2011), and macrodynamics (Skott and Ryoo, 2008; Aglietta and Bretton, 2001).
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General Electric is a particularly useful case study for at least three reasons. First,
significant media attention has provided an important source of information about
the firm’s behavior and activities. General Electric is famous for twenty years of
unbroken increases in quarterly profits during the 1980s and 1990s: “quarter after
quarter, year after year, GE’s earnings came gushing in” (Fortune, 3-4-2002). Media
reports follow success, and comparable media attention is not available for many
other nonfinancial firms. Second, because GE is structured as a conglomerate, there
is a (relatively) clear delineation between the financial statistics for GE Consolidated
and GE Capital. Third, GE’s CEO between 1981 and 2001, Jack Welch, is often
referenced in the business world as the ‘father’ of shareholder value, in regard to
his famous 1981 speech “Growing fast in a slow-growth economy”. GE also ranks
consistently high among U.S. firms in terms of share repurchases (Lazonick, 2009).
Thus, in light of the shareholder value ‘revolution’ over the post-1980 period, GE is
particularly relevant for considering the ‘practice’ of emphasizing shareholder value.
In this chapter, three major themes are emphasized in explaining GE’s growing
links with finance after the mid-1980s. First, GE has dramatically expanded into
banking activities, reflected both in a significant increase in GE Capital’s share of
GE’s total earnings and in a significant shift in the firm’s financial (balance sheet)
structure. Second, GE’s financial statistics show a shift in the composition of exter-
nal finance towards greater holdings of debt and a reduction in outstanding equity,
which is consistent with involvement in banking activities and also with shareholder
value orientation. Third, the industrial and financial aspects of GE’s business are
complementary and co-dependent. Between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000’s, GE’s
financial arm supported the industrial business, but also required the industrial busi-
ness — both its credit rating and that it is not regulated as a financial company —
to grow. The 2008 financial crisis and ensuing changes in the regulatory environment
suggest, however, that GE’s financial arm is a growing liability for the firm, leading
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management to reduce the size and alter the form of GE Capital, ostensibly return-
ing to greater emphasis on providing financing for GE’s own industrial goods and
services.
Thus, this chapter contributes to the literature on the financialization of non-
financial corporations by analyzing specific channels through which finance and in-
dustry are linked within an individual firm, and connecting these channels to observed
changes in the structure of GE’s balance sheet. The discussion in this chapter uti-
lizes annual reports, Compustat data, media attention, and the existing academic
literature. Published data and media reports summarize the financial structure of
GE, as well as investors’ perceptions of the company. Froud et al (2006) present
a particularly detailed case study of GE and financialization, which places primary
emphasis on shareholder value and the different narratives – for example, from the
media or industrial financial analysts – by which success in ‘creating’ shareholder
value is evaluated.2 While this case study builds on that by Froud et al, the emphasis
here is different, and – rather than explaining evaluations of GE’s performance by
different actors – focuses on explaining links and interdependencies between finance
and industry in the case of General Electric.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the development and
performance of GE as a conglomerate linking industry with finance; Section 4.3 relates
GE’s increasing involvement in financial services to its financial structure; Section 4.4
discusses post-2008 GE and recent downsizing in GE’s financial arm; and Section 4.5
concludes by drawing links to the financialization literature and inferences about the
scope of applicability of the case of GE.
2Froud et al. (2006) write, the “basic argument is that, because shareholder value as social
rhetoric can be appropriated and inflected by different social actors, financialization is not associated
with one invariant set of consequences in terms of firm performance or management behavior” (p.
7).
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4.2 An industrial-financial conglomerate
4.2.1 GE’s corporate structure
Since the early 1980s, General Electric has derived a significant and increasing pro-
portion of total earnings from its capital division, resulting in an ‘industrial-financial
conglomerate’ that clearly intertwines nonfinancial and financial activities within an
individual firm. This industrial-financial model is the outcome of a corporate strat-
egy made famous during the tenure of Jack Welch as CEO of GE, which utilized
acquisitions and divestments so as to focus on a core of high-performing businesses.
Famously, Welch mandated that each division was to be number 1 or number 2 in
its industry, or else risk being divested; this strategy applied to subsidiaries as well,
and is reflected in GE Capital’s evolving portfolio of activities over the post-1980
period.3 This objective was, furthermore, entirely consistent with expansion into
seemingly unrelated businesses, highlighted both by the growth of GE Capital and
by movement into broadcasting with the acquisition of NBC.
Consequently, General Electric is associated today with a wide diversity of both
industrial and financial products, ranging from household appliances and lightbulbs,
to aircraft engines and leasing, medical equipment, and corporate real estate services.
As a result of this diversity, while GE is not necessarily identified with a single product
or industry, the company is often listed as one of the world’s most successful brands
by business media outlets including Forbes and Business Week. Importantly, Welch
pursued this conglomerate-based expansion strategy as conglomerates were falling
out of fashion.4 Thus, Welch focused on branding the apparent diversity in GE’s
3The same “No.1/No.2” attitude applied to managers: each year managers were rated as A,
B,or C. ‘A’ managers received stock options, and ‘C’ managers were fired. Together with dramatic
downsizing of the non-managerial workforce soon after Welch became CEO, these policies earned
Welch the nickname of “neutron Jack”.
4Following a proliferation of conglomerates in the 1960s (Chandler, 1977), shareholder value
ideology and its institutional expression in the hostile takeover market supported a narrowing of
firms’ core businesses so as to allow investors to pick their own risks (Davis et al, 1994). Interestingly,
other firms often associated with significant financing arms – including Ford and General Motors –
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Table 4.1: Sales Growth
 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 
GE Consolidated 14.5% 2.0% 13.3% 6.7% 0.9% 
GE Capital 36.7% 9.2% 23.2% 5.6% -4.4% !
Source: Compustat, author’s calculations
Table 4.2: GE Capital’s share of total sales
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
13.5% 25.6% 38.1% 51.7% 40.3% 33.9% !
Source: Compustat, author’s calculations
divisions, arguing that the parts of GE fit together in a way that added value. Welch
argued GE was a ‘business engine’ united by a ‘common set of values’ and successful
‘business leadership’, which made for a strong whole (Tichy and Charan, 1992). Even
with this growing diversity in both the industrial and financial aspects of the business,
General Electric in the post-1980 period is most clearly defined by expansion of the
financial services division, GE Capital.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, GE Capital is a major source of growth for the consol-
idated company. While GE Consolidated’s sales growth averaged 7.3% a year between
1980 and 2010, this performance captures, in large part, growth in financial services,
for which growth averaged 12.4% per year.5 Table 4.1 records five-year averages of
GE’s sales growth since 1985 for GE Capital and for the consolidated company, which
also retained a conglomerate orientation during the declining popularity of conglomerates (Davis et al
1994). In this capacity, expansion into finance may be better understood instead as a manifestation
of product-line diversification among large firms following the end of the conglomerate movement
(Auerbach, 1988). With respect to GE, a diversification strategy may have been a particularly
important “defensive response to changing technology” (p. 230), given its emphasis on electronics,
where the profitability of different sectors changes rapidly.
5Data for GE Capital is available beginning in 1985. Sales are measured on a gross basis and
defined, according to generally accepted accounting rules (GAAP), as money received from the
normal operations of the business. For banks and financial service companies, this measure includes
both interest income and fee income.
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includes GE Capital, GE’s industrial divisions, and all other subsidiary branches of
GE. Prior to 2000, GE Capital’s sales growth consistently exceeds sales growth for the
consolidated company.6 The relative decline in GE Capital’s sales growth post-2000
is driven by contractions in 2001, 2005 and 2008-2009 and, in particular, by a 24.5%
contraction in 2009 following the financial crisis. Simultaneously with growth in the
capital division, GE’s industrial growth follows the pattern of (falling) value-added
in the U.S. manufacturing sector between 1980 and 1998 (Froud et al, 2006, p.333).
Together, growth in finance concurrent with declining industrial performance has
made GE increasingly reliant on its capital division over time. This growing reliance
is captured by Table 4.2, which summarizes the share of GE’s total sales derived
from GE Capital: between 1985 and 2000, GE Capital grew as a share of the total
company from 13.5% in 1985 to a peak of 51.7% in 2000 and, in 2010, GE Capital
was still responsible for over one third of GE’s total sales. GE’s performance –
particularly between 1980 and 2000 – is, therefore, one of unimpressive industrial
growth augmented by growth in financial services, which provided cash (sales) in the
face of declining real-sector earnings. The sales growth statistics in Tables 4.1 and 4.2,
therefore, summarize that GE Capital constitutes an increasingly important source of
sales and cash for the consolidated company over the post-1980 period, and also that
downswings in the capital division are more dramatic than in the industrial division
of the firm.
4.2.2 Expansion into financial services
General Electric first moved into financing activities in 1932 with the extension
of consumer credit for home appliances. The company rationale cites that, with the
Great Depression, GE introduced “GE Consumer Finance so that customers could pay
6Between 1985 and 2000, GE Capital’s sales growth is lower than that of the consolidated com-
pany only in 1994; in 1994, sales growth in both GE Capital and GE was negative, and the magnitude
of the decline was greater in the financial-services division than the industrial division.
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for new appliances over time, helping them build a better home even when times get
tough” (https://www.ge.com/about-us/history/1925-1934). Thus, GE’s movement
into captive finance – i.e. the provision of financing for its own industrial products
– was designed to promote sales in the face of falling demand. With the extension
of financing options, GE both encouraged industrial sales, and earned profits not
only from the sale of the original good, but also from the financing. This expansion
of a ‘non’-financial company into captive finance is not limited to General Electric,
although it was a particularly early player. Ford, Sears and General Motors are other
well-known examples of nonfinancial firms with large financing arms, largely involved
in providing captive finance for their own industrial products.
GE stands out from other large nonfinancial firms, however, in the extent to
which its financial activities extend beyond captive finance. Today, GE Capital,
“pours wealth into the corporate coffers by doing just about everything you can do
with money except print it” (Fortune, 2-2-1994; quoted in Froud et al, 2006, p. 351).
The growth in GE Capital has not only made the division increasingly important to
its parent company, but has also been so dramatic as to impact the structure of the
financial sector. In 2008, GE Capital was the seventh largest bank in the United States
measured in terms of total assets, and in 2013 it was the eighth largest bank. GE
Capital’s expansion since the mid-1980s has been accompanied by involvement in a
diverse portfolio of financial activities, many of which extend beyond any contact with
a GE industrial product. Furthermore, as the acquisition and divestment strategy
popularized under Welch applied to GE Capital as well as to the parent company,
the range of GE Capital’s activities has also evolved considerably over time.
In 1983, for example, General Electric moved into retail finance, issuing a private-
label credit card for Apple Computers; this was the first time a credit card was issued
for a specific manufacturers’ product (Froud et al., 2006). GE Capital has since
become the largest manager of private-label credit cards, managing consumer credit
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for a wide variety of companies including Wal-Mart, Ethan Allen Interiors, Gap, and
Banana Republic. In 2004, GE moved into the subprime mortgage industry with the
acquisition of Western Mortgage Company (WMC). When GE divested this mortgage
business in 2007 after the subprime bubble burst (at losses estimated at more than
one billion dollars), GE Capital was the tenth-largest subprime mortgage lender in the
U.S. — ranking above well-known examples of financial companies including Lehman
Brothers, Citigroup and Wachovia (Business Week, 5-6-2009). Thus, although data
on acquisitions and divestments is opaque, specific examples like WMC highlight the
role of acquisitions in GE Capital’s expansion – both in terms of total size, and with
respect to the range of activities in which the company has been involved.
As of early 2014, GE’s website advertises financing for a dramatic range of prod-
ucts and services: online consumer finance for jewelry, home landscaping, and sporting
goods; leasing in aviation; financing for healthcare equipment; corporate real-estate
lending; retail credit financing; and financing for leveraged buyouts, to name just a
few. With respect to consumer finance, GE’s website boasts that the company has
“teamed up with more than 150,000 retailers, contractors, dealers and healthcare
providers nationwide....making it quick, safe and easy to apply for financing online”
(https://www.gogecapital.com/en/consumer-credit-financing/find-merchants.html). GE
Capital’s diverse portfolio of activities is, correspondingly, reflected in holdings of a
wide variety of financial assets, including credit card receivables and asset-backed
securities backed by residential mortgages, commercial mortgages, and student loan
debt.
4.2.3 GE’s competitive advantage in financial services
GE Capital’s expansion was supported both by direct competitive advantages that
General Electric faces vis-a-vis other financial companies in the provision of financial
services, as well as by important complementarities between the financial and the
84
industrial aspects of its own business. Relative to financial companies, GE has ad-
vantages on both sides of the interest-rate spread determining financial profitability
— i.e. the cost of borrowing relative to the returns to providing financial services.
With respect to financial profitability, GE benefits from the fact that banking-sector
regulations do not apply to nonfinancial companies (or did not apply to GE prior
to 2012). Thus, by operating within the parallel- or shadow-banking sector (see, for
example, D’Arista and Schlesinger, 1993), GE captures advantages from regulatory
arbitrage, whereby GE is able to circumvent regulations applied to financial insti-
tutions.7 These regulations for traditional banks establish, for example, admissible
asset to liability ratios and provide for Federal Reserve oversight of the quality and
valuation of assets. Laxer regulation compared to traditional financial institutions
has allowed GE to move into (and out of) a wider spectrum of financial services,
with considerably less regulatory attention, than comparable financial institutions.8
GE has arguably faced less regulatory oversight in its industrial divisions as well: by
virtue of GE’s size, branches that would be subject to more stringent financial disclo-
sure requirements as individual firms are masked within GE’s aggregated statistics
(Froud et al., 2006).
7Definitions of the shadow banking system differ in regard to the specific ‘non-bank’ financial
actors included; however, “some elements are central to most descriptions. This includes a financial
institution that is not subject to banking regulatory supervision engaging in activities typically
considered ‘banking’. Traditional banking activities involve intermediation — channeling deposited
savings into investments, and providing a system for transferring payments from one entity or person
to another” (Taub, 2013, p. 449). D’Arista and Schlesinger’s original definition of ‘parallel banking’
included actors such as hedge funds and money market mutual funds, but also the financing arms
of nonfinancial firms, including GE Capital (D’Arista and Schlesinger, 1993).
8This point is exemplified by the example of Western Mortgage Company, which reflects GE’s
constantly evolving portfolio of financial activities. Froud et al. (2006) write that “Because such
finance businesses have few barriers to entry, the classic pattern is that returns fall with intensifying
competition and the flip side of serial acquisition is serial exit as GE protects its margins on finance
by quitting commodified areas. It is much easier to do this in finance by withdrawing capital than in
manufacturing where employees, suppliers and dealers are all affected” (Froud et al., 2006, p. 352),
and where there are fewer firm-specific irreversibilities in assets.
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GE has also had access to an exceptionally low cost of borrowing and, thus, enjoyed
competitive advantages on the other side of the interest-rate spread as well. Until
2012 GE’s debt was rated triple-A, providing the firm with virtually unlimited low-
cost external finance. Importantly, this rating depended not on the firm’s financial
services division, but on the industrial base. Moody’s ratings rationale for GE Capital
states explicitly that the rating includes “uplift associated with strong implicit and
explicit support from parent General Electric Company” (Moody’s 12-05-12). Thus,
as Froud et al. (2006) argue, the expansion of GE Capital reflects, in part, the
‘structural advantage’ of this triple-A rating, which made the financial business (as
the user of the credit rating) dependent on the industrial business (on which the
credit rating was based). Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, GE was one of only
a few nonfinancial firms with this coveted triple-A rating and, thus, had a greater
capacity to expand into financial activities than other nonfinancial firms. Perhaps
more importantly, however, GE Capital’s rating was higher than that of comparably-
sized financial institutions such as Citigroup, which — prior to the financial crisis —
was rated AA+.
General Electric’s movement into financing activities is, therefore, supported by
its ability to earn relatively high returns on the extension of credit (via less regula-
tion) and to borrow relatively cheaply (via a high credit rating). While the financial
business, therefore, depends strongly on the industrial business, evidence suggests the
relationship is mutual. In particular, the financial divisions can be argued to have
supported the consolidated firm’s ability to consistently achieve earnings that meet
shareholder expectations. This objective has been increasingly important in the post-
1980 period as institutional changes in the structure of the stock market associated
with the shareholder value movement — reflected, for example, in increasingly short-
term stock holding — have arguably made consistent monthly or quarterly earnings
growth increasingly important (Stout, 2012; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). Evi-
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dence, therefore, suggests that the financial division in an industrial context made
‘growth in shareholder value’ easier to achieve.
4.2.4 Limits to financial services growth for GE
There are, however, limits to financial growth for a nonfinancial firm. Indus-
trial classification is determined on the basis of a firm’s primary activity, which
is defined as “the activity that generates the most revenue for the establishment”
(http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/faqs/fqs.html#q8). With 50.3% of sales de-
riving from GE Capital in 1999 and 51.7% of sales deriving from GE Capital in
2000, further growth in financial services after early 2000s would make GE risk re-
classification as a financial company. Reclassification as a financial company would
both subject GE to more stringent regulation, and was also likely to lead to a credit
downgrading in line with the (lower) credit ratings of comparable financial institu-
tions, such as Citigroup. Both of these changes would erode the competitive ad-
vantage that GE enjoyed relative to financial companies between the 1980s and the
financial crisis in 2008. Thus, in the early 2000’s, GE began to push the limits of
finance-led growth, such that further expansion into financial activities would neces-
sarily be accompanied by either divestments in other financial areas, or a relatively
faster expansion of the firm’s industrial base.9
4.3 Financial structure
The expansion of GE’s financial services division has been accompanied by changes
in the structure of the company’s balance sheet reflected in both an increase in finan-
9The timing also coincides with a change in GE’s leadership, from Jack Welch to Jeffrey Immelt in
2001. GE’s governance under Immelt will necessarily differ from governance under Welch, and there
is considerable evidence that Immelt is working to ‘rebrand’ GE as a technology-driven, rather than
a finance-driven, company. However, considerable financial acquisitions took place under Immelt
as well; most notably, the acquisition of WMC in 2004. Major downsizing of the capital division
occurred after the 2008 crisis.
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Figure 4.1: Portfolio composition of GE Consolidated; relative to total assets
(a) Financial assets and capital
(b) Components of financial assets
Source: Compustat, Author’s Calculations
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cial asset holdings and outstanding debt, accompanied by a decline in outstanding
equity.10 Thus, on the asset side, there has been a shift towards greater holdings
of financial assets as a share of total assets in GE’s portfolio. Figure 4.1a plots to-
tal financial assets and the capital stock relative to total assets between 1955 and
2011. While the shares of financial assets and capital in GE’s portfolio are relatively
constant between 1955 and the mid-1980s, there is a dramatic shift in portfolio com-
position between 1986 and 1987, when the share of financial assets in GE’s portfolio
increases from 46.3% to 85.6%.11 After 1987, the structure of GE’s portfolio is again
relatively stable, but at a higher relative share of financial asset holdings.
Figure 4.1b decomposes total financial assets into four (exhaustive) subcategories:
cash and short-term assets, total current receivables, investments and advances, and
‘other’ financial assets. Cash and short-term investments include cash and cash-like
assets and securities with original maturities of less than one year; given current
accounting standards, a pure cash number cannot be disaggregated from other short-
term assets. Current receivables are standardly defined as outstanding money owed
to GE, such as credit card receivables. Investments and advances include assets such
as saving and loans securities, or investments in and advances to unconsolidated
subsidiaries; these are assets that are classified as neither capital nor R&D related
expenditures.12 Finally, the documentation on what constitutes ‘other’ financial as-
10GE is a multinational company with both fixed and financial international investments. For
example, GE issues bonds in thirteen different currencies (Layne and Christie, 2008). Accounting
procedures for the international dimensions of GE’s business are opaque and the available data is
based on U.S. accounting rules; thus, this discussion is largely focused on domestic aspects of GE’s
business.
11Inventories are not included in Figure 4.1a, such that the shares of capital and financial assets
in total assets do not add to one.
12Neither fixed capital nor any of the financial asset component categories include intangibles,
which would include not only research and development, but also the intangible value of GE’s
‘brand’. Exclusion of intangibles may mean that the capital stock is undervalued as a share of total
assets, but nonetheless, the portfolio shift towards financial assets is entirely consistent with the
expansion of GE Capital over this period.
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sets is unilluminating, although one can — for nonfinancial firms more generally –
draw inferences from the business press, which Krippner (2012) cites in listing “an
array of new financial instruments–money market mutual funds, ‘stripped’ treasuries,
Euromarket and Caribbean offshore dollar markets, foreign currency instruments and
portfolios of options and futures contracts” (p. 55).
Figure 4.1b highlights that receivables constitute the majority of GE’s financial
assets, and – on the basis of visual inspection – drive the portfolio shift towards
financial assets in 1987. Figure 4.1b, furthermore, highlights that growth in cash
holdings, which have received considerable attention in the recent literature on non-
financial firms (Bates et al., 2009; Foley et al., 2007), only characterize GE’s balance
sheet over the period since the crisis began in 2007. While the shift in GE’s portfo-
lio composition towards financial assets is consistent with the full sample descriptive
statistics discussed in Chapter 3, the composition of financial assets in GE’s portfolio
differentiates GE from other (large) nonfinancial firms, who have seen less growth in
receivables and relatively greater increases in cash and ‘miscellaneous’ assets. GE’s
portfolio concentration in receivables is, however, consistent with its extensive (and
unmatched) involvement in private-label credit cards.
It is important to highlight that, while the dramatic jump in financial assets as a
share of GE’s portfolio between 1986 and 1987 appears to signal a structural break,
there is no reason to expect that it derives from changes in accounting rules. GE
Capital’s portfolio consists almost entirely of financial assets and, thus, an expansion
in GE Capital relative to the industrial parent company must be reflected in a decline
in the portfolio share of capital. GE Capital was set up as a subsidiary in 1985;
between 1986 and 1987, GE’s balance sheet registers a jump in both financial assets
and outstanding debt (debt is discussed further in Section 4.3.2). This portfolio shift,
thus, reflects that GE utilized its top-notch credit rating to dramatically increase bond
issues and, simultaneously, to acquire additional financial assets. In particular, the
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Figure 4.2: Breakdown of total valuation; GE Consolidated
General Electric Consolidated Company
Source: Compustat, Author’s Calculations
timing coincides with GE’s expansion into retail finance via private-label credit cards,
which is, furthermore, concurrent with increased holdings of (credit-card receivables)
on GE’s balance sheet.
Simultaneous with the rise in financial assets, GE’s balance sheet registers a shift
away from equity, an increase in total outstanding liabilities, and a shift within these
liabilities towards long-term debt. Figure 4.2 decomposes the firm’s total valuation
into three components — long-term debt, short-term liabilities (notes payable) and
outstanding equity — and graphs each component five-year periods between 1985 and
2009. Figure 4.2 captures the shift away from equity on GE’s balance sheet: share-
holder equity as a component of outstanding external funds declines to approximately
20% of total funding beginning in the early 1990s, from more than 50% prior to the
expansion of GE Capital in the mid-1980s.
The decline in outstanding equity as a share of GE’s balance sheet is concurrent
with a rise in GE’s repurchases of its own stock. Figure 4.3, which graphs five-year
91
Figure 4.3: Gross stock repurchases relative to total equity
General Electric Consolidated Company
Source: Compustat, Author’s Calculations
averages of GE’s gross stock repurchases relative to total outstanding equity, indicates
that GE’s repurchases rise continuously after the mid-1970s, with the exception of
a decline in the sub-period with the dot-com bust in the early 2000s after which
repurchases rebounded to previously unseen levels. GE’s behavior is, furthermore,
consistent with both the sector-level trend and with the firm-level descriptive statistics
in Chapter 3, which highlight that growth in repurchases is concentrated among
the largest firms in the U.S. economy. A dramatic expansion in repurchases at the
sector level is often cited as a clear manifestation of a growing emphasis on the
‘maximization of shareholder value’ (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000): by reducing
the number of outstanding shares at given profits, repurchases improve stock market-
based measures of firm performance, including the short-term share price and return
on equity (ROE).13 While equity has never been a significant source of finance for
13Scope for large-scale stock repurchases was first opened in November of 1982 with Rule 10b-18,
which amended the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, providing ‘safe harbor’ by guaranteeing
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nonfinancial firms in the U.S. (Crotty, 2005), the nonfinancial corporate sector became
a net (re)purchaser of (nonfinancial corporate) stock during the 1980s. In fact, GE
is an important driver of the sector-level trend. Lazonick (2009) lists GE as number
six of the top fifty share repurchasers between 2000 and 2007 among firms listed in
the S&P index in January 2008.
As with other large nonfinancial companies in the U.S., GE’s total external li-
abilities have simultaneously risen. Figure 4.4a graphs external funds relative to
the capital stock over time, where the bottom two bars – long-term debt and notes
payable, relative to capital – reflect a standard measure of firm leverage. Figure 4.4a
highlights that GE’s leverage rose dramatically after the mid-1980s; as noted above,
this timing is consistent with the sudden expansion of financial asset holdings, pri-
marily concentrated in receivables. Furthermore, while the increase in GE’s leverage
was first dominated by rising short-term debt, rising leverage after the mid-1980s is
concentrated in long-term borrowing.
The vast majority of GE’s total outstanding liabilities are concentrated in GE
Capital. Table 4.3 decomposes total short-term and long-term debt outstanding for
the industrial divisions of GE and GE Capital for five selected years leading up to
and surrounding the financial crisis, and the bottom panel records the percentage of
short-term and long-term debt, respectively, held in GE Capital as a share of the
consolidated firm’s total outstanding debt. In all five years, GE Capital accounts
for a minimum of 97.9% of GE’s total outstanding short-term debt and 96.4% of
GE’s total outstanding long-term debt. These statistics highlight that – as with the
increase in financial assets – GE Capital has been responsible for the vast majority
of GE’s leverage, again capturing the extent to which GE increasingly operates as
that management will not face stock-price manipulation charges for open-market repurchases of the
company’s stock (Grullon and Michaely, 2002). From Figure 4.3 it is clear that GE repurchased
stock prior to the implementation of this rule, but that the magnitude of repurchases increased
dramatically beginning in the 1980-1983 sub-period.
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Figure 4.4: Two measures of GE’s leverage
(a) Outstanding debt relative to capital
(b) Outstanding debt relative to total assets
General Electric Consolidated Company; note the different scales for Figures 4.4a and 4.4b.
Source: Compustat, Author’s Calculations
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Table 4.3: Liabilities of GE Industrial and GE Capital
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
General Electric (Industrial divisions) 
Short-term debt 2,212 4,106 2,375 504 456 
Long-term debt 9,085 11,656 9,827 11,681 9,656 
General Electric Capital Services 
Short-term debt 173,316 192,421 193,533 133,939 118,797 
Long-term debt 252,963 308,504 321,068 327,472 284,407 
Percent of total liabilities held by GE Capital 
Short-term debt 98.7% 97.9% 98.8% 99.6% 99.6% 
Long-term debt 96.5% 96.4% 97.0% 96.6% 96.7% !
Millions of U.S. dollars
Source: Annual reports, selected years; Author’s compilation
a financial company. Thus, GE’s increase in leverage is consistent with a shift in
balance sheet structure that derives from a movement into financial services relative to
industrial activities. Finally, the increase in debt held by the consolidated corporation
is furthermore consistent with shareholder value-based explanations of changes in firm
behavior, according to which firm managers increasingly substitute debt for equity.
While an increase in leverage of the magnitude shown in Figure 4.4a would suggest
structural fragility for an industrial firm, the expansion of GE Capital since the mid-
1980s, and the fact that the overwhelming majority of GE’s debt is concentrated in the
financial services division, suggests that GE’s financial structure should be understood
differently than that of a purely nonfinancial company. Thus, to the extent that
GE’s increase in leverage (and financial assets) derives from the provision of financial
services, whereby the firm exploits a differential between the cost of borrowing and
the return to lending, the expansion of debt (and financial assets) captures a shift
in GE’s focus away from industrial and towards financial activities. Given that a
similar shift in balance sheet structure has occurred over the same period for a large
contingent of U.S. industrial firms, the case of GE suggests that this shift reflects, to
some degree, a movement by nonfinancial companies into the provision of financial
services.
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For a variety of reasons, financial companies carry more leveraged balance sheets
than nonfinancial companies. At a very basic level, physical capital is less important
in the operations of financial firms and, thus, measures of debt to capital are higher for
financial as compared to industrial firms. Furthermore, financial firms derive profit
from the spread between borrowing and lending. Debt and financial asset holdings,
therefore, rise concurrently and, assuming compatibility in term structure or liquid
markets for a firm’s financial assets, these assets can – at least theoretically – be
liquidated to meet liabilities.14 To account for this switch in activity, Figure 4.4b
graphs the evolution of GE’s outstanding debt relative to total assets, rather than
physical capital. Debt relative to assets increased during the mid-1980s, concurrent
with the expansion of GE Capital; beginning in 1990-1994, net leverage has, however,
remained relatively constant.
4.4 A retreat from finance? GE after the 2008 financial crisis
As was highlighted by the financial crisis in 2008, however, the issue of balance
sheet risk for an industrial-financial conglomerate is not nearly so simple. As GE
Capital – like other large financial institutions – faced a major contraction, the nar-
rative surrounding GE and GE Capital quickly changed, such that GE Capital was
increasingly seen as a liability, rather than a dynamic source of earnings growth. One
news report writes, for example, that “With interests in technology, manufacturing
and media, General Electric is highly diversified – a position that should help prop
up earnings in this troubled economic environment. GE has one blemish, however,
GE Capital” (CBS News, 12-28-2008). A particularly clear example of GE’s losses
14This is by no means to say that financial firms were not excessively leveraged in the years
leading up to the financial crisis in 2008 and there has been considerable recent attention to reigning
in leverage and raising capital requirements, generally in the context of (officially) financial firms
(for an example, see Crotty, 2009). Furthermore, the interest rate spread is not financial firms’ only
source of profits, and fee income has become increasingly important over the period discussed in this
chapter as well.
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from the crisis is the failure of Western Mortgage Company, whose failure saddled
GE with $1 billion in direct losses.
Rather than being limited to one bad acquisition, however, the crisis illustrated
more fundamental problems with the highly leveraged nature of GE’s balance sheet.
When asset markets froze, previously liquid assets became difficult to liquidate, as
was evident with WMC.15 GE also faced problems on the liability side of its balance
sheet, illustrated most starkly when the market for commercial paper froze in 2008,
making it increasingly difficult for GE to roll over its short-term debt. While financial
firms are the largest players on both the supply and demand side of the commercial
paper market, very large nonfinancial firms are also issuers of commercial paper, and
GE is among the largest issuers (Kacperczyk and Schnabel, 2010). Table 4.4 records
the percentage of GE Capital’s liabilities between 2006 and 2010 concentrated in
commercial paper, and illustrates that, going into the crisis, GE relied heavily on
commercial paper to meet its short-term obligations. The vast majority of GE’s
commercial paper was unsecured – i.e. not backed by any in-house asset.16
During the financial crisis and recession, GE therefore faced not only a decline
in demand for its industrial products, but also a balance sheet contraction stemming
from its highly leveraged financial structure. This fragility was, in fact, foreshadowed
by the relative sales growth of GE Capital and the Consolidated company, even prior
to 2000: while sales growth in GE Capital generally exceeded that of the consolidated
15Furthermore, GE’s official balance sheet numbers did not reflect securitized loans — credit-card
debt, commercial mortgages and equipment financing — held off-balance sheet in special-purpose
entities, which required the parent company to post collateral if defaults reached a set rate. In
2007, GE’s holdings of these off-balance sheet securities was estimated at $43 billion (Business Week
Magazine).
16In October 2008, GE accessed the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), which was set
up as a liquidity backstop to counter-act the freezing of the commercial paper market (Kacperczyk
and Schnabel, 2010). Additionally, the FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP)
backed $139 billion in GE Capital’s (unbacked) debt (Layne and Christie, 2008). GE was able to
qualify for this funding facility due to a loophole by which GE owned both a federal savings bank
and an industrial loan company and, therefore, already had a part of its business covered by FDIC
insurance.
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Table 4.4: Share of commercial paper in GE’s outstanding liabilities
GE Capital: Commercial Paper Issues as percentage of total outstanding liabilities (of the consolidated company) !!!!
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total Commercial Paper Outstanding 38.41% 24.20% 22.86% 14.70% 3.24% 
     Unsecured U.S. Commercial Paper 25.85% 22.69% 19.02% 11.17% 0.00% 
     Asset-backed U.S. Commercial Paper 2.47% 1.50% 1.11% 0.72% 0.00% 
     Non-U.S. Commercial Paper 10.09% 0.01% 2.74% 2.82% 3.24% !
Millions of U.S. dollars; commercial paper measured relative to total liabilities of GE Condolidated
Source: Annual reports, selected years; Author’s compilation
company, the declines in bad years were also more dramatic. In effect, GE Capital is
more volatile than the company’s industrial core. Thus, the case of GE highlights the
difficulties of interpreting growing leverage among firms linking industrial and finan-
cial activities. This point applies, more broadly, to nonfinancial firms that operate
large financial divisions: while “commercial firms are increasingly creating finance
subsidiaries in order to benefit from the upside of riskier trading operations, the crisis
showed that it is difficult for parent companies to both benefit from profits in good
times and insulate themselves from risk in bad times” (Taub, 2010).
Since the financial crisis, GE has furthermore lost aspects of its competitive ad-
vantage in financial services. First, GE’s bond rating was downgraded by S&P in 2009
from triple-A to AA+, and by Moody’s in 2012 to Aa3. Moody’s further downgraded
the debt of GE Capital to A1 – one notch lower than the parent company. Second, GE
was designated ‘systematically important’ by the U.S. Financial Stability Oversight
Council set up under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act to provide stability monitoring for the financial sector. This designation estab-
lishes GE as a ‘non-bank financial company’ under Section 113 of the Dodd-Frank
Act, and subjects GE to increased regulation. Importantly for the structure of the
firm, the designation requires GE to reduce the size of its capital division to less than
thirty percent of the consolidated company’s revenues, sales or profits.
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To reduce the size of its financial arm, GE is preparing to sell off its retail arm,
and in March 2014, filed for an IPO for Synchrony Financial, which includes the
company’s well-known private-label credit card division, expected to take place later
in 2014. In reducing the size of its capital division, there is a clear reduction in
the scope of the finanical division to ‘captive finance’ – i.e. towards focusing on
those financial services that are directly related to GE’s industrial products including,
for example, aviation services (aircraft leasing). Thus, GE is not moving out of
finance entirely, but returning to captive finance and, thus, to establishing stronger
links between the industrial and financial aspects of the business. The fact that
the range of GE Capital’s activities has expanded so far beyond captive finance in
the first place highlights that GE is in some respects exceptional relative to other
nonfinancial companies with financing divisions. While financial services can support
industrial earnings and even crowd in industrial demand – as the rationale for GE’s
consumer finance division in 1932 illustrates – financial service divisions also open up
nonfinancial firms to an additional source of risk. This additional source of risk is
the flip-side of the interdependent expansion of industry and finance in the context
of GE elaborated in Section 4.3.
4.5 Conclusion
The example of GE captures changes in both the behavior of nonfinancial firms
and in the structure of the financial sector, wherein ‘non’-financial companies are
increasingly involved and competitive in financial activites. Among nonfinancial firms,
GE is exceptional both in terms of sheer size and in the extent to which GE Capital has
moved beyond ‘captive finance’. This exceptionalism, however, makes GE an excellent
case study with which to explore the ‘financialization’ of nonfinancial corporations in
the U.S. economy. The case of GE highlights, first, that the dramatic expansion in
both financial asset holdings and outstanding debt – both of which are trends that
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have been highlighted in the existing literature on financialization and nonfinancial
corporations – are strongly linked with GE’s increasing involvement in the provision
of financial services. Second, the case study is consistent with accounts emphasizing
shareholder value motives as an important driver of changes in firm financial behavior
in the post-1980 U.S. economy. Importantly, GE’s financial services division may
have made it easier for the nonfinancial (parent) company to meet (or beat) stock-
market earnings expectations. Furthermore, these conclusions can be linked with the
large-sample econometric results in Chapter 5, which suggest, on the one hand, that
the provision of financial services may positively influence fixed investment among
very large firms like GE, but on the other hand, that shareholder value norms are
negatively associated with investment rates.
Thus, the case study of GE provides important insights into the nature of the link
between finance and industry within nonfinancial corporations in the U.S. economy.
Importantly, the case of GE does not clearly suggest that movement into financial
services came at the expense of an expansion in industrial activity. As such, GE’s
narrative does not lend credence to the contention that financial asset holdings, or
‘financialization’ more broadly, necessarily crowd out nonfinancial firms’ investment
in fixed capital. Quite the contrary, the case of GE highlights some clear sources
of interdependence, particularly in the case of captive finance activities. Captive fi-
nance activities provide nonfinancial companies the opportunity to capture or ‘crowd
in’ demand for their industrial products, while simultaneously earning profits from
the provision of the financial service. However, the case of GE also points to differen-
tial ‘upside’ and ‘downside’ risks to a large financial services division. In particular,
via GE Capital, General Electric not only faced a contraction in demand, but was
also open to significant additional balance sheet risk in the 2008 financial crisis. Fur-
thermore, given that GE’s primary source of short-term financing (commercial paper)
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froze, this balance sheet risk did not have a clear counter-advantage in less interrupted
access to credit markets that one may expect for a firm managing its own financing.
While the example of GE is dramatic, given the size and scope of GE Capital,
it develops intuition regarding the financialization of large corporations in the post-
1980 U.S. economy. Most importantly, detailed examination of an individual firm
can both clearly delineate the ways in which that firm has become increasingly in-
tertwined with financial markets, and the implications for understanding observed
changes in a firm’s balance sheet structure. In turn, these behavioral mechanisms
contribute to the literature on financialization and nonfinancial firms, in which clear
links between firm behavior and firms’ financial statements or balance sheet outcomes
are often blurred. As such, a case-study approach complements large-scale firm-level
or aggregate-level empirical studies, and the case study approach in this chapter
points to the potential for qualitative approaches in analyzing the financialization of
nonfinancial corporations.17
Importantly, the scope of the intuition garnered from the case of GE is limited
to the largest firms in the U.S. economy. Small (or even medium-sized) firms do
not, on the other hand, command the same competitive advantages as (very) large
nonfinancial companies in the provision of financial services and, accordingly, have
likely engaged with financial markets in the post-1980 period in dramatically different
ways. As Chapter 2 highlighted, the financial structure of small firms has evolved
differently from that of large firms in the post-1970 U.S. economy, suggesting that the
stories of the financialization of small and large firms differ. The largest firms among
which GE is included are, however, important drivers of employment and capital
accumulation, and better understanding of the links between finance and industry
within these firms is likely to have important macroeconomic implications. As such,
17The journal “Studies in Economics and Finance” did a special issue on qualitative research in
finance in 2007.
101
the case of GE, by pointing to specific changes in an individual firm’s behavior and
linking these changes to GE’s financial structure, complements existing analyses of
financialization and NFCs.
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CHAPTER 5
AN INVESTIGATION OF FIRM-LEVEL INVESTMENT
BEHAVIOR, 1971-2011
5.1 Introduction
The increasingly dominant role of finance over the post-1970 period in the U.S.
has, in recent years, led to a growing literature on financialization. While the precise
concept of financialization varies considerably across analyses, the shared premise is
that financial sector growth signifies an important structural change in the U.S. econ-
omy. The growing dominance of finance is highlighted by a sustained increase in the
share of financial-sector profits in total corporate profits since the early 1970s (Kripp-
ner, 2012). With respect to nonfinancial business, financialization is manifested in an
increasingly complex relationship between nonfinancial corporations (NFCs) and the
financial sector. Many large NFCs increasingly resemble financial companies, while
the hostile takeover movement and the emergence of shareholder value ideology point
to changes in corporate governance that have arguably increased the weight of short-
term valuations of firm performance in managerial decision-making (Crotty, 2005;
Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). Changes in NFC financial behavior are reflected in
both an increasing share of financial assets in firm portfolios, and in changes in the
structure of external finance, including increasing indebtedness and growing equity
repurchases among large firms.
This chapter explores changes in firm-level fixed investment behavior in the post-
1970 U.S. economy, emphasizing the implications of changes in NFC financing behav-
ior, increasingly entrenched shareholder value norms, and rising firm-level volatility
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for fixed investment. Recent work provides empirical support for the contention that
changes associated with a broadly-defined phenomenon of financialization inhibit fixed
investment. Stockhammer (2004) finds that rising rentiers’ income explains roughly
one third of a slowdown in capital accumulation in the U.S. (p. 736), and Van Treeck
(2008) argues that rising rentier incomes are responsible for a diversion of funds
from physical investment into consumption expenditure. This literature generally
emphasizes the aggregate level, a key exception being Orhangazi (2008), who finds
that increased payments by NFCs to the financial sector and higher financial profits
earned by NFCs constrain fixed investment, particularly among large firms.
While these analyses point to important empirical relationships regarding fixed
investment and increased flows between NFCs and the financial sector, they also
raise further questions. In particular, the use of financial profits, rentiers’ income or
payments to the financial sector as indicators of financialization raises the question of
what changed over the post-1970 period causing these measures to rise in a dramatic
and sustained way. Take, for example, Orhangazi’s (2008) finding that increased
flows of funds between NFCs and the financial sector constrain NFC investment rates.
These financial flows stem from firm decisions to acquire financial assets, or to borrow,
repurchase stocks or pay dividends. On the one hand, an increase in NFC payments to
the financial sector — due, for example, to an increase in interest payments — draws
(by definition) on the pool of available funds and, therefore, comes at a short-run
tradeoff with other uses of funds, including physical investment. On the other hand,
higher leverage — and correspondingly higher interest payments — results from a
firm’s decision to borrow in pursuit of some objective: profits, long-run growth, a
stock price increase, or to cover rising interest obligations. The implications for fixed
investment are likely to vary with this motivation; borrowing to acquire fixed capital,
for example, differs from borrowing to buyback stock. Thus, the question arises of
why NFC leverage grew over the post-1970 period and, more broadly, what factors
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underlie the observed changes in NFC financial behavior over recent decades and with
what implications for fixed investment?
This chapter explores this question via an econometric investigation of a firm-level
investment function. The empirical specification draws on theories of investment in
the spirit of Keynes and Minsky, which impart a key role to financial factors in in-
vestment decisions. Because the decision to invest involves not only a decision about
the proposed investment, but also a decision about how to finance that investment, a
firm’s investment and financing decisions are interdependent. A large empirical liter-
ature based on this body of theory emphasizes the relevance of financial determinants
of investment (Kuh and Meyer, 1957; Fazzari and Mott, 1986; Fazzari et al., 1988;
Ndikumana, 1999; Brown et al., 2009). This theoretical perspective starkly contrasts
a mainstream literature, which – on the assumptions of perfect capital markets and
perfect information – disregards financial factors in describing investment behavior
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Jorgenson, 1963).
In addition to financial variables, the econometric specification in this chapter
includes two variables capturing changes in the context within which NFCs make
investment and financing decisions specific to the post-1970 period: increasingly en-
trenched shareholder value norms, and rising firm-level volatility. Using a firm-level
panel of publicly-traded firms in the U.S., the empirical results highlight the economic
significance of both factors in inhibiting the allocation of funds for fixed investment.
In doing so, this chapter extends the existing literature on financialization and invest-
ment by isolating two factors that underlie changes in firm-level financial decisions:
changes in investment behavior are linked to financial decisions, but are rooted in
new corporate governance norms and rising firm-level volatility. The empirical anal-
ysis also emphasizes systematic firm-size differences: shareholder value norms signif-
icantly impact the behavior of large firms, while investment among smaller firms is
more strongly inhibited by rising volatility.
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 summarizes the stylized facts de-
scribing changes in NFC financial structure from 1971 to 2011. Section 5.3 motivates
the econometric specification, and Section 5.4 presents the empirical specification and
data. The econometric results are presented in Section 5.5 and Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 The ‘financialization’ of the nonfinancial corporation
5.2.1 NFC financial decisions: portfolio composition and external finance
Trends in the structure of firm-level balance sheets summarize the changes in NFC
investment and financing behavior over the post-1970 period that point to the ‘finan-
cialization’ of nonfinancial firms.1 On the asset side of firm balance sheets there has
been a marked decline in the share of fixed capital held in NFC portfolios: between
1971 and 2011 the across-firm yearly median of fixed capital relative to sales, shown
by the black line in Figure 5.1a, declined 5.3 percentage points, from 24.1 percent
in 1971 to 18.8 percent in 2011.2 Concurrently, financial assets relative to sales rose
18.1 percentage points, from 27.4% in 1971 to 45.5% in 2011. This portfolio shift
away from fixed capital and towards financial assets has been cited in the literature
on financialization to motivate a possible ‘crowding out’ relationship between finan-
cialization and fixed investment, whereby financial investments increasingly replace
investment in physical assets.
The increase in NFC financial assets holdings is concentrated, first, in liquid short-
term investments and, second, in ‘miscellaneous’ financial assets. Figure 5.1b de-
composes total financial assets into four (exhaustive) subcategories: total current
receivables, cash and short-term investments, investments and advances, and ‘other’
1The data is from Standard & Poor’s Compustat annual industrial database for 1971 through
2011; details on the variables are in Section 5.4.2 and summarized in Table A.2 in the appendix.
2The trend is similar if financial assets are measured relative to total assets. Sales are used here
to proxy for firm size.
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Figure 5.1: Financial assets and capital relative to sales
(a) Financial assets and the capital stock relative to
sales
(b) Components of financial assets relative to sales
Yearly medians
Source: Compustat, author’s calculations
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Table 5.1: Changes in components of financial assets relative to sales for small and
large firms; medians
  All firms Small firms* Large firms** 
  1971 2011 pp change 1971 2011 pp change 1971 2011 pp change 
Total financial assets 27.4% 45.5% 18.1 28.5% 51.4% 22.9 29.8% 47.2% 17.4 
     Cash & short-term investments 4.8% 12.4% 7.6 5.5% 20.4% 14.9 4.9% 9.1% 4.2 
     Current receivables 15.3% 13.7% -1.6 16.0% 13.3% -2.7 15.0% 13.6% -1.4 
     Advances 0.6% 0.0% -0.6 0.0% 0.0% 0 3.3% 2.9% -0.4 
     'Other' financial assets 2.3% 7.6% 5.3 2.3% 5.9% 3.6 2.5% 11.1% 8.6 
Capital  24.1% 18.8% -5.3 18.2% 9.7% -8.5 52.4% 43.9% -8.5 !* A firm is categorized as small if its total assets are in the bottom quartile of the asset distribution for any given
year.
** A firm is categorized as large if its total assets are in the top quartile of the asset distribution for any given year.
Source: Compustat, author’s calculations
financial assets. The first panel of Table 5.1 summarizes the change in total financial
assets, each subcategory and capital between 1971 and 2011. Current receivables
and advances have both grown relatively proportionally to firm-level sales. ‘Other’
miscellaneous financial assets, however, rose from 2.3 percent of sales in 1971 to 7.6
percent in 2011, and the largest increase is in liquid financial assets, which grow from
4.8 percent of sales in 1971 to 12.4 percent in 2011.3
This portfolio shift towards financial assets occurs across firm size. The second
and third panels of Table 5.1 summarize the change in each portfolio component
between 1971 and 2011 for sub-groups of small and large firms, where small firms are
defined as firms with total assets in the bottom quartile of the asset distribution in a
given year, and large firms as those with total assets in the top quartile of the asset
3The documentation on what constitutes ‘other’ financial assets is unilluminating. A similar issue
arises in the Flow of Funds data, in which the largest category of financial assets is an unidentified
category (see Crotty 2005 for a discussion). One can, however, draw inferences from the business
press, which Krippner (2012) cites in listing “an array of new financial instruments—money market
mutual funds, ‘stripped’ treasuries, Euromarket and Caribbean offshore dollar markets, foreign cur-
rency instruments, and portfolios composed of options and futures contracts” held on NFC balance
sheets.
‘Cash and short-term investments’ includes both cash and securities with original maturities less
than one year; because of accounting rules, ‘cash’ cannot be disaggregated from other ‘short-term
investments’.
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Figure 5.2: Debt relative to the capital stock
Source: Compustat, author’s calculations
distribution. Among small firms, total financial assets rose from 28.5 percent of sales
in 1971 to 51.4 percent in 2011, while fixed capital declined from 18.2 percent of sales
to 9.7 percent. Similarly, total financial assets held by large firms increased from 29.8
percent of sales in 1971 to 47.2 percent in 2011, and fixed capital declined from 52.4 to
43.9 percent of sales. While this growth in financial asset holdings is concentrated in
short-term and ‘other’ financial assets for both small and large firms, small firms have
acquired relatively greater shares of liquid assets. Among small firms, liquid financial
assets rose from 5.5 percent of sales in 1971 to 20.4 percent in 2011, while ‘other’
financial assets rose from 2.3 percent to 5.9 percent of sales. Among large firms, on
the other hand, financial asset acquisitions are dominated less by liquid assets, and
are instead concentrated in ‘other’ financial assets, which increased from 2.5 percent
to 11.1 percent of sales from 1971 to 2011.
While the shift in NFC portfolio composition occurs across the distribution of
firms, albeit to varying degrees, changes in the structure of both debt and equity
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Figure 5.3: Equity buybacks
Source: Compustat, author’s calculations
differ decisively by firm size. An increase in gross corporate debt has been cited as
a definitive characteristic of the financialization of nonfinancial corporations (Palley,
2007), and Flow of Funds data clearly documents rising leverage at the sector-level.
At the firm level, however, rising mean leverage across NFCs is simultaneous with
declining median leverage, shown in Figure 5.2, pointing to rising leverage among
large firms and concurrent de-leveraging among small firms. Since the early 1970s,
the distribution of debt among small firms has become increasingly skewed towards
zero, such that in the last five years of the sample (2005-2009) more than 55 percent
of small firms have leverage between zero and twenty-five percent of capital. Among
large firms, on the other hand, the distribution of debt has shifted to the right, such
that there are fewer large firms with ‘low’ leverage in 2011 than in the early 1970s.
Rising debt among large firms is accompanied by a dramatic increase in repur-
chases of own stock. Stock repurchases have received considerable attention in refer-
ence to the shareholder value movement (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Lazonick,
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2009), and the sector-level trend of rising buybacks is well known. While the firm-
level data reinforces this sector-level trend, it also highlights that repurchases are
concentrated among large firms. Figure 5.3 plots the across-firm yearly mean of gross
equity repurchases relative to total outstanding equities for the full sample of firms
and by firm size. While equity repurchases among large firms follow the full-sample
pattern quite closely, repurchases are low among small firms over the entire period.
Furthermore, median buybacks in any given year, both for the full sample and each
sub-sample of firms, are zero, reflecting the bulky and episodic nature of repurchase
plans: firms announce that stock will be repurchased over a set number of years,
followed by years without repurchases.
Concurrent with these changes in the structure of external finance, the correlation
between new borrowing and investment – shown in Figure 5.4 – has declined, indicat-
ing that rising leverage among large firms is not channeled into physical investment.4
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) argue, for example, that leveraged buyouts during the
hostile takeover movement, particularly during the 1980s, contributed to the rise in
corporate debt. Borrowing to buyout a company has no direct link to capital in-
vestment. The same is true of repurchasing stock. The concurrent rise in debt and
repurchases over this period, therefore, suggests that equity may be replaced with
debt on the balance sheets of large firms, while ‘traditional’ financing behavior – debt
finance for the acquisition of physical assets – is breaking down. As with changes on
the asset side of NFC balance sheets, changes in the structure of external finance,
therefore, raise questions about fixed investment in the post-1970 U.S. economy.
5.2.2 Changing corporate governance norms: shareholder value ideology
The growing entrenchment of shareholder value norms is one factor that has likely
shaped the changes in NFC behavior over the post-1970 period that point to the fi-
4A version of this graph appeared in Mason (2013).
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Figure 5.4: Correlation between investment and borrowing over time
Source: Compustat, author’s calculations
nancialization of nonfinancial firms. Institutional changes supporting the emergence
of shareholder value principles began in the 1970s — as inflation increased the value
of corporate plant and equipment relative to low stock prices, supporting the emer-
gence of a corporate takeover market (Krippner, 2012) — and became increasingly
entrenched over the 1980s and 1990s, with the rise of agency theory, institutional
investors and changing norms regarding managerial pay (Lazonick and O’Sullivan,
2000). Agency theory suggests two mechanisms to alleviate agency problems between
managers and shareholders (owners) within firms: a hostile market for corporate
control, which ‘disciplines’ managers via a threat to managerial autonomy (Jensen,
1986, p. 324), and stock option based executive compensation (Jensen and Murphy,
1990). The concurrent rise of institutional investors has supported both a transition
away from long-term stock holding towards higher trading frequency (Lazonick and
O’Sullivan, 2000; Stout, 2012), and the push for stock-option based managerial pay
(Krippner, 2012).
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These institutional changes have gradually led to the internalization of ‘value
maximization’ as a motive driving managerial decision-making. This emphasis on
‘value maximizing’ objectives is summarized by an introductory corporate finance
text, which defines the “fundamental objective of corporate finance: maximizing the
current market value of the firm’s outstanding shares...[The] objective overrides other
plausible goals, such as ‘maximizing profits”’ (Brealey and Meyers, 2012, p. 13).
Observed changes in firm-level balance sheets, furthermore, suggest that this shift
in objectives influences managers’ portfolio and financing decisions. Stock buybacks,
in particular, are a clear manifestation of shareholder value-maximizing objectives:
buybacks improve (stock) market-based valuations of firm performance, reflected in
both a higher share price and in higher return on equity. As such, buybacks both
diminish the likelihood of hostile takeover and increase the value of stock options.
The influence of shareholder value norms on managerial decision-making may,
however, be primarily limited to large firms. This distinction is suggested by Figure
5.3, which indicates that equity buybacks over the post-1970 period are concentrated
among large firms, and is also consistent with evidence that stock option-based pay
is greater among large firms, both in absolute values and relative to firm size, than
among small firms (Core et al, 1999).
5.2.3 Rising firm-level volatility
Rising firm-level volatility over the post-1970 period may have also contributed
to the changes in firm-level financing and investment behavior that point to the
financialization of nonfinancial corporations. Rising firm-level volatility has been
extensively documented in the existing literature (Comin and Phillipon, 2005), and
has been linked, for example, to new information and communication technologies
leading to shorter product life cycles (Skott and Guy, 2013). Figure 5.5 plots demand
volatility for firms in this sample, defined as the coefficient of variation in the firm-
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Figure 5.5: Volatility (the coefficient of variation in S/K)
Source: Compustat, author’s calculations
level sales-to-capital ratio, where the standard deviation and mean are based on five
years of lags. Volatility for the full sample of firms, shown by the grey line, rises
almost one hundred percent between 1971 and 2011, and volatility among large firms
increases approximately fifty percent, from 11.5 percent in 1971 to 16.9 percent in
2011. Relative to large firms, however, volatility among small firms increased far
more dramatically, nearly doubling from 28.4 percent in 1971 to 53.8 percent in
2011. Figure 5.5, therefore, suggests that rising firm-level demand volatility provides
particular insight into the behavior of small firms over the recent financialization of
the U.S. economy.
For example, higher volatility, reflecting greater uncertainty, is likely to drive
higher demand for liquid assets. Bates et al (2009) find evidence that idiosyncratic risk
(firm-level volatility) is a determinant of increased cash holdings over this period (p.
2018). This evidence is consistent with the fact that small firms hold relatively greater
shares of liquid – as opposed to non-liquid – financial assets than large firms (see
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Table 5.1). Higher volatility and correspondingly greater uncertainty regarding future
demand may similarly be a factor behind de-leveraging among small firms. Similarly,
volatility may affect the decision to invest in fixed capital. Capital investments are
long-term and largely irreversible; in a more volatile environment, investment demand
is likely to be lower for given expected returns.
5.3 Investment
5.3.1 Framework
To motivate the econometric specification used below, this section outlines the
firm-level determinants of investment demand, providing a framework for exploring
the implications of changes in NFC portfolio composition and financing behavior for
fixed investment. Consider a firm that invests in two types of assets – fixed capital
(K) and financial capital (M) – and that finances its expenditures via a combination
of internal funds, new debt (D), and proceeds from new equity issues. Using a dot
over a variable to denote a time rate of change, the firm’s uses of funds include
the acquisition of new assets, whether fixed capital (K˙ = I) or financial assets (M˙),
dividend payments to shareholders (Div), and interest payments on outstanding debt
(idebtD, where idebt is the firm’s cost of borrowing). The firm’s sources of funds include
profits earned on fixed capital (P ), returns earned on financial assets (idepM , where
idep is the financial profit rate), new share issues (N˙ new shares at a price of ν per
share), and new borrowing (D˙).
The firm’s finance constraint can then be expressed as:
pI + M˙ +Div + idebtD = P + idepM + υN˙ + D˙ (5.1)
where p denotes the price of the investment good. Equation 5.1 is an identity, cap-
turing that a firm’s total sources of funds must be equivalent to the firm’s total uses
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of funds. This expression highlights the interdependence of investment and financ-
ing decisions: decisions to invest in fixed capital or to acquire financial assets are
concurrent with decisions about how to finance that asset acquisition.
For a given set of objectives, the firm’s desired stocks of capital, financial assets
and debt (K∗, M∗, and D∗) can be defined as the levels the firm would select if it
could adjust each stock freely in pursuit of these objectives, subject to labor market,
demand and financing constraints.5 A higher expected profit rate on fixed capital
(pie) makes holding capital more desirable (K∗pie > 0). Because future profits are
unknown, investment depends on the expected profit rate on new capital. Financing
constraints include both the macroeconomic interest rate environment, and also how
the interest rate faced by an individual firm depends on factors such as leverage and
wealth. All else equal, a higher financial profit rate (idep) makes holding financial
assets more desirable (M∗idep > 0), and a higher cost of borrowing (i
debt) leads to a
smaller desired stock of debt (D∗
idebt
< 0). Due to imperfect competition in goods
markets and imperfections in financial markets – requiring, for example, collateral to
obtain external financing – the desired stocks are finite.
The adjustment of the firm’s capital stock can be described by a stock adjustment
from the current level of each stock towards the desired level. Because K, M and
D are jointly determined, the evolution of the capital stock depends not only on
the discrepancy between the current and desired level of capital, but also on the
simultaneous discrepancies between the current and desired levels of financial assets
and debt. The adjustment of the firm’s capital stock over time (K˙) can, therefore,
be summarized as:6
5Of course, firms do not directly maximize objective functions; however, strict maximization is
not necessary. The key point is that, at any point in time, firms have desired stocks of capital,
financial assets and debt, which are determined in pursuit of the firm’s objectives, and which are
jointly determined due to the finance constraint.
6After including capital, financial assets and debt, the book value of equity is simply a residual;
the adjustment of the stock of equity is, therefore, not included separately here.
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K˙ = f(K∗ −K,M∗ −M,D∗ −D)
It is plausible to assume linear homogeneity, such that a doubling of K∗, for example,
will lead to a doubling of K˙. Thus, the firm’s accumulation rate can be written:
Kˆ =
K˙
K
=
I
K
= f(
K∗ −K
K
,
M∗ −M
K
,
D∗ −D
K
) (5.2)
= f(
K∗
K
,
K∗
K
M∗
K∗
,
M
K
,
K∗
K
D∗
K∗
,
D
K
) (5.3)
As discussed above, the desired levels of each stock (expressed in Equation 5.3
as K
∗
K
, M
∗
K∗ and
D∗
K∗ ) are jointly determined by the expected profit rate, the financial
profit rate and the cost of borrowing.7 Assuming that individual NFCs do not have
price-setting power in financial markets, both the financial profit rate and the cost of
borrowing are exogenous determinants of investment. With imperfect competition in
product markets, however, expected profitability is not an exogenous parameter; ex-
pected profitability is, instead, summarized by the combination of current profits (pi)
and the utilization rate of fixed capital (u), which together capture the demand and
production conditions facing the firm (Skott, 1989). Because expectations regarding
future profits are formed largely on the basis of recent performance, the current profit
rate (pi) is one indicator of expected future profitability. However, un-utilized capital
does not earn profits; thus, the expected return on additional capital also depends
on whether the additional unit of capital will be utilized. If the firm’s utilization
rate is below its desired level, the expected profit rate on additional capital is corre-
spondingly low. Equation 5.4, therefore, summarizes the determinants of investment
demand:
7The stock adjustment in Equation 5.2 similarly describes the adjustment of stocks of financial
assets and debt (M˙ and D˙):
M˙ = h(K∗ −K,M∗ −M,D∗ −D)
D˙ = z(K∗ −K,M∗ −M,D∗ −D)
These three adjustment processes must be jointly satisfied.
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I/K = f˜(pi, u, idep, idebt,
M
K
,
D
K
) (5.4)
The expected signs follow from the discussion above. The profit rate and the
utilization rate are positively related to the investment rate. Financial profitability,
on the other hand, is negatively associated with the investment rate. The financial
profit rate captures the opportunity cost of acquiring fixed rather than financial assets
and, therefore, the ‘hurdle’ rate of return that a manager must expect to earn on fixed
capital in order to invest in fixed rather than financial assets. Similarly, a higher cost
of borrowing is associated with a lower investment rate. Because capital investments
are generally financed with a combination of internal and external funds, an increase
in the cost of external funds decreases investment demand at otherwise equal expected
rates of return.
Turning to the current stocks of financial assets and debt in the firm’s portfolio,
first, the stock of financial assets is positively related to the investment rate. If
the firm’s outstanding stock of financial assets exceeds the desired stock of financial
assets, resources will be reallocated into capital investments, and investment will rise.
The relationship between financial assets and capital, therefore, captures a portfolio
adjustment process whereby, at given rates of return on fixed and financial assets, a
firm holds both financial assets and fixed capital in a relatively stable proportion.8
Last, an increase in the stock of debt, all else equal, decreases the investment
rate. Contrary to financial assets, debt entails future cash payment commitments,
and a larger stock of debt increases both lenders’ and borrowers’ risk, reducing the
firm’s investment demand (Keynes, 1936; Minsky, 1975). From the perspective of
management, a larger stock of debt reduces the firm’s margin of safety with which to
8This adjustment process is consistent with Tobin (1965), who argues that in a monetary economy
with two types of assets, “the community will hold the two assets in proportions that depend on
their respective yields” (Tobin, 1965, p. 678), such that “Capital deepening in production requires
monetary deepening in portfolios” (p. 679).
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respond to adverse shocks (Kalecki, 1971), thereby decreasing managerial willingness
to tie up funds in capital investments. From the perspective of creditors, a large
stock of debt signals potential solvency problems and intensifies agency problems in
the lending relationship, such that a large stock of debt may inhibit a firm’s ability
to obtain (additional) external funds, constraining future investment.
5.3.2 Shareholder value norms
The desired stocks of capital, financial assets and debt (K∗, M∗, and D∗) de-
pend on the firm’s objectives and, thus, the specific functional form of investment
demand depends on these objectives as well. As of yet, these objectives have not
been specified. As discussed in Section 5.2, however, the increasing entrenchment of
shareholder value norms over recent decades has led to the internalization of ‘value
maximizing’ norms and, accordingly, a shift in objectives towards a growing empha-
sis on ‘value’. It has, furthermore, been a frequent claim in the literature that this
growing emphasis on shareholder value has shortened managerial time horizons, such
that managers targeting value are less likely to tie up funds in long-term, irreversible
capital investments than managers targeting ‘traditional’ objectives.
The implication is that a growing emphasis on ‘value maximizing’ objectives has
a direct negative effect on NFC investment rates, which can be captured via a shift
in the investment demand function:
I/K = f˜(u, pi, idep, idebt, K,M,D;Sv) (5.5)
where Sv denotes shareholder value objectives and (I/K)Sv < 0. Equation 5.5 states
that at an otherwise equal financial profit rate, expected profit rate, utilization rate,
cost of borrowing, and stocks of capital, financial assets and debt, a manager aiming to
maximize a firm’s stock market valuation will allocate fewer funds towards long-term
capital investment projects than a manager targeting traditional objectives.
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Stockhammer (2004) also argues that shareholder value ideology constrains in-
vestment via changing managerial preferences. Empirically, Stockhammer equates
shareholder value objectives with rentiers’ income, a variable that is similar to fi-
nancial profits. Because rentiers’ income is endogenous to the investment decision,
however, it is also interrelated with the firm’s other financial decisions, such as the
use of debt and equity. Equating shareholder value objectives with rentiers’ income,
therefore, omits changes in a firm’s response to a given cost of borrowing or finan-
cial profitability that may accompany an increased emphasis on shareholder value.
Here, the implications of shareholder value norms are, instead, explored via a shift
in the finance constraint to allow for possible impacts of shareholder value norms on
other financial decisions, in addition to investment. Specifically, the implications of
shareholder value objectives are explored via the impact of shareholder value norms
on investment, where the growing entrenchment of these norms can be understood as
exogenous to the individual firm.
5.3.3 Firm-level volatility
On the other hand, for given objectives, a firm’s desired stocks of capital, financial
assets and debt also depend on its environment, and rising volatility over the post-
1970 period signals changes in the environment within which NFCs make investment
and financing decisions. Higher volatility reflects greater uncertainty; thus, all else
equal, a manager facing high volatility is expected to invest less in fixed capital, which
is generally long-term and largely irreversible, than a manager facing low volatility.
As with shareholder value norms, the impact of firm-level volatility on the investment
decision can be expressed via a shift in the investment demand function, capturing
that managers react differently to the same financial variables in a highly volatile or
a less volatile environment. Incorporating volatility (V ), Equation 5.6 presents the
final investment specification:
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I/K = f˜(u, pi, idep, idebt, K,M,D;Sv, V ) (5.6)
In addition to shareholder value norms and volatility, other factors – in particu-
lar, changes in the competitive environment stemming from increased international
competition and the globalization of production – are also likely to influence NFC in-
vestment behavior over the post-1970 period.9 Rather than proposing an exhaustive
explanation of factors causing changes in investment behavior, however, this chapter
focuses more narrowly on the implications of two particular channels for domestic in-
vestment. The exclusion of other potentially relevant factors is, however, a limitation
of this chapter.
5.4 Empirical strategy and data
5.4.1 Statistical specification
The empirical specification of the investment function follows from the discussion
in Section 5.3:
(I/K)it =β0 + β1(I/K)i,t−1 + β2ui,t−1 + β3pii,t−1 + β4i
dep
i,t−1 + β5i
debt
i,t−1
+β6(
M
A
)i,t−1 + β7(
D
A
)i,t−1
+β8Rk,t−1 + β9Vi,t−1 + it
(5.7)
where A denotes total assets, the subscript i denotes the firm, t denotes the year, and
k denotes industry.
In addition to the terms discussed above, the empirical specification includes a
lagged dependent variable to incorporate dynamic effects in the adjustment of the
capital stock. These dynamic effects capture persistence and path dependencies in
9The development of global value chains and the offshoring of production, such that capital is
moved abroad but sales are recorded in domestic income accounts, are additional factors behind the
declining capital to sales ratio (see, for example, Milberg, 2008).
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investment stemming from the long-term nature of capital investments, irreversibil-
ities in investments, and adjustment costs in the acquisition and implementation of
new capital. Thus, the coefficient is expected to be positive (β1 > 0).
The remaining expected signs follow from Section 5.3. The coefficient on capac-
ity utilization (u) is expected to be positive (β2 > 0) and, controlling for capacity
utilization, the coefficient on the profit rate is also expected to be positive (β3 > 0).
Both the financial profit rate and the cost of borrowing are expected to be negatively
related to fixed investment (β4 < 0 and β5 < 0). Finally, the coefficient on the stock
of financial assets is expected to be positive (β6 > 0), while the coefficient on the
firm’s outstanding stock of debt is expected to be negative (β7 < 0).
In the empirical specification, shareholder value norms are represented by the
yearly industry-level average of gross stock repurchases relative to total equity (Rkt).
The variable captures the impact on investment of the expectations of (stock) market
participants that managers target stock market-based indicators of firm performance
over profit or growth objectives. It is important to note that, because the objective is
to explore the implications of changing corporate governance norms on investment, the
repurchases variable does not explore the direct effect of an individual firm’s decision
to repurchase stock on its own investment. The independent inclusion of firm-level
repurchases would, however, provide little econometrically relevant information about
investment due to the bulky and episodic nature of stock repurchase plans.
The expectation is that norms encouraging managerial ‘maximization’ of market-
based value impinge on the allocation of resources for fixed investment (β8 < 0). In
particular, managers operating in industries in which average repurchases increase,
then also face pressure to target financial indicators of firm performance, due to
the fact that the firms in each industry constitute a comparison group against which
managerial performance is evaluated. An increase in average repurchases among firms
in industry k indicates that other firms in industry k are repurchasing stock, thereby,
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both improving financial metrics of performance such as earnings per share and return
on equity, and increasing the value of their own stock options. Consequently, as a
manager in this industry, you also face pressure to target these financial indicators.
Not doing so, first, makes your firm appear undervalued on the stock market relative
to your competitors, thus making your firm a candidate for corporate takeover and
risking your position of authority as a manager. Second, the value of the stock option
pay of other managers in your peer group rises relative to your own. The resulting
pressure to reallocate funds towards financial performance squeezes fixed investment.
As suggested by the discussion in Section 5.2, however, shareholder value norms
are expected to primarily influence the behavior of large corporations. These large
corporations also drive the sector-level trends. Thus, the relationship between the
repurchases variable and the investment rate is expected to be negative for large
firms and for the full sample; however, the effect is expected to be stronger for large
firms. With less evidence that shareholder value norms impact the behavior of smaller
firms, the coefficient is expected to be insignificant for subsamples of small firms.
Similarly, managers of firms facing high volatility are expected to be less willing to
tie up funds in long-term fixed investment projects, and more apt to acquire financial
assets. Thus, an increase in firm-level volatility is expected to have a negative effect
on fixed investment (β9 < 0). Furthermore, like shareholder value norms, volatility
is expected to have differential effects on investment for different sized firms, and in
particular, to most strongly impact investment rates of small firms.
5.4.2 Estimation strategy
The empirical specification also includes time- and firm-level fixed effects. These
fixed effects capture unobservable year- and firm-specific factors that are relevant for
describing a firm’s behavior but cannot be explicitly controlled for in the regression —
in the case of firm fixed effects, for example, managerial capability. The estimations
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use the Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), which accounts for
potential endogeneity arising from the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable and
firm-level fixed effects in a panel setting.
The estimations also include additional lags of the explanatory variables. The
inclusion of lags is standard in empirical work on investment functions (Fazzari et
al, 1988; Fazzari and Mott, 1986; Ndikumana, 1999). Because managers act sub-
ject to uncertainty and imperfect information, investment decisions are based on
expectations regarding the future. These expectations, formed on the basis of recent
experience, are captured empirically by lags of the explanatory variables. Results
are reported for three lags of the explanatory variables. Estimations with two lags
are similar but show evidence of second order autocorrelation in the errors, which
is ameliorated by the inclusion of the third lag. Because volatility is constructed on
the basis of a five-year moving average and, therefore, incorporates multiple years of
information, only the first lag of volatility is included.
It is, finally, important to note inherent difficulties in empirical analyses of invest-
ment functions. The interdependence of portfolio and financing decisions introduces
potential endogeneity between the financing variables and the investment decision.
In this analysis, two steps are taken to ameliorate the potential for bias. First, the es-
timates are based on lagged rather than contemporaneous values of the explanatory
variables. Fazzari and Mott (1986) use a similar procedure: “Because all invest-
ment must be financed somehow, either internally or externally, current investment is
closely linked to current finance by definition. Omitting the contemporaneous finance
variables from the regression and using only lagged values alleviates this problem” (p.
179).10 The investment rate is, similarly, defined as a function of lagged explanatory
10Additional justification for this choice stems from the fact that, for example, profits earned in
period t are still unrealized when investment decisions in period t are made, whereas profits from
period t− 1 are already realized and, therefore, a determinant of the decision to invest.
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variables in Orhangazi (2008) and Stockhammer (2004). Second, the Arellano-Bond
methodology, which corrects for endogeneity introduced by the lagged dependent vari-
able by instrumenting I/Kt−1 with its own lags, is extended to the other potentially
endogenous variables. Thus, the variables appearing in the firm’s finance constraint
(pi, idep, idebt, M , D) are also instrumented with their own lags using GMM.
5.4.3 Data
The sample is an unbalanced panel of annual data for publicly traded nonfinancial
U.S. firms from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database between 1971 and 2011.
Table 5.2 summarizes descriptive statistics for the full sample and by size quartiles,
where size is defined by total assets. The variable definitions are as follows. The
investment rate is capital expenditures relative to the capital stock. This investment
rate refers to domestic investment. Capacity utilization is defined as sales relative
to the capital stock. Because there is no direct analog for capacity at the firm level,
this definition of capacity utilization is standard in empirical studies using firm-level
data (Fazzari and Mott, 1986; Orhangazi, 2008). The profit rate on fixed capital is
defined as profits (gross operating income) relative to the capital stock. Analogously,
the financial profit rate is financial profits (non-operating income) relative to the
outstanding stock of financial assets. Financial assets are the sum of cash and short-
term investments, current receivables, ‘other’ investments, and advances. The cost
of borrowing is the firm’s effective interest burden: interest payments relative to
total debt. This variable captures factors contributing to a firm’s cost of obtaining
external finance, such as the firm’s bond or credit rating, banking relationships and
outstanding lines of credit. The financial profit rate and effective interest burden are
adjusted for inflation using the GNP deflator. Shareholder value norms are captured
by the yearly industry average of gross stock repurchases relative to total outstanding
equity. Finally, volatility is the coefficient of variation in firm-level sales-to-capital
125
T
ab
le
5.
2:
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
st
at
is
ti
cs
  
  
A
ll 
fir
m
s 
1s
t Q
ua
rti
le
 (S
m
al
l) 
2n
d 
Q
ua
rti
le
 
3r
d 
Q
ua
rti
le
 
4t
h 
Q
ua
rti
le
 (L
ar
ge
) 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
M
ed
ia
n 
 
St
d 
D
ev
 
O
bs
 
M
ed
ia
n 
St
d 
D
ev
 
 O
bs
 
M
ed
ia
n 
St
d 
D
ev
 
 O
bs
 
M
ed
ia
n 
St
d 
D
ev
 
 O
bs
 
M
ed
ia
n 
St
d 
D
ev
 
O
bs
 
(I
/K
) t-
1 
ov
er
al
l 
be
tw
ee
n 
w
ith
in
 
0.
27
 
0.
22
 
0.
17
 
0.
18
 
N
=2
37
,4
27
 
n=
17
,9
99
  
T-
ba
r=
13
.2
 
0.
24
 
0.
29
 
0.
22
 
0.
24
  
N
=5
9,
67
7 
n=
91
,3
2 
  
T-
ba
r=
6.
5 
0.
25
 
0.
23
 
0.
21
 
0.
17
 
N
=6
4,
92
7 
n=
10
,5
12
   
T-
ba
r=
6.
2 
0.
21
 
0.
18
 
0.
18
 
0.
12
  
N
=5
8,
92
5 
 
n=
7,
63
4 
   
 
T-
ba
r=
7.
7 
0.
16
 
0.
13
 
0.
14
 
0.
08
  
N
=5
3,
89
8 
 
n=
4,
06
2 
   
T-
ba
r=
13
.3
 
(S
/K
) t-
1 
ov
er
al
l 
be
tw
ee
n 
w
ith
in
 
4.
45
 
18
.0
2 
15
.6
8 
11
.1
9 
N
=2
40
,6
54
 
n=
18
,0
23
  
T-
ba
r=
13
.4
 
5.
90
 
24
.9
2 
20
.0
7 
16
.2
0 
N
=6
0,
35
7 
n=
9,
16
3 
  
T-
ba
r=
5.
9 
5.
81
 
18
.1
8 
17
.1
0 
9.
48
 
N
=6
5,
57
7 
n=
10
,5
44
  
T-
ba
r=
6.
2 
4.
59
 
13
.3
7 
13
.5
4 
5.
97
  
N
=5
9,
70
2 
n=
7,
67
0 
  
T-
ba
r=
7.
8 
2.
37
 
9.
30
 
9.
81
 
4.
18
 
N
=5
5,
01
8 
n=
4,
09
2 
   
T-
ba
r=
13
.4
 
π t
-1
 
ov
er
al
l 
be
tw
ee
n 
w
ith
in
 
0.
32
 
16
.9
3 
14
.5
5 
11
.0
1 
N
=2
40
,0
25
 
n=
18
,0
17
  
T-
ba
r=
13
.3
 
-0
.0
6 
12
.6
8 
9.
92
 
8.
22
 
N
=6
0,
19
0 
n=
9,
15
3 
  
T-
ba
r=
6.
6 
0.
38
 
4.
68
 
4.
80
 
2.
95
  
N
=6
5,
44
1 
n=
10
,5
34
   
T-
ba
r=
6.
2 
0.
43
 
1.
72
 
1.
86
 
1.
18
 
N
=5
9,
55
8 
 
n=
7,
65
5 
   
T-
ba
r=
7.
8 
0.
31
 
1.
03
 
1.
08
 
0.
78
  
N
=5
5,
01
8 
n=
4,
09
2 
   
  
T-
ba
r=
13
.4
 
ide
p t
-1
 
ov
er
al
l 
be
tw
ee
n 
w
ith
in
 
-0
.0
1 
0.
08
 
0.
05
 
0.
07
 
N
=2
39
,5
37
 
n=
18
,0
29
  
T-
ba
r=
13
.3
 
0.
00
 
0.
11
 
0.
06
 
0.
09
 
N
=6
2,
79
3 
n=
9,
24
3 
  
T-
ba
r=
6.
8 
-0
.0
1 
0.
07
 
0.
05
 
0.
05
 
N
=6
5,
19
4 
n=
10
,5
49
  
T-
ba
r=
6.
2 
-0
.0
1 
0.
06
 
0.
05
 
0.
05
 
N
=5
8,
74
8 
n=
7,
65
2 
  
T-
ba
r=
7.
7 
-0
.0
1 
0.
07
 
0.
05
 
0.
06
 
N
=5
2,
80
2 
n=
4,
07
6 
   
T-
ba
r=
13
.0
 
ide
bt
t-1
 
ov
er
al
l 
be
tw
ee
n 
w
ith
in
 
0.
05
 
0.
23
 
0.
17
 
0.
20
 
N
=2
08
,4
77
 
n=
18
,0
28
 
T-
ba
r=
13
.4
 
0.
07
 
0.
33
 
0.
23
 
0.
27
 
N
=4
7,
91
2 
 
n=
8,
34
3 
  
T-
ba
r=
5.
7 
0.
06
 
0.
25
 
0.
22
 
0.
20
 
N
=6
5,
27
4 
 
n=
10
,5
50
  
T-
ba
r=
5.
5 
0.
05
 
0.
18
 
0.
15
 
0.
15
 
N
=5
4,
08
8 
 
n=
7,
30
4 
   
T-
ba
r=
7.
4 
0.
05
 
0.
12
 
0.
10
 
0.
10
 
N
=5
3,
42
4 
 
n=
4,
01
8 
   
T-
ba
r=
13
.3
 
(M
/A
) t-
1 
ov
er
al
l 
be
tw
ee
n 
w
ith
in
 
0.
41
 
0.
25
 
0.
06
 
0.
06
 
N
=2
40
,5
53
 
n=
18
,0
35
  
T-
ba
r=
13
.3
 
0.
53
 
0.
27
 
0.
23
 
0.
17
 
N
=6
3,
37
2 
n=
9,
29
7 
  
T-
ba
r=
6.
8 
0.
45
 
0.
24
 
0.
24
 
0.
11
 
N
=6
5,
41
0 
 
n=
10
,5
68
  
T-
ba
r=
6.
2 
0.
37
 
0.
21
 
0.
22
 
0.
09
 
N
=5
8,
88
0 
n=
7,
66
0 
   
T-
ba
r=
7.
7 
0.
31
 
0.
19
 
0.
19
 
0.
09
 
N
=5
2,
89
1 
n=
4,
08
1 
   
T-
ba
r=
13
.0
 
(D
/A
) t-
1 
ov
er
al
l 
be
tw
ee
n 
w
ith
in
 
0.
24
 
0.
35
 
0.
28
 
0.
25
 
N
=2
44
,5
73
 
n=
18
,0
44
  
T-
ba
r=
13
.6
 
0.
18
 
0.
55
 
0.
37
 
0.
40
 
N
=6
3,
53
3 
 
n=
9,
30
3 
  
T-
ba
r=
6.
8 
 
0.
18
 
0.
27
 
0.
26
 
0.
15
 
N
=6
5,
96
1 
 
n=
10
,5
89
  
T-
ba
r=
6.
2 
0.
27
 
0.
25
 
0.
24
 
0.
14
  
N
=5
9,
95
9 
n=
7,
69
4 
   
T-
ba
r=
7.
8 
0.
30
 
0.
19
 
0.
20
 
0.
11
 
N
=5
5,
12
1 
  
n=
4,
10
0 
   
T-
ba
r=
13
.4
 
R t
-1
 
ov
er
al
l 
be
tw
ee
n 
w
ith
in
 
0.
02
 
0.
01
 
0.
01
 
0.
01
 
N
=2
60
,3
80
 
n=
18
,0
54
  
T-
ba
r=
14
.4
 
0.
02
 
0.
01
 
0.
01
 
0.
01
  
N
=6
4,
17
1 
n=
9,
31
4 
   
T-
ba
r=
6.
9 
0.
00
 
0.
06
 
0.
04
 
0.
05
 
N
=6
1,
58
3 
 
n=
10
,2
14
   
T-
ba
r=
6.
0 
0.
00
 
0.
06
 
0.
04
 
0.
05
 
N
=5
6,
99
3 
  
n=
7,
46
5 
   
 
T-
ba
r=
7.
6 
0.
00
 
0.
07
 
0.
04
 
0.
06
 
N
=5
2,
12
6 
 
n=
4,
01
3 
   
T-
ba
r=
13
.0
 
V t
-1
 
ov
er
al
l 
be
tw
ee
n 
w
ith
in
 
0.
18
 
0.
29
 
0.
31
 
0.
16
 
N
=1
63
,5
28
 
n=
14
,7
57
  
T-
ba
r=
11
.1
 
0.
38
 
0.
41
 
0.
40
 
0.
23
  
N
=3
0,
40
4 
n=
5,
36
4 
  
T-
ba
r=
6,
7 
0.
23
 
0.
28
 
0.
29
 
0.
16
 
N
=4
1,
45
5 
n=
7,
08
8 
   
T-
ba
r=
5.
9 
0.
16
 
0.
19
 
0.
21
 
0.
11
 
N
=4
4,
46
7 
  
n=
5,
93
7 
   
T-
ba
r=
7.
5 
0.
12
 
0.
14
 
0.
15
 
0.
10
 
N
=4
7,
20
2 
n=
3,
56
5 
   
T-
ba
r=
13
.2
 
!
S
o
u
rc
e:
C
o
m
p
u
st
a
t,
a
u
th
o
r’
s
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
126
ratio, where the mean and standard deviation are averaged over the previous five years
of data. The ratios are winsorized. These variable definitions, with the Compustat
reference numbers, are also summarized in Table A.3 in the appendix.11
5.5 Results
Table 5.3 presents the regression results for the full sample and for size quar-
tiles. Long-run multipliers, summarizing the total effect of the three lags of each
explanatory variable on investment, are shown in Table 5.4.12
5.5.1 Non-financial determinants of investment
Together, the non-financial determinants of investment — the lagged dependent
variable, capacity utilization and the profit rate — point to the validity of the re-
gression model, and are largely consistent with the standard baseline determinants
of investment. For the full sample of firms, the coefficient on the first lag of the de-
pendent variable is positive and significant, capturing dynamic effects in investment
behavior. With the exception of the smallest quartile of firms, this coefficient is also
positive for all size sub-samples, and the magnitude of the effect becomes stronger as
firm size increases.
The coefficients on capacity utilization and profitability also have the expected
signs in most specifications. Coefficients on both the first lag and the long-run mul-
tipliers for capacity utilization are positive and significant for the full sample of firms
11The rates of return here are pre-tax rates of return; this is a limitation of the available data.
While a firm’s average tax rate can be calculated, it is not possible to determine whether those taxes
are applied to financial or nonfinancial income. The extent to which firms are differentially able
to avoid taxation further discredits attempts to incorporate a firm’s tax burden into the measured
profit rates (tax havens, for example, are likely to be more heavily utilized by large multinational
corporations).
12The long-run multipliers are calculated as follows. Consider, for example, a basic investment
function, in which investment is a function of three lags of both investment and profits: (I/K)t =∑3
i=1 αi(I/K)t−i +
∑3
i=1 βipit−1. The long-run multiplier for profits (LRpi) captures the cumulative
effect of a change in profits on investment: LRpi = (
∑3
i=1 βi)/(1−∑3i=1 αi).
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Table 5.3: Estimation results; dependent variable I/K
  All NFCs 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile  3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
(I/K)t-1 0.2600*** 0.0435* 0.1519*** 0.2991*** 0.4127*** 
  (0.0118) (0.0232) (0.0200) (0.0189) (0.0202) 
(I/K)t=2 0.0165* -0.0654*** -0.0231* 0.0007 0.0040 
  (0.0083) (0.0156) (0.0128) (0.0119) (0.0121) 
(I/K)t-3 0.0032 -0.0381*** -0.0265*** -0.0056 -0.0078 
  (0.0068) (0.0132) (0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0090) 
(S/K)t-1 0.0035*** 0.0030*** 0.0043*** 0.0031*** -0.0001 
  (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0011) 
(S/K)t-2 -0.0007*** -0.0001 -0.0006* 0.0003 -0.0005 
  (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0011) 
(S/K)t-3 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0003 
  (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
πt-1 -0.0007 -0.0016 0.0005 0.0067*** 0.0094** 
  (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0046) 
πt-2 0.0000 -0.0014 0.0009 -0.0040* 0.0003 
  (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0022) 
πt-3 0.0011 0.0009 0.0009 0.0004 -0.0006 
  (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
idept-1 -0.1222* -0.0422 -0.0535 -0.1110 0.0227 
  (0.0670) (0.0715) (0.0894) (0.0705) (0.0371) 
idept-2 0.0884 -0.0045 -0.0328 -0.0029 0.0554* 
  (0.0591) (0.0749) (0.0799) (0.0524) (0.0316) 
idept-3 -0.0157 -0.0417 0.1017** -0.0335 -0.0224 
  (0.0284) (0.0414) (0.0442) (0.0337) (0.0201) 
idebtt-1 -0.0468 -0.0069 -0.0208 -0.0093 -0.0460 
  (0.0295) (0.0287) (0.0269) (0.0250) (0.0284) 
idebtt-2 0.0301 0.0099 0.0015 0.0033 0.0009 
  (0.0319) (0.0323) (0.0272) (0.0245) (0.0228) 
idebtt-3 0.0099 0.0138 0.0124 0.0039 0.0227** 
  (0.0094) (0.0124) (0.0116) (0.0113) (0.0116) 
(M/A)t-1 0.1549*** 0.1689*** 0.1620*** 0.1417** 0.1082** 
  (0.0552) (0.0601) (0.06222) (0.0588) (0.0472) 
(M/A)t-2 0.1036* 0.1607*** -0.0087 0.0878* 0.1105*** 
  (0.0560) (0.0583) (0.0641) (0.0514) (0.0417) 
(M/A)t-3 -0.1002*** -0.0326 -0.0657 -0.0533 -0.0895*** 
  (0.0360) (0.0448) (0.0431) (0.0375) (0.0322) 
(D/A)t-1 -0.1024*** -0.0670** -0.05661 -0.1513*** -0.1640*** 
  (0.0314) (0.0284 (0.0404) (0.0405) (0.0422) 
(D/A)t-2 0.0680** 0.0483* -0.0629 0.0515 0.0124 
  (0.0334) (0.0278) (0.0408) (0.0384) (0.0385) 
(D/A)t-3 -0.0234 -0.0130 -0.0101 -0.0038 0.0369 
  (0.0236) (0.0234) (0.0284) (0.0268) (0.0265) 
Rt-1 -0.3366** -1.0764* 0.2419 -0.1991 -0.4463*** 
  (0.1551) (0.6253) (0.3826) (0.2140) (0.1621) 
Rt-2 -0.2130 -0.7491 -06556* 0.1486 -0.1891 
  (0.1469) (0.6308) (0.3733) (0.2036) (0.1408) 
Rt-3 -0.1862 -1.2875 0.1784 0.0321 -0.4648** 
  (0.1792) (0.7978) (0.4555) (0.2363) (0.1840) 
Vt-1 -0.0990*** -0.0895*** -0.0859*** -0.0726*** -0.0653*** 
  (0.0094) (0.0168) (0.1434) (0.0158) (0.0165) 
Obs 99,096 13,624 21,830 28,397 35,245 
Firms 10,316 2,835 4,153 4,177 3,006 
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan (p value) 0.0000 0.5706 0.0003 0.0321 0.0000 
2nd order auto. 0.4691 0.5347 0.9105 0.5287 0.7697 !The regressions are based on the Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments. The instrument set includes includes
instruments beginning from t − 2, and is restricted to three additional lags of the explanatory variables to keep the
number of instruments less than the number of groups. Coefficients for the year fixed effects are not reported. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. The p values for the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions and for the
Arellano-Bond test of second order autocorrelation are obtained from two-step estimations.
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%.
Each firm-size quartile is defined according to total assets (the first quartile includes firms with total assets below
the 25th percentile of total assets for that year, the second quartile includes firms with total assets above the 25th
percentile and below the 50th percentile of total assets for that year, etc.).
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Table 5.4: Long-run coefficients; dependent variable I/K
  All NFCs 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile  3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
(S/K) 0.0038*** 0.0029*** 0.0041*** 0.0040*** -0.0005 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0020) 
π 0.0005 -0.0020 0.0026 0.0044 0.0153 
  (0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0034) (0.6248) (0.0096) 
idep -0.0687 -0.0834 0.0172 -0.2088* 0.0943** 
  (0.0730) (0.0963) (0.1368) (0.1144) (0.0408) 
idebt -0.0009 0.0158 -0.0077 -0.0028 -0.0378 
  (0.0568) (0.0426) (0.0439) (0.0415) (0.0519) 
(M/A) 0.2197*** 0.2802*** 0.0975 0.2496*** 0.2186*** 
  (0.0503) (0.0655) (0.0162) (0.0679) (0.0519) 
(D/A) -0.0802*** -0.0300 -0.1444*** -0.1469*** -0.1940*** 
  (0.0283) (0.0279) (0.0461) (0.0388) (0.0401) 
R -1.0215** -2.9371** -0.2622 -0.0261 -1.8613** 
  (0.4398) (1.1785) (0.8218) (0.6248) (0.5762) 
V -0.0990*** -0.0895*** -0.0859*** -0.0726*** -0.0653*** 
  (0.0094) (0.0168) (0.1434) (0.0158) (0.0165) !The long-run coefficients are based on the regression results in Table 5.3. Results for volatility are based replicated
from Table 5.3 for comparison. Long-run coefficients are calculated on the basis of an autoregressive process: the
sum of the coefficients on the lags of each variable, divided by one minus the sum of the coefficients on the lags of
investment. The p-values are based on a Chi2 statistic. The standard errors, shown in parentheses, are calculated by
dividing the estimate by square root of the Chi2 statistic.
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%.
and the first three size quartiles; for the largest quartile of firms the coefficient is
negative, but insignificant. The magnitude of the short-run relationship between ca-
pacity utilization and investment, captured by the coefficient on the first lag of S/K,
is large: in the full sample, a one standard deviation increase in capacity utilization
implies a 0.29 standard deviation increase in the investment rate. The short run
coefficient on the profit rate also has the expected sign in the largest three quartiles,
and the estimate is significant for sub-samples of above-median firm size. The long
run coefficients have the expected sign in all but the smallest sample of firms, but
are insignificant. An insignificant coefficient on the profit rate is, however, unsurpris-
ing given that, together, many of the other explanatory variables jointly capture the
profit conditions facing a firm.
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5.5.2 Financial determinants of investment
The results highlight the relevance of changes in NFC financial behavior since the
early 1970s for NFC investment behavior. Beginning with the financial profit rate,
the coefficients on both the first lag and the long-run multiplier for the full sample
of firms are negative as expected, although not statistically significant. In the case
of the financial profit rate, the firm size results are, however, particularly interesting.
While the short run coefficients on the first lag of the financial profit rate for the
smaller three quartiles of firms are negative as expected, the coefficients on both the
first lag and the long-run multiplier for the largest quartile of firms are positive and
– in the case of the long-run effect – statistically significant.
The positive relationship between the financial profit rate and investment among
large firms suggests that large firms capture complementarities between financial prof-
its and the non-financial components of their business that are not generated by
smaller firms. As noted in Section 5.2, large firms have also acquired relatively more
non-liquid (‘other’) financial assets than smaller firms. Together, the different com-
position of financial assets by firm size and the positive coefficient on the financial
profit rate for large firms suggest that small and large firms have different motivations
for acquiring financial assets. While the liquid assets acquired by small firms may
hedge against volatility and risk, the ‘other’ financial assets held by large NFCs may
instead reflect movement into the provision of financial services, namely borrowing
and lending for profit. NFC expansion into car loans and store-issued credit cards are
particularly cogent examples (Froud et al, 2005). Store-issued credit cards, for ex-
ample, generate financial profits and also capture demand for the firm’s non-financial
products, thereby supporting fixed investment.
The coefficient on the first lag of the effective interest burden is negative in all
specifications, but statistically insignificant. Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect
is quite small. For the full sample, a one standard deviation increase in the effective
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interest rate corresponds to a 0.05 standard deviation decline in the investment rate.
The long-run multiplier is also insignificant in all specifications, suggesting that a
higher cost of borrowing has no significant long-run effect on investment. Notably,
Orhangazi (2008) finds a negative, but in most subsamples significant, relationship
between the first lag of NFC payments to the financial sector and fixed investment.
However, Orhangazi’s payments variable combines interest payments with sharehold-
ers payouts (dividend payments and stock buybacks). Importantly, the difference
between Orhangazi’s results and those presented here suggests that the strength of
Orhangazi’s finding captures payouts to shareholders, rather than to creditors.
The stock of financial assets has a positive and robust relationship to fixed invest-
ment in both the short-term and the long-run in most specifications. This finding
does not lend support to the proposition in the financialization literature that finan-
cial assets are crowding out physical investment. Instead, the stock of financial assets
is the only avenue through which post-1970 changes in NFC financial structure are
found to support investment. In the full sample, a one standard deviation increase in
the stock of financial assets is associated with a 0.18 standard deviation increase in the
investment rate. This positive relationship is consistent with the portfolio adjustment
process described in Section 5.3: for given expected returns, firms hold both fixed and
financial assets, and investment increases if the stock of financial assets rises above
the desired level.13 Thus, firms acquire financial assets – which ameliorate inherent
risks of long-term and irreversible capital investments – concurrently with fixed cap-
ital. The magnitude of the coefficient is smaller for large firms, particularly in the
short run, which is consistent with the idea that large firms face fewer constraints
13Empirically, the stock of financial assets may also capture a ‘financing motive’ , summarizing
profitability and demand from previous periods as firms saved up to invest. The empirical results
are, however, robust to omitting financial assets from the regression.
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than small firms in obtaining external finance and, therefore, depend less strongly on
the smoothing function of financial assets.
The stock of financial assets has not been included in the empirical literature on
financialization and investment, and the independent inclusion of the stock of financial
assets and the financial profit rate is an innovation of this analysis. While the stock
of financial assets is found to have a robust positive relationship to fixed investment,
the financial profit rate is negatively related to investment in most specifications.
The difference points to different time implications of the financial profit rate and
an acquired stock of financial assets. An increase in the financial profit rate may
drive a short-term reallocation of funds towards financial assets, but a larger stock of
financial assets provides flexibility to carry out long-term fixed investment projects
despite uncertainty regarding future profits or the cost and availability of external
finance.
Last, for the full sample and all size sub-samples, an increase in the stock of
debt is found to constrain investment. In both the short run and the long run, debt
has a negative and significant relationship to fixed investment in most specifications,
and particularly among large firms. In the full sample, a one standard deviation
increase in the stock of debt is associated with a 0.16 standard deviation decline
in investment. This finding is consistent with the existing literature, which also
highlights a robust negative relationship between a firm’s stock of debt and investment
rate (Ndikumana, 1999; Orhangazi, 2008). Thus, among large firms, whose stocks of
debt rose substantially after the 1970s, this negative relationship points to a marked
decline in the support of external finance for fixed investment in recent decades.
5.5.3 Shareholder value norms
The results, furthermore, capture a negative relationship between shareholder
value norms and fixed investment rates. Both the first lag and the long-run multi-
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plier of the repurchases variable are found to have a significant negative relationship
to NFC investment rates for the full sample of firms, implying that an increase in
average industry-level repurchases leads to a decline in the investment rates of other
firms in that industry. This result suggests that managers in industries in which av-
erage repurchases rise also face pressure to target financial performance indicators.
The pressure to reallocate funds towards financial targets squeezes fixed investment.
This finding is consistent with the financialization literature emphasizing changes
in corporate governance associated with shareholder value ideology (Lazonick and
O’Sullivan, 2000), and the findings here draw a direct link between shareholder value
norms and investment behavior. These conclusions are consistent with Stockham-
mer’s (2004) analysis of the impact of shareholder value objectives on investment,
but provide explicit firm-level, rather than aggregate-level, empirical support for a
negative relationship between shareholder value norms and fixed investment.
The empirical results also reiterate the expected firm-size differences: shareholder
value norms are found to most strongly impact the investment behavior of the largest
quartile of firms. While average industry-level repurchases are also found to be sig-
nificant for the full sample and weakly significant for the smallest quartile of firms,
the magnitude of the effect among the largest firms is considerably greater than for
either the full sample or small firms.14 A one standard deviation increase in average
industry-level repurchases is associated with only a 0.02 standard deviation decline
in investment for the full sample of firms, and a 0.05 standard deviation decline in
investment for the smallest firms. For the largest quartile of firms, however, a one
standard deviation increase in average industry-level repurchases is associated with
14Sub-period estimations, shown in Table A.4 in the appendix, furthermore show that the negative
relationship between shareholder value norms and investment strengthens over the post-1970 period.
Dropping the 1970s – the decade during which shareholder value ideology had not yet become
firmly entrenched – strengthens the estimated effect of shareholder value norms on fixed investment.
Additional robustness checks in the appendix further support the conclusion that shareholder value
norms most substantially and robustly impact the investment behavior of large NFCs.
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a 0.14 standard deviation decline in investment, highlighting that the impingement
of shareholder value norms on fixed investment is largely a phenomenon of large
corporations.
5.5.4 Firm-level volatility
The results also highlight the importance of rising volatility in explaining changes
in NFC investment behavior, particularly among small firms. Rising firm-level volatil-
ity is found to have a negative and significant relationship to fixed investment rates for
both the full sample and each subsample of firms. In the full sample, a one standard
deviation increase in volatility is associated with a 0.13 standard deviation decline
in the investment rate. The magnitude of the effect is, furthermore, greater for the
smallest quartile of firms: among small firms, a one standard deviation increase in
volatility is associated with a 0.17 standard deviation decline in the investment rate.
Among the largest quartile of firms, on the other hand, a one standard deviation
increase in volatility is associated with only a 0.04 standard deviation decline in the
investment rate. Thus, smaller firms are more sensitive to a given increase in volatil-
ity than larger firms, which is consistent with the fact that small firms – with fewer
total assets and market power – are more vulnerable to swings in sales than large
firms. Given that the total increase in volatility is also especially dramatic among
small firms, the cumulative effect of rising volatility is particularly important in ex-
plaining the investment behavior of small NFCs over the post-1970 period. Volatility
has not been raised in the existing literature on financialization and investment; how-
ever, these results suggest that rising volatility is relevant factor underlying changes
in NFC investment rates over the post-1970 period, therefore, contributing to the
changes in firm financial structure pointing to the ‘financialization’ of NFCs.
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5.6 Conclusion
Changes in the portfolio composition and external financing behavior of NFCs over
the post-1970 period in the U.S. raise important questions about fixed investment and
accumulation in a ‘financialized’ economy. This chapter contends that shareholder
value norms and rising firm-level volatility are two factors driving changes in portfolio
composition and external financing behavior, and that both factors have inhibited the
allocation of funds for capital investment between 1971 and 2011. In doing so, this
chapter builds on the literature on financialization, which emphasizes relationships
between fixed investment and financial profits, payments to the financial sector, and
rentiers’ income. These indicators of financialization are, however, endogenous to the
individual firm’s investment decision and are ultimately driven by other changes –
for example, in managerial priorities or the institutional context within which firms
operate. This chapter explores the role of changing managerial priorities and rising
firm-level volatility in driving the sustained changes in NFC financial behavior over
the post-1970 period that have led to sustained growth in financial profits and rentiers’
income.
Shareholder value norms inhibit fixed investment by inducing a shift in managerial
priorities towards financial targets. A large literature critical of shareholder value ide-
ology has raised concerns regarding the implications of shareholder value norms for a
host of key economic variables, including employment, growth, sustainable prosperity
and investment. By emphasizing a link between shareholder value norms and declin-
ing investment rates, this chapter corroborates some of the claims in this literature.
It does so in a novel way, by examining the implications of changing norms regarding
corporate governance and the appropriate allocation of funds for investment behav-
ior. Rising firm-level volatility similarly makes managers less willing to tie-up funds
in long-term and irreversible investment projects and, accordingly, also inhibits fixed
investment.
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Both the descriptive and econometric analysis in this chapter emphasizes differ-
ences by firm size, pointing to two different stories of financialization for large and
for small firms and indicating that the constraints facing small and large firms have
evolved differently over the post-1970 period. While shareholder value norms have
significantly impacted the investment behavior of large firms, the dramatic increase in
volatility facing small firms highlights that rising volatility is particularly important
for explaining the financial behavior of smaller NFCs. Concurrent de-leveraging and
a declining share of capital in small firm’s portfolios, furthermore, suggests that small
firms have faced growing real-side constraints that have led them to borrow less, hold
more liquidity, and invest less in fixed capital.
The analysis in this dissertation lies entirely at the firm level. In many cases,
particularly with the descriptive statistics, large firms mirror the sector and drive the
aggregate trends. Still, further analysis linking the firm level to the aggregate level
is necessary to draw conclusions about capital accumulation and macroeconomic dy-
namics in the U.S. economy. The econometric results also raise some more specific
questions; for example, that large firms may exploit complementarities between fi-
nancial and non-financial activities that are not available to smaller firms, suggested
by the positive relationship between the financial profit rate and investment for large
firms. This finding suggests that further investigations of financialization and nonfi-
nancial corporations should delve more specifically into the types of financial activities
that NFCs engage in. Because of the ambiguity regarding the definitions of ‘other’
financial assets in both the firm level and the aggregate (Flow of Funds) data, this
point also highlights the importance of case studies in further research on financial-
ization and nonfinancial firms. Overall, however, the findings in this chapter suggest
that the increasingly financial orientation of firms in the U.S. economy inhibits fixed
investment, particularly among the largest NFCs, which are traditionally important
sources of both investment and employment in the U.S. economy. As such, the find-
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ings presented in this chapter raise fundamental questions about the sustainability of
increasingly finance-oriented growth.
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APPENDIX
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES
Table A.1: Summary of variable definitions
Variable Compustat Item Numbers
Financial assets: Cash and short-term invest-
ments, current receivables, other current as-
sets (less inventories), and ‘other’ investments
and advances. Measured relative to sales.
Financial assets: 1, 2, 68, 31, 32,
69, respectively.
Sales: 12
Capital: Property, plant and equipment.
Measured relative to sales.
Capital: 141.
Sales: 12
Total debt: Current and long-term debt. 34 and 142, respectively.
Repurchases: Gross repurchases. Measured
relative to total equity.
Gross repurchases: 115
Total equity: 144
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Table A.3: Summary of variable definitions
Variable Definition Compustat Items
I/K Investment rate Capital expenditures relative to the
capital stock (net property, plant and
equipment)
Capital expenditures
(128)
Capital stock (141)
S/K Capacity uti-
lization
Sales relative to the capital stock Sales (12)
Capital stock (141)
pi Profit rate Gross operating income relative to the
capital stock
Sales (12)
Capital stock (141)
isep Financial profit
rate
Gross non-operating income relative to
financial assets 1
Non-operating income
(61)
Financial assets (see
below)
idebt Effective inter-
est burden
Interest payments relative to total debt
(the sum of current and long-term debt)
Interest payments (15)
Total debt (34 and
142)
Mdep Financial assets Cash and short-term investments, cur-
rent receivables, other current assets
(less inventories), and ‘other’ invest-
ments and advances (which includes,
for example, investments in and ad-
vances to unconsolidated subsidiaries
and affiliates, and banks and savings &
loan investment securities, and miscel-
laneous assets such as stock or debt is-
suance costs)
Relative to total assets in econometric
specification)
Financial assets (1, 2,
68, 31, 32, and 69 re-
spectively)
Total assets (6)
D Total debt Current and long-term debt
(Relative to total assets in econometric
specification)
Total debt (34 and
142)
R Industry av-
erage of gross
repurchases
Gross repurchases relative to total eq-
uity
Gross repurchases
(115)
Total equity (144)
V Coefficient of
variation in
sales to capital
ratio2
The standard deviation of S/K relative
to the mean; five year average
Sales (12)
Capital stock (141)
1 The results are robust to financial profits defined as the sum of interest and dividend income.
2 The results are robust to defining the coefficient of variation in profits to capital ratio.
Inflation adjustment based off the GNP deflator.
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Table A.4: Additional specifications; dependent variable I/K
  Column 1 Column 2  Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 1971-2011 1981-2011 
(I/K)t-1 0.2561*** 0.2799*** 0.2762*** 0.1333*** 0.4381*** 0.2600*** 0.2600*** 
  (0.0102) (0.0118) (0.0102) (0.0186) (0.0204) (0.0118) (0.0130) 
(I/K)t=2 0.0324*** 0.0115 0.0266*** -0.0159 0.0142 0.0165* 0.0170* 
  (0.0062) (0.0077) (0.0067) (0.0118) (0.0128) (0.0083) (0.0089) 
(I/K)t-3 0.0099* -0.0012 0.0091 -0.0187* -0.0030 0.0032 0.0043 
  (0.0052) (0.0067) (0.0057) (0.0105) (0.0095) (0.0068) (0.0076) 
(S/K)t-1 0.0030*** 0.0038*** 0.0035*** 0.0035*** 00007 0.0035*** 0.0032*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
(S/K)t-2 -0.0006*** -0.0005** -0.0006*** -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0007*** -0.0005** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
(S/K)t-3 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0005*** -0.0004* 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
πt-1 -0.0008 -0.0011       -0.0007 -0.0012 
  (0.0014) (0.0015)     (0.0015) (0.0017) 
πt-2 -0.0016 -0.0001       0.0000 0.0007 
  (0.0014) (0.0015)     (0.0014) (0.0013) 
πt-3 0.0004 0.0013       0.0011 0.0013 
  (0.0009) (0.0012)     (0.0011) (0.0012) 
idept-1 -0.1447** -0.1487** -0.1684** 0.0024 0.0185 -0.1222* -0.1608** 
  (0.0631) (0.0715) (0.0705) (0.0829) (0.0381) (0.0670) (0.0669) 
idept-2 0.0562 0.0697 0.0999 0.0226 0.0401 0.0884 0.0599 
  (0.0580) (0.0635) (0.0665) (0.0858) (0.0345) (0.0591) (0.0609) 
idept-3 0.0087 -0.0048 0.0147 0.0084 -0.0190 -0.0157 0.0009 
  (0.0242) (0.0293) (0.0268) (0.0393) (0.0211) (0.0284) (0.0282) 
idebtt-1 -0.0121 -0.0455       -0.0468 -0.0813*** 
  (0.0302) (0.0329)     (0.0295) (0.0285) 
idebtt-2 0.0586* 0.0290       0.0301 0.0215 
  (0.0282) (0.0325)     (0.0319) (0.0318) 
idebtt-3 0.0083 0.0124       0.0099 0.0123 
  (0.0067) (0.0095)     (0.0094) (0.0098) 
(M/A)t-1 0.2368***   0.2023*** 0.2407*** 0.1748*** 0.1549*** 0.1425** 
  (0.0546)  (0.0578) (0.0695) (0.0521) (0.0552) (0.0580) 
(M/A)t-2 0.0902*   0.0233 0.0467 0.0756 0.1036* 0.0871 
  (0.0522)  (0.0616) (0.0730) (0.0467) (0.0560) (0.0597) 
(M/A)t-3 -0.1131***   -0.0120 0.0447 -0.1087*** -0.1002*** -0.1037*** 
  (0.0302)  (0.0373) (0.0466) (0.0345) (0.0360) (0.0383) 
(D/A)t-1 -0.1059*** -0.1078*** -0.1186*** -0.0888*** -0.0835** -0.1024*** -0.1101*** 
  (0.0284) (0.0328) (0.0313) (0.0295) (0.0402) (0.0314) (0.0336) 
(D/A)t-2 0.0892*** 0.0702** 0.0148 0.0106 -0.0422 0.0680** 0.0706** 
  (0.0309) (0.0344) (0.0339) (0.0317) (0.0412) (0.0334) (0.0349) 
(D/A)t-3 -0.0178 -0.0190 0.0149 0.0051 0.0360 -0.0234 -0.0173 
  (0.0159) (0.0249) (0.0229) (0.0241) (0.0301) (0.0236) (0.0242) 
Rt-1   -0.3038* -0.2103 -0.4433 -0.3805** -0.3366** -0.6048*** 
    (0.1554) (0.1542) (0.5467) (0.1594) (0.1551) (0.1597) 
Rt-2   -0.2974** -0.1778 -0.6922 -0.1328 -0.2130 -0.1643 
    (0.1448) (0.1427) (0.5032) (0.1423) (0.1469) (0.1525) 
Rt-3   -0.2631 0.1265 -0.5874 -0.4876*** -0.1862 -0.6536*** 
    (0.1821) (0.1759) (0.6741) (0.1858) (0.1792) (0.1830) 
Vt-1   -0.0939*** -0.0995*** -0.1003*** -0.0760*** -0.0990*** -0.0946*** 
    (0.0092) (0.0086) (0.0149) (0.0172) (0.0094) (0.0099) 
Obs 123,556 99,096 121,510 21,286 37,033 99,096 81,917 
Firms 13,319 10,316 11,833 3,683 3,125 10,316 9,394 
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan (p value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3352 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
2nd order auto. 0.3618 0.2219 0.3716 0.3530 0.0843 0.4691 0.5320 !The estimation strategy is identical to that in Table 5.3. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant
at 1%.
Column 1: a baseline investment model that omits shareholder value norms and volatility.
Column 2: omits the stock of financial assets.
Columns 3-5: omits financing variables that are insignificant in full sample and show firm-size results (column 3 shows
the full sample, column 4 the smallest quartile of firms, and column 5 the largest quartile of firms). The results are
robust to dropping insignificant variables, and also reinforce that shareholder value norms primarily impacts large
NFCs.
The last two columns show sub-period estimations: column 6 reproduces the full sample estimations, and column 7
drops 1971-1980.
141
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Aglietta, M. and R. Bretton (2001). Financial systems, corporate control and
capital accumulation. Economy and Society 30 (4), 433-466.
[2] Auerbach, P. (1988). Competition: The economics of industrial change. Oxford:
Blackwell.
[3] Basu, D. (2011). Financialization, household credit and economic slowdown in
the U.S.. Political Economy Research Institute Working Paper Series #261.
[4] Bates, T., K. Kahle and R. Stulz (2009). Why do U.S. firms hold so much more
cash than they used to? The Journal of Finance 64 (5), 1985-2021.
[5] Boyer, R. (2000). Is a finance-led growth regime a viable alternative to Fordism?
A preliminary analysis. Economy and Society 29 (1), 111-145.
[6] Brealey, R. and S. Myers (2012). Principles of corporate finance. Mc-GrawHill,
7th edition.
[7] Brown, J., Fazzari, S., and B. Petersen (2009). Financing innovation and growth:
cash flow, external equity, and the 1990s R&D boom. The Journal of Finance
64 (1), 151-185.
[8] Business Week (2009, May 6). The top 25 subprime lenders. Online:
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/may2009/db2009056
672318.htm (accessed March 24, 2014).
[9] Chandler, A. (1977). The visible hand: The managerial revolution in American
business. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
[10] Cecchetti, S. and E. Kharoubi (2012). Reassessing the impact of finance on
growth. BIS Working Paper Series #381.
[11] Che, Y. and R. Sethi (2013). Credit market speculation and the cost of capi-
tal. Columbia University Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series No.
1314-07.
[12] Comin, D. and T. Phillion (2005). The rise in firm-level volatility: causes and
consequences, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2005 22, 166-228.
[13] Core, J., R. Holthausen, and D. Larcker (1999). Corporate governance, chief
executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 51 (3), 371-406.
142
[14] Crotty, J. (1990). Owner-manager conflict and financial theories of investment
instability: A critical assessment of Keynes, Tobin and Minsky. Journal of Post
Keynesian Economics 12 (4), 519-542.
[15] Crotty, J. (1992). Neoclassical and Keynesian approaches to the theory of invest-
ment. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 14 (4), 483-496.
[16] Crotty, J. (2005). The neoliberal paradox: the impact of destructive product
market competition and ‘modern’ financial markets on nonfinancial corporation
performance in the Neoliberal era. In G. Epstein (Ed.), Financialization and the
world economy, 77-110. Northampton: Edward Elgar.
[17] Crotty, J. (2009). Structural causes of the global financial crisis: a critical assess-
ment of the ‘new financial architecture’. Cambridge Journal of Economics 33 (4),
563-580.
[18] Cynamon, B. and S. Fazzari (2008). Household debt and the consumer age:
Source of growth – risk of collapse. Capitalism and Society 3 (2).
[19] D’Arista, J. and T. Schlesinger (1993). The parallel banking system. Economic
Policy Institute Briefing Paper.
[20] Davis, G. (2009). Managed by the markets. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[21] Davis, G., K. Diekmann, and C. Tinsley (1994). The decline and fall of the
conglomerate firm in the 1980s: the deinstitutionalization of an organizational
form. American Sociological Review 59 (4), 547-570.
[22] Davis, L. (2013). Financialization and the nonfinancial corporation: an inves-
tigation of firm-level investment behavior in the U.S.: 1971-2011, University of
Massachusetts Department of Economics Working Paper #2013-08.
[23] Demir, F. (2008). Financial liberalization, private investment and portfolio
choice: financialization of real sectors in emerging markets. Journal of Devel-
opment Economics 88 (2), 314-324.
[24] Epstein, G. (2002). Financialization, rentier interests and central bank policy.
manuscript, Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst,
MA, December.
[25] Epstein, G. (2005). Introduction. In G. Epstein (Ed.), Financialization and the
world economy, 3-16. Northampton: Edward Elgar.
[26] Epstein, G. and J. Crotty (2013). How big is too big? On the social efficiency
of the financial sector in the United States. Political Economy Research Institute
Working Paper series #313.
143
[27] Epstein, G. and A. Jayadev (2005). The rise of rentier incomes in OECD coun-
tries: financialization, central bank policy, and labor solidarity. In G. Epstein
(Ed.), Financialization and the world economy, 46-76. Northampton: Edward
Elgar.
[28] Fazzari, S., R. Hubbard and B. Petersen (1988). Financing constraints and cor-
porate investment. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 141-206.
[29] Fligstein, N. (1990). The Transformation of Corporate Control. Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press.
[30] Foley, C., J. Fritz, S. Titman and G. Twite (2007). Why do firms hold so much
cash? A tax-based explanation. Journal of Financial Economics 86 (3), 1629-
1658.
[31] Fox, J. (2002, March 4). America’s most ad-
mired companies. Fortune Magazine. Online:
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune archive/2002/03/04/319114
/index.htm (accessed March 24, 2014).
[32] Froud, J., J. Sukhdev, A. Leaver, and K. Williams (2006). Financialization and
strategy: Narrative and numbers. New York: Routledge.
[33] Galbraith, J. (2012). Inequality and instability: a study of the world economy
before the great crisis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[34] Gezici, A. (2007). Investment under financial liberalization: channels of liquid-
ity and uncertainty. manuscript, Department of Economics, University of Mas-
sachusetts, Amherst, MA.
[35] Greenwood, R. and D. Scharfstein (2013). The growth of finance. The Journal
of Economic Perspectives 27 (2), 3-28.
[36] Grullon, G. and R. Michaely (2002). Dividends, share repurchases, and the sub-
stitution hypothesis. The Journal of Finance 57 (4), 1649-1684.
[37] Hein, E. and T. van Treeck (2010). ‘Financialisation’ in post-Keynesian models
of distribution and growth: a systematic review. In M. Setterfield (Ed.), Hand-
book of alternative theories of economic growth, 277-292. Northampton: Edward
Elgar.
[38] Holmstrom, B. and S. Kaplan (2001). Corporate governance and merger activity:
making sense of the 1980s and 1990s. Journal of Economic Perspectives 15 (2),
121-144.
[39] Jagannathan, M., C. Stephens and M. Weisback (2000). Financial flexibility
and the choice between dividends and stock repurchases. Journal of Financial
Economics 57 (3), 355-384.
144
[40] Jensen, M. (1986). Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers.
American Economic Review 76 (2), 323-329.
[41] Jensen, M. and K. Murphy (1990). Performance pay and top management in-
centives. Journal of Political Economy 98 (2), 225-264.
[42] Jorgenson, D. (1963). Capital theory and investment behavior. American Eco-
nomic Review 53 (2), 247-259.
[43] Kacperczyk, M. and P. Schanbl (2010). When safe proved risky: commercial
paper during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Journal of Economic Perspectives,
24 (1), 29-50.
[44] Kalecki, M. (1971). Selected essays on the dynamics of the capitalist economy
1933-1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[45] Keynes, J. (1936). The general theory of employment, interest and money. Lon-
don: Macmillan.
[46] Krippner, G. (2005). The financialization of the American economy. Socio-
Economic Review 3 (2), 173-208.
[47] Krippner, G. (2012). Capitalizing on crisis: The political origins of the rise of
finance. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
[48] Kuh, E. and J. Meyer (1957). Acceleration and related theories of investment:
an empirical inquiry. Review of economics and statistics 38 (3), 217-230.
[49] Lavoie, M. (1992). Foundations of Post Keynesian Anaysis. Northampton: Ed-
ward Elgar.
[50] Layne, R. and R. Christie (2008, Nov 12). GE wins
FDIC insurance for up to $139 billion in debt. Online:
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a3I211f0pz9s&
refer=home (accessed March 24, 2014).
[51] Lazonick, W. (2009). Sustainable prosperity in the new economy: New business
organization and high-tech employment in the United States. Kalamazoo: W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
[52] Lazonick, W. (2013). From innovation to financialization: how shareholder value
ideology is destroying the US economy. In M. Wolfson and G. Epstein (Eds.) The
handbook of the political economy of financial crises, 491-511. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
[53] Lazonick, W. and M. O’Sullivan (2000). Maximizing shareholder value: a new
ideology for corporate governance. Economy and Society 29 (1), 13-35.
[54] Levine, R (1997). Financial development and economic growth: views and
agenda. Journal of Economic Literature 35, 688-726.
145
[55] Lin, K. and D. Tomaskovic-Devey (2013). Financialization and US income in-
equality: 1970-2008. American Journal of Sociology, 118 (5), 1284-1329.
[56] Mason, J. (2013). What is business borrowing for? Available online:
slackwire.blogspot.com/2013/01/what-is-business-borrowing-for.html.
[57] Milberg, W. (2008). Shifting sources and uses of profits: sustaining US financial-
ization with global value chains. Economy and Society 37 (4), 420-451.
[58] Milberg, W. and D. Winkler (2010). Financialisation and the dynamics of off-
shoring in the USA. Cambridge Journal of Economics 34 (2), 275-451.
[59] Milberg, W. and D. Winkler (2013). Outsourcing economics: Global value chains
in capitalist development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[60] Minsky, H. (1975). John Maynard Keynes. McGraw Hill.
[61] Modigliani, F. and M. Miller (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and
the theory of investment. American Economic Review 48 (3), 261-297.
[62] Montecino, J., G. Epstein and I. Levina (2014). Long-term trends in intra-
financial sector lending in the U.S.: 1950-2012. Political Economy Research In-
stitute Working Paper #344.
[63] Ndikumana, L. (1999). Debt service, financing constraints, and fixed investment:
evidence from panel data. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 21 (3), 445-478.
[64] Orhangazi, O. (2008). Financialisation and capital accumulation in the non-
financial corporate sector. Cambridge Journal of Economics 32 (6), 863-886.
[65] Palley, T. (2007). Financialization: what is it and why it matters. Political Econ-
omy Research Institute Working Paper #153.
[66] Phillips, D. (2008, Dec 28). General Electric taps TARP for additional cap-
ital. CBSnews, Moneywatch. Online: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/general-
electric-taps-tarp-for-additional-liquidity/ (accessed March 24, 2014).
[67] Scott, R. and S. Pressman (2009). Consumer debt and the measurement of in-
equality in the US. Review of Social Economy 67 (2), 127-146.
[68] Skott, P. (1989). Conflict and effective demand in economic growth. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
[69] Skott, P. (2012). Pluralism, the Lucas critique and the integration of micro and
macro. University of Massachusetts Deaprtment of Economics Working Paper
no. 2012-04.
[70] Skott, P. (2013). Increasing inequality and financial instability. Review of Radical
Political Economics 45 (4), 478-488.
146
[71] Skott, P. and F. Guy (2013). Power, luck and ideology in a model of executive pay.
University of Massachusetts Department of Economics Working Paper #2013-
01.
[72] Skott, P. and S. Ryoo (2009). Macroeconomic implications of financialisation.
Cambridge Journal of Economics 32 (6), 827-862.
[73] Stockhammer, E. (2004). Financialisation and the slowdown of accumulation.
Cambridge Journal of Economics 28 (5), 719-741.
[74] Stockhammer, E. (2006). Shareholder value and the investment-profit puzzle.
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 28 (2), 193-215.
[75] Stout, L. (2012). The shareholder value myth: How putting shareholders first
harms investors, corporations and the public. Berrett-Koehler Publishers.
[76] Taub, J. (2010). Comment letter on advance notice of proposed rulemaking re-
garding authority to require supervision and regulation of certain nonbank fi-
nancial companies. SAFER Policy Brief #26.
[77] Taub, J. (2013). What we don’t talk about when we talk about banking. In M.
Wolfson and G. Epstein (Eds.) The handbook of the political economy of financial
crises, 447-466. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[78] Tichy, N. and R. Charan. Speed, simplicity, self-confidence: An interview with
Jack Welch. In J Gabarro (Ed.) Managing people and organizations, 432-446.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
[79] Timmons, H. (2002, April 7). Does GE Capital deserve that AAA? Business Week
Magazine. Online: http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2002-04-07/does-ge-
capital-deserve-that-aaa (accessed March 24, 2014).
[80] Tirole, J. (2005). The theory of corporate finance. Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
[81] Tobin, J. (1965). Money and economic growth. Econometrica 33 (4), 671-684.
[82] Tomaskovic-Devey, D. and K. Lin (2011). Income dynamics, economic rents,
and the financialization of the US economy. American Sociological Review 76 (4),
538-559.
[83] van Treeck, T. (2008). Reconsidering the investment-profit nexus in finance-led
economies: an ARDL-based approach. Metroeconomica 59 (3), 371-404.
[84] van Treeck, T. (2009). A synthetic, stock-flow consistent macroeconomic model
of distribution and growth. Cambridge Journal of Economics 33 (3), 467-493.
147
